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ABSTRACT OF THESIS 
The twentieth century has been called the "century of eschatology" because this doctrine expanded to include 
many elements of theology that had previously been neglected as germane to "the end times." As a result of 
movements which began in the nineteenth century, all of contemporary theology has been "eschatologized" to 
the point where eschatology has become the instrumental hermeneutic through which all other theological 
motifs are interpreted. In particular, there has been a resurgence of philosophical, theological, and scientific 
inquiry into the concept of time and its ontological status in determining the nature of reality. This resurgence 
has led to significant implications for the definition of God's eternity. 
In this dissertation I examine the relationship between time and eternity in twentieth century Reformed 
eschatology by analyzing the work of three Reformed theologians who benefit from and inform their 
respective generations' understanding of eschatology. In the work of H. R. Mackintosh, Emil Brunner, and 
Jurgen Moltmann, one finds a redefmition of time as it relates to God's eternity. Each theologian strategically 
deals with the dominant legacies of Idealism and Materialism from the nineteenth century in defending the 
centrality of eschatological hope for Christian faith. 
Through their work, one understands why a contemporary eschatological interpretation of time departs from 
the traditional Boethian view of eternity as sheer timelessness in favor of a more comprehensive view of 
eternity as part of God's own being which God shares with creation. Thus, the theology of time has become a 
hotly-debated topic within eschatological discussions, focusing on the nature of God's eternity and the human 
experience of time. 
The debate over time and eternity also has repercussions for christology as all of Jesus' life is re-interpreted as 
an eschatological event which reveals God's will for the world. The Christ event is an act of eschatological 
revelation, and therefore doctrines which deal with the person and work of Christ are re-examined through the 
lens of the time-eternity relation. We see that twentieth century eschatology reshaped the understanding of 
time and eternity in that eternity is now understood to be a description of God's being which incorporates time. 
Eternity is descriptive of the quality of God's life rather than God's timelessness. For human beings, temporal 
life is marked by transience, change, and death, while eternal life characterizes living in the fullness of God's 
presence. As a result of faith, eternal life has begun now for human beings in a provisional way . We have 
also seen how the resurrection of Jesus was an eschatological event that ushered in the new eschatological eon 
for creation. The process of creation's transition from temporality to eternity began at the resurrection and will 
be completed at the consummation. Thus, Reformed eschatology now unites all of created reality, including 
space and time, to the person and work of Christ as he brings in the eschatological kingdom of God. 
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Chapter One 
Redefining Time: Project Goal 
God is eternal. This statement seems to be, on the surface, a simple 
declaration regarding one of God's attributes. It is one of the basic confessions of 
faith, drawn from the biblical witness of a God who is transcendent over all temporal 
creation. Jewish and Christian scriptures contain numerous ascriptions to a God who 
is above and beyond the parameters of time. Among them, Psalm 90 proclaims God's 
transcendence in that "before the mountains were born or you brought forth the earth 
and the world, from everlasting to everlasting you are God." Likewise, Isaiah 40 
expresses faith in a God who surveys the passage of time from an eternal vantage 
point: "Do you not know? Have you not heard? The Lord is the everlasting God, the 
Creator of the ends of the earth. He will not grow tired or weary, and his 
understanding no one can fathom." Hebrews 13 extols the endless continuity in Jesus 
Christ who "is the same yesterday and today and forever." Jesus himself incurs the 
wrath of many when he asserts in John 8 that "before Abraham was, I am."} Faith in 
God is always accompanied by a belief that the eternal God is transcendent above 
history and not subject to the passage of time in the same way that creatures are. 
Classical doctrinal statements regarding God link eternity with other attributes 
In order to describe God's absolute and unlimited life. Within the Reformed 
Tradition, when the Westminster Confession of Faith articulates its doctrine of God, it 
does so by assigning superlative characteristics to the God who is the opposite of 
humanity, so that God is "infinite in being and perfection, a most pure spirit, invisible, 
without body, parts, or passions, immutable, immense, eternal, incomprehensible, 
1 Other important passages regarding God's transcendence over time include Genesis 1: 1; Proverbs 
8:22-30; Isaiah 43:10; Isaiah 57:15; Malachi 3:6; John 1:1-3; Colossians 1:17; James 1:17; 1 Peter 
1 :20; and 2 Peter 3:8. 
1 
almighty, most wise, most holy, most free, most absolute.,,2 Such statements of God's 
transcendent being are echoed throughout history as the church links God's eternity to 
an infinite existence void of any change. 
Scratching just below the surface of this seemingly simple belief in God's 
eternity, however, reveals many complexities in modem theology concerning what it 
means to ascribe the concept of eternity to God, mainly how eternity and time are 
related. In his eternity is God completely void of time and therefore timeless, or is 
eternity an endless duration of time and therefore temporal? To claim that God is 
"everlasting" and without beginning or end does not answer the question, and 
proponents of both divine temporality and divine timelessness mount impressive 
arguments based on many of the same scriptural references.3 Indeed, the task of 
defining of God's relationship to time is obscured by the abundance of biblical 
passages that, taken together, lack a unified definition of either time or eternity.4 
Consequently, James Barr has noted that "if such a thing as a Christian doctrine of 
time has to be developed, the work of discussing it and developing it must belong not 
to biblical but to philosophical theology."s To be sure, inquiring into the meaning of 
the eternal God's relation to temporality raises numerous philosophical and 
theological questions. 
If God's being eternal means that God is completely timeless, then are all 
measurements of time irrelevant when applied to God? What is the composition and 
meaning of history, the "progress" of time, if God is timeless? Are all moments in 
time simultaneously present to God, and if they are, then is not every moment 
predetermined by God without any possible alternatives? Does being eternal 
2 "The Westminster Confession of Faith," in The Constitution a/the Presbyterian Church: Part 1, Book 
a/Confessions (Louisville, KY: Office ofthe General Assembly, 1996),6.011. 
3 Alan G. Padgett, God, Eternity, and the Nature a/Time (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), chp. 2. 
4 Paul Helm, Eternal God (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988),5-11. 
5 James Barr, Biblical Words for Time (London: SCM Press, 1962), 149. 
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necessarily mean that God is immutable and cannot expenence any changes in 
relation to creatures? Can an immutable and impassable God really be the personal 
God who sustains creation, who reveals himself to the men and women he loves, and 
who calls Israel and the church into being? Since God creates and interacts with 
temporal creatures, which surely God does according to the Bible, then is not God 
affected by changes in such a way that renders God temporal as well? Saying that 
God is eternal is no simple utterance, and it quickly raises many implications for 
theology and faith. The subjects of time and eternity, consequently, have been 
prominent areas of study in the history of Christian theology, and the last one hundred 
years in particular have seen a resurgence of theological inquiry into the idea that God 
is eternal. 
In an insightful essay that analyzes the resurgence of eschatology in twentieth 
century theology, Christoph Schwabel claims that "when one looks back on the 
history of theological thought in the twentieth century one cannot avoid the 
impression that it could correctly be called the century of eschatology.,,6 Schwabel 
makes this claim by carefully tracing several key developments which increased the 
scope of eschatology for theology, and he helpfully identifies particular areas of 
eschatological thought where unique contributions were made to strengthen and 
expand eschatology's significance for theology as a whole. Schwabel's most 
significant conclusion is that contemporary theology's renewed appreciation for 
eschatology has resulted in a highly-nuanced understanding of the relationship 
between time and eternity. As the subjects of time and eternity have generated more 
and more intellectual curiosity, modem theologians, philosophers, and scientists have 
6 Christoph Schwobel, "Last Things First?: The Century of Eschatology in Retrospect," The Future as 
God's Gift, ed. David Fergusson and Marcel Sarot (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 2000), 217-241. 
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engaged in much fruitful dialogue in a quest to better understand the relationship 
between of time and eternity for a variety of fields. 
As a result of this dialogue, what it means in modem theology to say that God 
is eternal is nothing simplistic at all! To the contrary, it is a statement that is hotly 
debated from the variety of angles mentioned above, and there is no uniformity of 
opinion when it comes to describing the nature of God's eternity and how an eternal 
God relates to a temporal creation. As a result of this theological debate, twentieth 
century theology, under the rubric of eschatology, reveals several important 
developments in the ways in which temporality and the human experience of it are 
enveloped in and confronted by the eternity of God. The evolving understanding of 
God's eternity is crucial in modem theology because, as Nelson Pike has stated, "the 
position that a theologian takes on the topic of divine eternity has a kind of controlling 
effect on the general shape and texture of his broad theological view about the nature 
of God."7 Pannenberg likewise assesses that "the relation between time and eternity 
is the crucial problem in eschatology, and its solution has implications for all parts of 
Christian doctrine.,,8 Within modem theology the conundrum of the time/eternity 
dialectic has far-reaching consequences for so many doctrines that are basic to 
Christian belief. 
7 Nelson Pike, God and Timelessness (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1970), ix. 
8 Pannenberg rightly goes on to link the question of time's relation to eternity to many other aspects of 
doctrine by saying: "The identity of those who will be raised with those who are now alive; the relation 
of the future of God's kingdom at the end of history to its being present in the work of Jesus; the 
relation of the general resurrection of the dead at the return of Jesus Christ to the fact that even at death 
those who sleep in him are already with him, so that their fellowship with him is not broken; the 
relation of the return of Jesus himself to his earthly work; and last but not least the relation of the 
eternal kingdom of God and his world government to the futurity of his kingdom - all these are 
questions and themes that are without answers, and the substance of which cannot be understood, so 
long as we do not clarify the relation between time and eternity. But the answers we give here affect 
also our understanding of human creatureliness in distinction from its corruption by sin, and they 
obviously have ramifications also for our understanding of God's economy of salvation as a whole in 
its relation to the inner trinitarian life of God." Wolfhart Pannenberg, Systematic Theology, v. 3, trans. 
Geoffrey W. Bromily (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1998),595-596. 
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For example, if one subscribes to a theory of God's absolutely timeless 
existence, on the one hand, then critical implications arise regarding God's 
immutability and the determinism of divine decrees. If one asserts, on the other hand, 
that God's eternity does not mean timelessness but everlasting temporality, then God 
is capable experiencing duration and change. This view affects one's doctrine of 
creation and God's immanence within it and sovereignty over it. A person's 
understanding of God's eternity informs her doctrine of the incarnation of the Son of 
God in time and how this event affects God's eternal being. Theological definitions 
of human life, atonement, eternal life, and other doctrinal areas are fed by the position 
one takes regarding the relationship of eternity to time. 
As we shall see, the major impetus of recent theologies of time and eternity is 
a move away from the traditional theological account of eternity as sheer 
timelessness. The classical approach, which was the dominating hermeneutic 
throughout ancient and medieval theology, regards God as absolutely timeless. For 
the timeless God of orthodoxy, all moments in time are eternally "present" to God and 
all events exist in a divine timeless simultaneity. This, in tum, leads to inescapable 
conclusions regarding God's immutability and inability to experience any duration or 
succession in relation to the temporal process. It is this traditional defmition of the 
timelessness of God that undergoes tremendous critique and refinement within 
twentieth century eschatology. 
Schwobel's assessment of twentieth century eschatology begins with his belief 
that the Historical Quest movement initiated by Schweitzer and Weiss began to raise 
theology's eschatological awareness to an unprecedented level. It was this movement 
in modem theology that proved to be the wedge that precipitated the opening of the 
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parameters of eschatology to include time and eternity. 9 The broadening scope of 
eschatological boundaries occurred mainly through new approaches to time and 
eternity in the fields of science, theology, and philosophy, and consequently 
eschatology came to include much more than the traditional "end-time" topics of 
death, judgment, heaven, and hell. With a renewed concentration on the concepts of 
time and eternity, "eschatology could therefore no longer be relegated to a harmless 
little chapter at the end of dogmatics, as Barth characterized the place of the 'last 
things' in their ordinary dogmatic treatment, but had to be understood as the 
perspective which determines the theological enterprise from the start. ,,10 The 
growing importance of eschatology for all of theology has resulted in a redefinition of 
time and eternity within the twentieth century that I will examine through the work of 
three particular theologians whose work has been highly regarded within academic 
and ecclesiastical circles. 
The goal of this dissertation is to examine the diverging aspects of time in 
relation to eternity in twentieth century Reformed eschatology, and to accomplish this 
goal I will focus on the work of three Reformed theologians whose careers form a 
traceable progression of thought during the last one hundred years. The three 
Reformed theologians whose work I have chosen to explore are Hugh Ross 
Mackintosh, Emil Brunner, and Jiirgen Moltmann. They are systematic theologians 
who became increasingly aware of the eschatological implications of theology, and 
they pay special attention to the New Testament's claims for the eschatological future 
on account of the person and work of Jesus Christ. Comparing and contrasting their 
views on time and eternity will yield the dividend of a better understanding of the 
9 Albert Schweitzer, The Quest of the Historical Jesus: A Critical Study of Its Progress from Reimarus 
to Wrede, trans. W. Montgomery (London: Adam & Charles Black, 1910); Johannes Weiss, Jesus' 
Proclamation of the Kingdom of God, trans. Richard H. Hiers (London: SCM Press, 1971). 
10 Schwobel, "Last Things First?" 222. 
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significance of eschatology within modem theology. Studying their views on time 
and eternity will also reveal several aspects of their work that have not yet been 
described in print. 
The choice of Mackintosh, Brunner, and Moltmann is two-fold. The first 
reason relates to the chronological sequence of their work. Dividing the twentieth 
century into three fairly even periods coincides closely to their theological careers: 
Mackintosh worked in the first one-third of the century, Brunner in the second, and 
Moltmann in the third. Thus, we gain a sense of the progression of eschatological 
thought by following their combined work over a one hundred year span. Each one is 
shaped by the dominant theological and philosophical influences of their day as well 
as the scientific discoveries and cultural events in the larger world. Studying their 
work within this chronological framework will reveal both the continuity and change 
in theology regarding time and eternity as one period gave way to the next. 
H. R. Mackintosh represents an early renewal of inquiry into eschatological 
perspectives, and even though his eschatological views are not as well-known or as 
well-developed as later theologians, Mackintosh serves as an important early figure in 
the resurgence of this doctrine. Mackintosh's position in the early part of the century 
displays his dependence upon and subsequent break from the legacy of liberalism that 
pervades late nineteenth and early twentieth century thought. In his work he 
strategically steers a theological course between the idealism and materialism that 
dominates the philosophical and theological endeavors of the early twentieth century. 
Emil Brunner was a tremendously influential theologian who contributed 
greatly to the doctrine of eschatology during the middle years of the twentieth 
century, and Brunner, who is widely described as a theologian within the "neo-
orthodox" movement, represents a generation of dialectical theologians whose work 
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incorporates a thoroughly eschatological outlook. 11 I recognIze that there IS a 
problem of speaking in these terms in that "neo-orthodoxy" too often serves as a 
generalization of the work of several mid-twentieth century theologians. The work of 
Barth, Brunner, Neibuhr, and Tillich, among others, cannot be simplistically labeled 
as neo-orthodox as if their work neatly merges together within one school of 
thought.
12 
Nevertheless, Brunner served as a major influence on theologians and 
pastors alike during the middle years of the twentieth century, and it was through his 
writings that many in the United States and Europe were introduced to those 
mentioned above. 13 
In addition to Mackintosh and Brunner, I will also assess the tremendous 
developments in eschatological thought regarding time and eternity that are proposed 
by Jiirgen Moltmann during the final one-third of the century. As a late-twentieth 
century theologian, Moltmann displays an acutely sensitive approach to the radical 
nature of evil that only a theologian working in a post-Holocaust context could 
produce. He is intensely aware of the ways in which evil thwarts God's intentions, 
11 For definitions of neo-orthodoxy, see James Richmond, "Neo-Orthodoxy," in The Westminster 
Dictionary of Christian Theology, ed. John Bowden and Alan Richardson (philadelphia: Westminster 
Press, 1983), 395; Langdon Gilkey, "Neo-orthodoxy," in A Handbook of Christian Theology, ed. 
Arthur A. Cohen and Marvin Halverson (Cleveland: World Publishing Co., 1958),256-261. 
12 Bruce McCormack has carefully delineated several reasons why the neo-orthodox descriptor is 
unsuitable for Barth's work in comparison to Brunner and others. See Bruce L. McCormack, Karl 
Barth's Critically Realistic Dialectical Theology: Its Genesis and Development 1909-1936 (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1995), 1-28. 
13 See Gary Dorrien, Theology Without Weapons: The Barthian Revolt in Modem Theology (Louisville: 
John Knox Press, 2000), 6-13. Since Brunner's theology is often associated, in both comparison and 
contrast, with that of Karl Barth, a fair question to ask in this discussion is why one might choose 
Brunner over Barth as a mid-century theologian to investigate. Certainly, Barth incorporates into his 
theology the eschatological elements of Christian doctrine in very significant ways. I have chosen 
Brunner over Barth, however, for the primary reason of bringing to light an aspect of Brunner's 
theology that has not yet received the attention of scholarship. Unlike Barth, Brunner's eschatological 
views, in particular those of time and eternity, have not received nearly the same amount of research 
and attention as Barth's have. Brunner is often overlooked as an example of a mid-twentieth century 
dialectical theologian who fully embraces eschatology in an attempt to reclaim it at the center of 
systematic theology. Some work of research must be done to shed light on Brunner's approach to time 
and eternity, whereas Barth has been and continues to be extensively probed in regard to his 
eschatology. Analyses of Barth's theology of time and eternity include Colin Gunton, Becoming and 
Being: The Doctrine of God in Charles Hartshorne and Karl Barth (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1978), 177-185; Richard H. Roberts, "Barth's Doctrine of Time," in Karl Barth (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1979), 88-146. 
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and he strives to demonstrate how eschatological hope is the only means by which 
humanity may look forward to the future in the midst of contemporary injustice and 
suffering. Moltmann is important also for the ways in which he represents a 
generation that is concerned with the enormous ecological problems that face the 
world, and he incorporates into his eschatology a dimension which addresses the 
future of creation as well as humanity. Moltmann offers several unique propositions 
regarding time, eternity, and the eschatological future for a creation that is plagued by 
social and ecological disasters. 
The second reason behind my choice of these three for analysis is that their 
work reveals the major theological and philosophical shift that took place within 
eschatology during the twentieth century. As a direct result of their views on time and 
eternity, their theology reveals a trend of moving away from the emphasis on God's 
eternity as timelessness that we find in traditional theology eternity toward a view of 
God's eternity as inclusive of time. God's eternity incorporates temporality and 
makes it possible. God's dynamic eternity will allow for the prospect that certain 
attributes of God are immutable, while God also experiences types of change and 
duration in relation to creation, and in particular, to human beings. Each theologian 
shares a desire to incorporate temporal history within a larger eschatological 
framework of God's purposes, and their efforts share common themes, as well as 
defmite differences, in their propositions of how the eternal God interacts with 
creation. 
The narrative format that I have chosen for this work is best described as a 
tensed approach: through the genres of the past, present, and future tenses of time. 
This approach in itself reveals my own belief that reality is the dynamic process of 
God's continual engagement with creation and with humanity. Using the tenses of 
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time are an absolute necessity if we are to speak of God in meaningful way, a way 
which is much different to an approach based on a static theory of time, which I shall 
define in due course. Twentieth century theology's move to pull eschatology out of 
the future "end times" and into present reality greatly alters how we define the 
experiences of the past, present, and future. This move affects how we view the 
human experience of time as temporal beings who are invited to share, in part, in the 
eternity of God. Therefore, each chapter focuses on how the distinct tenses of time -
past, present, and future - come into play in the descriptions of eschatological 
doctrines by Mackintosh, Moltmann, and Brunner. I will analyze what theories of 
time and eternity each theologian pre-supposes in order to propose the positions they 
hold regarding different aspects of Christian doctrine. In particular, we shall see how 
Mackintosh, Brunner, and Moltmann describe the time-eternity relation in the 
christological doctrines of the incarnation, crucifixion, and resurrection and how these 
are defined as eschatological events. 
A cautionary word must be said about the nature of this project regarding the 
possibilities of examining each of these theologians. Anyone of them alone could 
serve as the topic of an in-depth examination regarding time and eternity. Given the 
voluminous writings of Brunner and Moltmann, especially, each supplies enough 
material for analysis to occupy one's attention until the end times. The purpose of this 
project is not to probe the innumerable theological intricacies of each theologian. The 
goal is to understand the nuances of time and eternity in Reformed eschatology 
through their views and to offer, by comparison and contrast of their work, insights 
into the evolving definitions of time and eternity during the twentieth century. 
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Reality as "Tensed" 
Before we assess our three theologians' views of time in relation to eternity, 
we should outline some working assumptions regarding time and how we experience 
it. At the beginning of the twentieth century, J. M. E. McTaggert analyzed the two 
basic ways in which events in time can be described, and he provided theologians and 
philosophers alike with the terminology necessary to describe temporal reality:4 
While his views have been altered and expounded upon, his division of time into the 
A -series and B-series has proven to be instrumental in defming the relation of 
temporal events and the nature of time. McTaggert's two theories of time have other 
names which are generally used interchangeably by philosophical and theological 
theorists of time. The A-series is known also as tensed or dynamic, while the B-series 
is frequently associated with the terms tenseless or static. I5 I prefer to employ the 
terms tensed/dynamic and tenseless/static because they are more descriptive of the 
ontological nature of events than are the monikers A-series and B-series. 
According to the tensed theory of time, events are ordered by the temporal 
predicates of past, present, or future, and time is described as dynamic because there 
is real change and becoming in the passage of time. Events that are future eventually 
are experienced as present and then past and are ontologically described as such. I6 
14 J. M. E. McTaggert, "The Unreality of Time," in Mind 17 (1908), 457-474; republished in 
McTaggert, The Nature of Existence, v. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1927), chp. 33. 
15 William Lane Craig helpfully delineates the several different "families" of theories that are 
subsumed under both the A -series and B-series theories of time, but for our purposes it is relevant to 
note only the primary aspects of both theories and that he uses the various terms interchangeably. See 
his extensive analysis of both theories in Craig, The Tensed Theory of Time (Dordrecht: Kluwer 
Academic Press, 2000), and Craig, The Tenseless Theory of Time (Dordrecht: Kluwer Acadmic Press, 
2000). 
16 The reliance on linguistic theory to describe the ontological nature of time has been carefully 
outlined by several modem philosophers. Gorman and Wessman have observed that "all four thousand 
or so known languages enable their speakers to designate temporal relationships and to distinguish 
between past, present, and future events - though with varying degrees of difficulty." Bernard S. 
Gorman and Alden E. Wessman, "The Emergence of Human Awareness and Concepts of Time," in 
The Personal Experience of Time, ed. Bernard S. Gorman and Alden E. Wessman (New York: Plenum 
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A tensed theory of time accounts for temporal succession and the claim that what is 
present is what is real. 17 Events in the present are real, events in the future are not yet 
real, and events in the past were real but are no longer. The present is given primacy 
over the past and the future because what it present is real and, therefore, true This 
means that change is necessarily the determining factor in the tensed description of 
events as there can be no time without change. This type of change, however, is 
extrinsic rather than intrinsic. An extrinsic change involves change in an object's 
relation to another object, while an intrinsic change is a non-relational change 
involving only the subject. I8 Extrinsic changes are the signifiers that time has 
elapsed. 19 Due to changes that occur over time, there is an ontological distinction 
between the tenses of events that must be past, present, or future, and this distinction 
is measured by the changing status of a thing or event. 
Defining dynamic time, therefore, is a matter of tense in that tense ultimately 
reveals the basic truth of a real event: it was, is, or will be. Because events come into 
existence and then cease to exist, tensed descriptions change truth-values as there is a 
real difference between an event that exists in the present and an event which is either 
past or future and therefore does not exist. Because future events do not exist now 
they do not exist at all and there are conceivably innumerable future events that can 
emerge out of the present. 20 Potential future events are not actually real while they 
Press, 1977), 44-45; See also Richard Gale, The Language of Time (New York: Humanities Press, 
1968); Quentin Smith, Language and Time (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993); and D. H. 
Mellor, Real Time (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981). 
17 A. N. Prior, "The Notion of the Present," in Studium Generale 23 (1970): 245-248; David Lewis, On 
the Plurality of Worlds (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986),203-204. 
18 An example of an object's intrinsic change would be an apple's change from green to red. The apple 
has not changed in relation to anything but itself. A parent, however, will extrinsically change in 
height in relation to a child who grows taller. The change is not due to any change in height of the 
parent but to the intrinsic change of the height of the child. In relation to each other, they change 
extrinsically. See Richard Swinburne, The Coherence of Theism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), 
211-215; 
19 William Carter and Scott Hestevold, "On Passage and Persistence," in American Philosophical 
Quarterly 31 (1994),269-283. 
20 Storrs McCall, "Objective Time Flow," in Philosophy of Science 43 (1976), 337-362. 
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still exist in the future, but if one of the possible future events become present, i.e. 
real, then there is a change in the ontological status of the event where it posses a 
truth-value that it lacked while only in the future. For this reason, a tensed theory of 
time sees time's passage from the future into the present to be a fundamental element 
of objective reality - the becoming actual of non-actual future events. 21 
The B-series, tenseless theory of time differs from the tensed approach in that 
it disallows change and temporal becoming: events are permanently fixed according 
to their position in relation to other events. The temporal relation between events is 
not described in terms of past, present, or future but as prior to, simultaneous with, or 
later than. There are not multiple possible events that could emerge from the future 
because all events already exist in relation to each other. When events are viewed as 
fixed in time, then time is actually static, and there is no becoming of events because 
they already exist in relation to each other. There is no such thing as change because 
all temporal events exist independently of an observer who may describe one event as 
"present" depending on his location in the time-series. 
The notion of change is, therefore, mind-dependent upon the one who 
observes an event as either before or after another event. In a tenseless reality, 
though, all events exist equally in time and are therefore real. 22 They exist tenselessly 
because there is no basic ontological distinction between events. The tensed terms of 
past, present, and future are descriptions that matter only for a human observer.23 In a 
tenseless reality, events all exist objectively and concurrently at locations in time, and 
21 Brian Leftow, Time and Eternity (Cornell, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991), 17-18. 
22 On the mind-dependency of tense, Adolf Griinbaum writes: "Coming into being (or becoming) is not 
a property of physical events themselves but only of human or conscious awareness of these events." 
Griinbaum, "The Anisotropy of Time," in The Nature of Time, ed. by T. Gold (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1967), 153. 
23 Albert Einstein, who had much to say about time, adopted this static view of time, and therefore he 
could write to his lifelong friend Michael Besso's survivors upon Besso's death that "this signifies 
nothing. For us believing physicists the distinction between past, present, and future is only an illusion, 
even if a stubborn one." Letter of Albert Einstein, March 21, 1955, quoted in Banesh Hoffman with 
Helen Dukas, Albert Einstein: Creator and Rebel (London: Hart-Davis, MacGibbon, 1972) 258. 
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what is "now" depends solely on the position of the subjective witness of an event. 
Since future events are already real, there is no ontological change in status due to 
their becoming present. Consequently, the passage of time is not an objective feature 
of reality: it is only a matter of human perception. Time is therefore static if reality is 
tenseless, and time does not flow outside the human experience of change and 
transience. 
Adherents to a tenseless view of time tend to speak of reality as a "Block 
Universe" because time occupies a fourth dimension of space.24 The universe exists 
in a framework of total simultaneity, where all events exist in a static singularity 
while only perceived by observers as past, present, and future. Based on Einstein's 
descriptions of time's relativity, reality is conceived as the totality of all moments 
existing in a static universe, as John Lucas describes: 
Relativity regards time as a dimension, like, although not entirely like, 
the dimensions of space. It encourages us to treat space-time 
geometrically, and in general relativity to fuse geometry and physics in 
a single geometrodynamics. It is an inevitable concomitant of this 
approach that we take a block view of the universe in which the future 
course of events is already laid out as a path ... The future already 
exists: it is only that we do not yet know what is in store for us, and 
only discover that as we crawl along our world-line. More cogently, it 
argues that there cannot be a real, modal or ontological, difference 
between future and past, because the present - the instant that divides 
past from future - depends on our criterion of simultaneity, and our 
criterion of simultaneity depends on our frame of reference.25 
24 An idea first proposed by Hermann Minkowski in 1908 in response to Einstein's work on the Special 
Theory of Relativity. Minkowski, "Space and Time," in The Principles of Relativity, by A. Einstein, et 
aI., trans. W. Perrett and G. B. Jeffery (New York: Dover Publications, 1952.) See also Hilary Putnam, 
"Time and Physical Geometry," in The Journal of Philosophy, 64 (April 1967), 240-247; Donald C. 
Williams, Principles of Empirical Realism (Springfield: Charles C. Thomas, 1966); Roger Penrose, 
"Big Bangs, Black Holes, and 'Time's Arrow,'" in The Nature of Time, ed. by Raymond Flood and 
Michael Lockwood, 37-62. 
25 John R. Lucas, "The Open Future," in The Nature of Time, ed. Raymond Flood and Michael 
Lockwood (New York: Blackwell, 1986), 130. 
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Regarding temporal events as statically fixed, as in a tenseless, block universe, thus 
disregards the nature of change and becoming that is crucial to the tensed portrayal of 
reality?6 
The main point of contention between theorists of time is which one - the 
tensed or tenseless -- should be given priority over the other as a more apt description 
of reality. Michael Tooley describes the drama of this debate by stating that it is 
"the most fundamental question in the philosophy of time: whether a static or a 
dynamic conception of the world is correct.,,27 McTaggert argues that the A-series is 
the more basic way of describing time because B-series statements of reality are 
reducible to and dependent upon the A-series, but not vice-versa. He gains this 
insight by claiming that the A -series is necessary to account for change, since there 
cannot be time without change. McTaggert argues that whatever is a necessary 
condition for the possibility of change is also a necessary condition for the existence 
of time, and since the A-series is part of the analysis of change, it is a necessary 
condition for time. Since change cannot be described adequately in B-series terms, 
there cannot be a B-series without an A-series.28 Put another way, the dependency of 
tenseless statements upon tense suggests an ontological preference of tense as more 
descriptive of reality since tenseless statements can be understood in terms of tensed 
26 For views that are antagonistic toward the detenninism of a block universe, especially as it relates to 
the Special Theory of Relativity, see Paul Davies, God and the New Physics (London: J. M. Dent & 
Sons, Ltd., 1983), 131-132; Storrs McCall, "Temporal Flux," in American Philosophical Quarterly, 3 
(October 1966),271. 
27 Michael Tooley, Time, Tense, and Causation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 13. 
28 McTaggert is engaged here in a debate primarily with Russell who disagrees with McTaggert's 
analysis of the necessity of change as the ground of time. Contrary to McTaggert, Russell contends 
that change can be best described in tenns of a B-series ordering. His famous example is that of a hot 
poker that cools down, a fact of intrinsic change which B-series descriptions can best capture: (i) the 
poker is hot at one time; (ii) it is not hot at a later time. In the B-series these facts never change - they 
are true at all times. For Russell, the B-series is the basis of A-series statements. Thus, for Russell, 
change can be analyzed in B-series tenns only. For an object to change is for it to be in a certain state 
at one time and not in a state at a later time. Since A-series statements can be analyzed in terms of B-
series statements, the A-series is dependent, both onto logically and in tenns of the meaning of the 
statements, on the B-series. For more detailed analysis of the McTaggert-Russell debate, see Michael 
Dummett, "The Reality of the Past," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 69 (1968-1969), 239-258. 
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statements, but not vice-versa?9 McTaggert's analysis can be summarized in this 
way: 
1. B-series relations are temporal relations; 
2. There cannot be temporal relations unless there is change; 
3. There cannot be change unless time in reality has an A-series ordering; 
4. Therefore, there cannot be B-series relations unless time in reality has an 
A-series ordering. 
One would be tempted to conclude from this that McTaggert has answered the 
question of which theory of time is more reflective of reality. 
Unfortunately, McTaggert greatly clouds the issue by concluding that even 
though the A-series is more ontologically basic to reality, the A-series is inherently 
contradictory and, consequently, time is unreal. The A -series is unreal based on the 
proposition that "past, present, and future are incompatible determinations. Every 
moment must be one or the other, but no event can be more than one. But every 
moment has them all. If M is past, it has been present and future. ,,30 This conclusion, 
often termed "McTaggert's paradox," maintains the while tense is basic to describing 
events, tensed descriptions are ultimately fallacious because one event cannot be in 
three tenses simultaneously. McTaggert concludes that the division of time into an A-
series is incoherent and cannot be used to make accurate statements about temporal 
reality.31 
Proponents of a block universe similarly dismiss a tensed view of reality 
primarily as a result of the Special Theory of Relativity. Adding time to the three 
dimensions of space creates a mathematically defensible structure of reality in which 
29 For example, the B-series statement P is earlier than Q may be reduced to the A-series statements 
that: P is past and Q is present, or P is present and Q is future, or P is past and Q is future, or P is 
more past than Q, or P is less future than Q. 
30 J. M. E. McTaggert, "The Unreality of Time," 466. 
31 For critiques of McTaggert's Paradox, see C. D. Broad, An Examination of McTaggert's Philosophy, 
2 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1938), 2:280-302; E. J. Lowe, "The Indexical Fallacy 
in McTaggert's Proof of the Unreality of Time," in Mind 96 (1987), 62-70; David J. Buller and 
Thomas R. Foster, "The New Paradox of Temporal Transcience," in Philosophical Quarterly 43 
(1992): 357-366. 
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all moments in time are fixed to a position in space.32 Einstein concluded that 
Relativity Theory is "distinctly in favor of the static picture and found in this 
representation of motion as something existing in time-space a more convenient and 
more objective picture of reality.,,33 Changes may take place in time, but space-time 
itself never changes, so that events in space-time are fixed in their location. A 
tenseless theory of time develops from relativity theory in that the structure of the 
space-time continuum never changes and does not include change and the becoming 
of events. 
Despite McTaggert's paradox and arguments for a block universe as proposed 
in Relativity Theory, defenders of a tensed theory of time assert that change and 
becoming are essential to the understanding of reality because reality itself is tensed. 
A dynamic view of time is fundamentally correct because tensed facts are not merely 
a product of language but are accurately descriptive of an objective reality: tense in 
language is reflective of tense in the world.34 The present is real in human experience 
while the past and future were and are not yet real. One argument in favor of a tensed 
reality is offered by the phenomenologist Edmund Husserl. He describes how 
necessary the categories of past, present, and future are to the human consciousness of 
time, and this consciousness is reflective of reality itself.35 Likewise, William 
Friedman says that the "division between past, present, and future so deeply 
permeates our experience that it is hard to imagine its absence" and that therefore 
32 Minkowski, "Space and Time," in The Principle of Relativity, by A. Einstein, et aI, trans. W. Perrett 
and G. B. Jeffry (New York: Dover Pulications: 1952), 76. 
33 Albert Einstein and Leopold Infeld, The Evolution of Physics (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1938), 
220. 
34 D. H. Mellor argues for a contrary view that results in tensed sentences being given tenseless truth 
conditions and that the present is therefore "unreal." See Mellor, Real Time (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1981), 26ff. . 
35 Edmund Hussed, The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness, ed. by M. Heldegger, trans. 
James Churchill (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1964). 
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human beings have "an irresistible tendency to believe in the present,,36 In their 
views, human beings are justified in holding a tensed view of reality because the 
distinctions between past, present, and future are basic to the human experience of 
time, and this experience is not illusory because time is real. One could argue in 
response that they are too dependent upon psychological interpretations of the 
experience of time, which is precisely the claim of adherents to a static view of 
reality. But to them, the experience of time is more than a psychological 
interpretation, it is the most basic way in which reality is structured. 
Probing arguments in favor of a dynamic conception of the universe have been 
issued in the last two decades in the work of several philosophers and theologians 
who propose varying theories which justify a tensed view of reality. They take into 
account the philosophical and mathematical/scientific implications of maintaining the 
ontological primacy of a tenseless/static reality, and these theologians offer 
convincing claims on why a tensed view of reality is correct from a Christian 
perspective and why we are correct to adhere to a dynamic theory of time. 37 Part of 
William Lane Craig's defense of a tensed reality is based on his refusal to give in to 
the claim that tense is only a matter of human observation and is therefore mind-
dependent. He follows the rationale of Alvin Plantinga to state that the belief in tense 
is a "properly basic belief' to human experience that we must hold unless it can be 
defeated by another belief.38 Craig writes: 
36 William Friedman, About Time (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990),92. 
37 Since we will be dealing exclusively with the theological and philosophical arguments of our three 
representative theologians, I believe it is beyond the scope of this dissertation to probe the detailed 
mathematical and scientific principles involved in the various approaches to both the dynamic and 
static views of temporality. For the scientific/mathematical computations, including aspect of relativity 
theory, involved in explaining dynamic and static time, see Craig's The Tensed Theory of Time and The 
Tenseless Theory of Time; Padgett, God, Eternity, and the Nature of Time, and Eternity, 82-95; and 
Michael D. Robinson, Eternity and Freedom: A Critical Analysis of Divine Timelessness as a Solution 
to the Foreknowledge/Free Will Debate (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1995),89-109. 
38 See Alvin Plantinga, "Reason and Belief in God," in Faith and Rationality, ed. by Alvin Plantinga 
and Nicholas Wolterstorff (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983),47-63. 
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Our belief in the reality of the external world is so deeply ingrained 
and strongly held than any successful defeater of this belief would 
have to possess enormous warrant. In the absence of any successful 
defeater, you are perfectly justified in taking your experience of the 
external world to be veridical. Now the advocate of a dynamic view of 
time may argue similarly concerning our belief in the past, present, and 
future. Belief in the objective reality of tense is a properly basic belief 
which is universal among mankind. It therefore follows that anyone 
who denies this belief (and who is not aware that he has no good 
defeaters of that belief) is irrational, for such a person fails to hold to a 
belief which is for him properly basic.39 
Tense is a fundamental belief based on one's real experience of past, present, and 
future, and therefore it is incoherent to suggest an alternative theory of tense less 
reality if it is never experienced by anyone. In the common experience of time by 
humanity, present experiences are present before they are past and after they are 
future.
4o 
To deny this claim is to make a statement that contradicts everyone's 
experience. Since tense is essential to the expression of reality, it is justifiable to 
claim that reality is itself tensed. 
Craig further defends the tensed theory of time by highlighting the experience 
of the present in contrast to the past and the future, about which we have different 
attitudes. We must employ the language of tense to speak about what we either 
remember or anticipate. Attitudes of regret or appreciation for the past and attitudes 
of dread or excitement for the future must be connected to tensed facts. One cannot 
describe attitudes toward the past or future without using tense, and such feelings 
would be irrational in a tenseless reality. Relief and excitement only make rational 
sense in dynamic time because they are grounded in the reality of temporal 
39 William Lane Craig, Time and Eternity (Wheaton, IL: Crossway Books, 2001), 132. After 
examining various views that oppose his, Craig also writes: "On a static theory of time we are all of us 
hopelessly mired in irrationality, prisoners to an illusion from which we are powerless to free 
ourselves. By contrast, if a dynamic theory of time is correct, our experiences and beliefs are entirely 
rational and appropriate. Thus, insofar as we think that such experiences are justified, we should 
embrace a dynamic theory of time." Craig, Time and Eternity, 142. 
40 This contrasts with what D. H. Mellor, a defender of tenseless reality, says regarding the illusory 
nature of present experiences. He goes so far as to claim that "although we observe our experiences to 
be present, it really isn't." See Mellor's rationale in, Real Time, 26-54. 
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becoming.41 The experience of temporal becoming is likewise basic to the human 
experience of time because we experience the world in continual flux and movement. 
If the static view of time, in which there is no objective present, were true, then there 
would be no way of logically anticipating the future and waiting for it to become 
present. Craig explains: 
When we wait for something to happen, we are experiencing the lapse 
of time in anticipation of some event. We do not merely experience 
the tenseless length of the temporal interval between our location and 
the location of the later event .... Rather there must be the experience of 
the passage of time. In the experience of waiting we apprehend 
temporal becoming, as things come to be and pass away until the 
anticipated event occurs. If the static view of time were correct, it 
would be irrational to wait for anything, since there is no temporal 
becoming. But such an experience is unavoidable.42 
The human experience of temporal becoming is so strong that it is counter-intuitive to 
propose a view of reality that does not acknowledge the passage of time as a real 
experience in our anticipation of any date in the future. Thus, by remembering the 
past and by anticipating the future, we give credence to our fundamental belief that 
reality itself is tensed. 
Alan Padgett undertakes a critique of the static view of time in God, Eternity, 
and the Nature of Time, and he similarly concludes that the arguments behind the 
static view of time are not convincing enough to negate the claim that reality is 
dynamic. Padgett does not discredit the arguments which defend the static time of a 
block universe, but in order to give it precedence there must be reasons for "adopting 
a stasis view of time as the only proper view of the physical universe as it is in 
itself.,,43 Padgett asserts that defenders of static time in a block universe make the 
basic mistake of "assuming the sufficiency of the Special Theory of Relativity for 
41 Craig, Time and Eternity, 137. 
42 Craig, Time and Eternity, 141. 
43 Padgett uses the term stasis instead of static in his work. Padgett, God, Eternity, and the Nature of 
Time, 93. 
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ontology, in particular for the theory oftime.,,44 He makes this claim after noting that 
the foundation for Relativity Theory involves certain unsustainable assumptions about 
the concept of simultaneity in the space-time continuum. In Padgett's view, there are 
no overriding philosophical claims which determine that a static view of reality is 
more fitting than a dynamic.45 
It is an argument from a theological standpoint that Padgett, Pike, and 
Swinburne, among others, make that I find the most compelling when considering the 
question of a tensed versus tenseless reality. We will delve more deeply into many 
aspects of this argument later, but for introductory purposes, it bears stating that from 
a Christian perspective reality is tensed because the world is the sphere in which a 
personal God acts to sustain creation and to redeem human beings in a relational 
way.46 The doctrine that God has created the world and sustains it is central to 
theism, and this view entails that God is intimately related to what he has made.47 
The personhood of God determines that reality is dynamic because God loves that to 
which he is related. 
Time is a necessary entity for the relationship between God and the world 
because this relationship depends on change, development, and growth between God 
and the "other" with whom he is related. In his argument against a timeless God, 
Robert Coburn claims that a timeless (Coburn uses the word eternal to mean timeless) 
being could not be personal because 
surely it is the necessary condition of anything's being a person that it 
should be capable (logically) of, among other things, doing at least 
some of the following: remembering, anticipating, reflecting, 
44 Padgett, God, Eternity, and the Nature a/Time, 92. 
45 Padgett, God, Eternity, and the Nature a/Time, 96. 
46 For criteria to establish personhood, see Daniel Dennett, "Conditions for Personhood," in The 
Identities a/Persons, ed. Amelie O. Rorty (Berkeley: University of Cali fomi a Press, 1976), 175-196. 
For aspects of God's personhood that are central to theism, see Swinburne, The Coherence a/Theism, 
99-125. 
47 Padget, God, Time and Eternity, 146; Pike, God and Timelessness, 110-111; Swinburne, The 
Coherence of Theism, 126-148. 
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deliberating, deciding, intending, and acting intentionally. To see that 
this is so, one need only to ask oneself whether anything which 
necessarily lacked all of the capabilities noted would, under any 
conceivable circumstances, count as a person. But now an eternal 
being would necessarily lack all of these capabilities inasmuch as their 
exercise by a being clearly requires that the being exist in time.48 
Coburn has been criticized for too quickly assuming that mental events involve 
duration within God's being, and his critics dismiss his words based primarily on 
aspects of God's omniscience.49 
What Coburn's critics fail to elaborate on is his phrase "acting intentionally," 
and I would add, "being acted upon." Any action of God within creation requires 
dynamic time because an action results in a change from what was to what is, so that 
Pike rightly claims that "responses are located in time after that to which they are 
responses.,,50 It would be impossible to reconcile the God of the Bible who acts, calls, 
and intervenes with a notion of a static reality. There is real growth and change in 
people's relationships with God, and there is a mutuality between God and persons 
who are the recipients of his actions on their behalf. 51 God acts upon and responds to 
his people in his relationship with them. As we shall see in our section on God's 
eternity, to act and be acted upon is to be changed in the real relation between the one 
who acts and the recipient of that action. Therefore, reality is dynamic because God 
is personal. 
48 Robert Coburn, "Professor Malcom on God", in Australasian Journal of Philosophy, v. 40-1, January 
(1962-3), 155. . '
49 Many have undertaken the argument that a timeless God could, theoretIcally, be personal, but that IS 
not my concern here. 1 am not concerned, at this point, with God's tem~o:ality or ~temporality. 1 ru:n 
concerned with whether time is dynamic or static, and 1 contend that It IS dynamlc because God IS 
personally related to what he has created. For the perso~?od of a timel~ss. Go~, .see Craig, Time ~~d 
Eternity, 79-86; Leftow, Time and Eternity, 283-309; WIlham E. Mann, SlIDpliclty and ImmutabIlity 
in God," International Philosophical Quarterly 23 (1983),267-276. 
50 Pike God and Timelessness, 128. 
51 William Hill, "Does the World Make a Difference to God?," Thomist 38 (1974), 146-164. 
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Placing Mackintosh, Brunner, and Moltmann 
within the Reformed Tradition 
The reinvigorated interest in eschatology and its sub-categories of time and 
eternity accelerated through the twentieth century's years of upheavals, terrible wars, 
and remarkable technological and scientific changes. Those who shined the light of 
scholarship and inquiry onto time and eternity include many luminaries of modem 
theology. These theologians recovered eschatology from the margins of academic 
interest and moved it to the center, and their writings remain some of the most in-
depth analyses of eschatology in the history of Christian thought. The three 
theologians serving as the subjects of this study made invaluable contributions to 
twentieth century theology and the understandings of time and eternity. The fact that 
these theologians belong to the Reformed Tradition connotes several key factors 
regarding their approach to theology, and their work reflects the main concerns of the 
tradition as they have been handed down from the Reformation era. There are many 
aspects of Reformed theology that guide the work of each theologian. The majesty 
and praise of God, a polemical view against idolatry, the sovereign freedom of God, 
and the radical nature of grace are but a few themes that course through the veins of 
their work. That each of these theologians is Reformed is clear from the prominence 
of these themes in their work, yet none is confmed to their tradition as if in a trap. 
There is a dogmatic richness to their theology that seeks to incorporate 
individual theological premises into a larger, systematic diagram. Each theologian is 
remarkably well-versed in the history of doctrine and its development through the 
Patristic and Medieval periods. Their work details the differences in Roman Catholic 
and Protestant theology as they developed in the centuries following the Reformation, 
and they are knowledgeable in the discrepancies between Eastern and Western 
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Christianity. Being well-versed in the development of doctrine informs their views as 
they are aware that they are heirs in a long line of theologians whose faith and work 
has preceded theirs. The Reformed tradition is ecumenical by nature, and 
Mackintosh, Brunner, and Moltmann are willing to engage other vantage points in 
agreement as well as in dissent in all aspects of their thought. Understanding their 
particular views on time and eternity will be aided by knowing something of their 
historical context as well as the major theological and philosophical influences on 
their work. 
Born In 1870, Mackintosh grew up amidst the Calvinism of a Scottish 
Highlands manse, although his was not a Scottish Calvinism of rigid orthodoxy. 
After the death of his parents during his childhood, Mackintosh was raised by an 
uncle who was a minister in the Free Church of Scotland. During his years of 
theological study, Mackintosh's intellectual perspectives were shaped by the Arts 
Faculty of Edinburgh University, especially Professor Pringle-Pattison, who 
impressed upon Mackintosh a deep appreciation for philosophy. Pringle-Pattison 
instilled in Mackintosh a thirst for philosophical inquiry, particularly in regard to the 
Hegelianism with which Mackintosh would be engaged throughout his career. The 
highly influential biblical scholars of his day, Marcus Dods and A. B. Davidson, also 
strengthened Mackintosh's dedication to the study of Scripture as the Word of God.52 
The high point of his theological learning came during his semesters of study 
in Germany in 1894 and 1895. During these years, he strengthened his command of 
the German language as well as numerous aspects of German theology. He studied 
under Ritschl and Herrmann, and he never relinquished admiration for either of these 
towering intellects. Mackintosh became quite familiar with the Ritschlian school 
52 Redman, Reformulating Reformed Theology, 20. 
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present in Scotland and on the Continent during the years of his study in Edinburgh 
and Marburg. Mackintosh carries on a continual dialogue with Ritschl in his work, 
and Herrmann remained a close friend to Mackintosh from their years of study 
together. 53 Throughout his writings Mackintosh remains indebted to these two 
thinkers. Often, however, Mackintosh cites Ritschl, not in agreement, but in contrast 
and criticism. While dependent on Ritschlian thought in many ways, Mackintosh 
differed from the Ritschlian school in several important areas. 54 
Upon completion of his years of study, Mackintosh assumed the pulpit of 
Queen Street Free Church in Tayport in 1897, and he remained an influential leader 
dedicated to the Scottish church for the rest of his life. In 1901 he moved to the 
Beechgrove congregation in Aberdeen and stayed there until his appointment at the 
age of thirty-four to the New College faculty in 1904, where he would stay until his 
death in 1936. He continued to preach regularly in pulpits across Scotland, and he 
always remained concerned about the theology of preaching and practice of ministry. 
He was fond of saying "what cannot be preached ought not to be believed," and he 
continually stressed the close connection between academic theology and the 
experiences of faith for the Christian. For him, the head and the heart needed to feed 
off of each other for authentic faith. Mackintosh served in many capacities of 
leadership in Scottish church life, chairing many committees and serving as 
Moderator of the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland in 1933. As an 
ecumenist and church leader, Mackintosh maintained his ties to the German church, 
53 Mackintosh's appreciation toward Herrmann is demonstrated in "Herrmann's ~ommunio~ of God," 
in Expository Times 40 (1928-29): 38-39, a book review in which Mackintosh wntes that thIS book by 
Herrmann "belongs to that small class of great books on theology ... which are also great books of 
devotion." 
54 Leitch, A Theology o/Transition, 27-35 
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and he expressed grave reservations over what was happening to the church in the 
early years of the Nazi regime.55 
Mackintosh maintained his ecumenical links throughout his career as 
professor at New College, and he is remembered fondly by students and colleagues 
who learned from his theological enterprise. Thomas F. Torrance writes that the 
lectures Mackintosh "gave us were often a form of ... 'rational worship.' And they 
were always evangelical and redemptive in their import ..... Mackintosh himself was 
so consumed with the moral passion of the Father revealed in the death of Jesus on the 
cross, that in his lecture room we often felt we were in a sanctuary, where the holiness 
and nearness of God were indistinguishable. ,,56 Mackintosh corresponded by letter 
with Barth on at least seventeen occasions, and the two met in person once, leaving 
Barth with "an unforgettable impression." Largely due to Mackintosh, Barth accepted 
the invitation to deliver the Gifford Lectures in 1936.57 
Mackintosh was well-known in his day in both British and Continental 
theological circles, and his work in the fIrst one-third of the twentieth century has 
influenced several generations of theologians and pastors alike. Mackintosh is an 
important figure because his work serves as a transitioning fulcrum between the 
ebbing liberal theology of the nineteenth century and the rising tide of dialectical 
theology in the twentieth. Living in the period that he did, Mackintosh is a theologian 
whose work straddles that of both Ritschl and Barth, for Mackintosh studied under the 
55 Macaulay writes, perhaps with some hyperbole: "The outbreak of persecution, in the name of Neo-
paganism, against the Jews and Christian Churches, Protestant a~d Catholic. alike, in Ge~any filled 
him with dismay. In the afflictions endured by many German friends, he himself was afflIcted. All 
this vicarious suffering had much to do with the decline of his strength, and with his premature death." 
Macaulay, "Memoir,"18. ." . . . 
56 Thomas F. Torrance, "R. R. Mackintosh: TheologIan of the Cross, ill ScottIsh Bulletzn of 
Evangelical Theology 5 (1987): 162. . 
57 Mackintosh's letters to Barth, Karl-Barth-Archlv, 25.07.1935; and 29.10.1935 
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former and read much of the latter. 58 In the historical development of the doctrine of 
eschatology, Mackintosh clearly points in the direction that succeeding theologians 
would move in the later years of the twentieth century. 
Mackintosh lived in the closest proximity to the influential work that brought 
about the rediscovery of the eschatological message of Jesus, and he capitalizes on the 
new scholarship of this rediscovery in his theological approach. As a result, he 
realizes that all of theology possesses an eschatological thrust: 
In Dogmatics as now taught eschatology comes last, constituting, so to 
speak, the final movement of the symphony; it is usually the briefest 
section of the whole and may quite likely stand for something still 
briefer in the private creed. But in the New Testament it is the 
atmosphere in which men live and move. Scholarship, as we all know, 
has discovered this in the last twenty years. Book has followed book, 
proving more and more in detail how the convictions, the incentives 
and the consolations of the first Christians believers were -- not purely 
eschatological but -- eschatological through and through. 59 
With ingenuity and foresight, Mackintosh benefited from the rediscovery of 
eschatology within late-nineteenth century theology to make it a theme that runs 
throughout his work. As such, he is heavily reliant on the concepts of time and 
eternity as he articulates his positions on various doctrines. 
Donald Baillie points out in his inaugural lecture for the Hugh Ross 
Mackintosh Lectureship that Mackintosh was highly prophetic of theology's return to 
eschatology in the twentieth century, a doctrine which would come to the fore a 
58 James Leitch's starting premise in his dissertation on Mackintosh is that his theology primed 
twentieth century European theology for the sea change initiated by Barth. James W. Leitch, A 
Theology of Transition: H. R. Mackintosh as an Approach to Karl Barth (London: Oliver and Boyd, 
1953). While Barth's career extended well past Mackintosh's death in 1936, Mackintosh read much of 
Barth's early work and offered an eager, appreciative assessment of Barth: "The theology of Barth, 
criticize it as we may, is the Christian thinking of a great Christian mind, explosive and often unduly 
emphatic, but none the less of incalculable import for the church in our time.... At the m~ment he 
stands in the midst of his theological work, which cannot but take years to complete. Nothmg more 
enriching for the whole Church could be thought of than that the time for completion should be given 
him, if God will, and that more and more his living influence should pass from land to land." H. R. 
Mackintosh, Types of Modem Theology (London: Nisbet and Co., 1937),319. 
59 Mackintosh, Immortality and the Future, 108. 
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f I 60 . genera IOn ater. Mackintosh was the ftrst among twentieth century theologians to 
delve deeply into the understanding that history reveals an origin and a goal which lie 
outside itself, and that Jesus Christ is the center of that history. Mackintosh devoted 
several essay-length efforts to delineating the meaning of faith and history for 
Christian doctrine, and his christo logy abounds in eschatological themes that would 
be further developed by later theologians. 
While later theologians would be more decisive in their insistence upon 
eschatology as the framework of interpretation for theology, Mackintosh nevertheless 
realizes that theology in his day was undergoing tremendous changes, especially the 
doctrine of eschatology and how it was understood and presented in the fteld of 
systematic theology.61 Mackintosh provides his chief contribution to the doctrine of 
eschatology in a work entitled Immortality and the Future, which was ftrst published 
in 1915. Mackintosh is well-remembered for his magnum opus, The Doctrine of the 
Person of Jesus Christ, as well as for his influential work on atonement in The 
Christian Experience of Forgiveness, and yet it is surprising how little attention is 
paid to his work on eschatology. It is well worth noting that Immortality and the 
Future was published in close proximity to Mackintosh's main work on christology, 
and his thoughts on eschatology echo throughout all his writings. 
60 Donald Baillie, "The Place of H. R. Mackintosh in Modem Theology," Hugh Ross Lectureship, 
Lecture 1, delivered in New College, Edinburgh, March 8, 1943. According to Baillie, "Mackintosh 
heralded somewhat proleptically the return to dogma, the return to eschatology, the return to church-
consciousness which are now unmistakable. From the start there ran through his thinking a strong 
sense of 'the divine initiative,' and its priority over human effort, which the dialectical theology has 
more recently been emphasizing." 
61 "Eschatology is, in short, not devout poetry, covering up hideous doubts and fears, like moss upon a 
tom and ragged stone; it represents a vital and inalienable impulse of the religious spirit. For, by its 
very nature, religion takes account of the last and fmal things. It is concerned with ultimate realities, 
which have projected themselves into our experience in the form of unconditioned values .... Religion 
is religion only as it rises into the sphere of fmalities, to unite us with the Eternal in modes over which 
change has no power. Elsewhere we have no choice but to accept the relative; faith alone has, and 
better still, has promise of, the absolute." H. R. Mackintosh, Immortality and the Future (London: 
Hodder & Stoughton, 1915), 107. 
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Scholars familiar with Mackintosh or with Scottish theological trends have 
tended to focus on other areas of his work, primarily those of christology and 
atonement. 62 Several article-length treatments of Mackintosh appeared within twenty 
years of his death, including a biographical sketch by his close friend A. B. 
Macaulay.63 Brief critiques of Mackintosh's christology were offered by scholars who 
followed him as leaders of Scottish theology. Donald Baillie, a former student and 
colleague of Mackintosh, touches on Mackintosh's work as he offers a brief analysis 
of kenotic christology in his book entitled God Was in Christ, while John McIntyre 
also analyzes portions of Mackintosh's kenotic christo logy in The Shape of 
Christo logy. 64 
Recent years have seen a renewed interest in Mackintosh's theology, 
especially in the work of Robert Redman. His excellent book, Reformulating 
Reformed Theology, is the best available analysis of Mackintosh to date.65 Redman 
focuses on the christological and soteriological aspects of Mackintosh's theology, and 
he has contributed several important, shorter articles to the corpus of work on 
Mackintosh. Second only to Redman's work in significance is the dissertation on 
Mackintosh published by James W. Leitch under the direction of Barth. Leitch looks 
primarily at Mackintosh's doctrine of God, and he diligently traces the many 
62 J. K. Mozley, Recent Tendencies in British Theology (London: SPCK, 1951), 140-143; P. S. Watson, 
"The Kenosis Doctrine in H. R. Mackintosh's The Person of Jesus Christ," in Expository Times 64 
(1952-53): 68-71; T. W. Gardiner, "A Tribute to Professor H. R. Mackintosh," in Scottish Journal of 
Theology 5 (1952): 225-236. 
63 A. B. Macaulay, "Memoir," in Sermons. See also A. Martin, "The Late Very Reverend Professor H. 
R. Mackintosh," Life and Work Magazine 7 (1936): 287-288; J. G. Riddell, "The Late Very Reverend 
Professor H. R. Mackintosh," Expository Times 48 (1937): 6-11. 
64 Donald M. Baillie, God Was in Christ: An Essay in Incarnation and Atonement (New York: 
Scribner, 1955), 94-98; John McIntyre, The Shape of Christology (London: SCM, 1966), 133-134. 
Both scholars respect the integrity of Mackintosh's kenotic doctrine while pointing out a tendency in 
Mackintosh's christology to emphasize the humanity of Christ to the exclusion of divinity within the 
Chalcedonian theory of two natures. 
65 Robert Redman, Jr., Reformulating Reformed Theology: Jesus Christ in the Theology of Hugh Ross 
Mackintosh (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1997); "Participatio Christi: H. R. 
Mackintosh's Theology of the Unio Mystica," in Scottish Journal of Theology, 49 (1996): 201-222; 
"H. R. Mackintosh's Contribution to Christology and Soteriology in the Twentieth Century," in Scottish 
Journal of Theology 42 (1988): 517-534. 
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important connections between Mackintosh and nineteenth century German 
philosophy and theology.66 Apart from these two scholars, there is no other probing, 
in-depth examination of Mackintosh's theology.67 
Brunner was born in 1889 in Winterthur, Switzerland, near Zurich, and from 
the start of his life he was highly steeped in Swiss Reformed theology. His 
grandfather was a minister in the Reformed Church, and Brunner called Hermann 
Kutter, the pastor who catechized him, "the greatest man" he ever knew. Brunner 
breathed in the air of Swiss political culture, politics, and history, and his Swiss 
nationality was the first major influence to shape his thinking. Brunner's later 
writings on the nature and responsibilities of government and political freedom 
display this heritage, and he became an adamant critic of totalitarianism when such 
movements were on the rise in the twentieth century. It is clear to see how his 
theology was shaped and guided by the Reformed tradition in his native country. This 
influence was so pervasive that Brunner begins his intellectual biography by extolling 
the virtues of Swiss history and culture before anything else.68 
Brunner's professional interest in theology and ministry began when he studied 
theology at the universities of Zurich and Berlin, and he became a minister in the 
Swiss Reformed Church in 1912. He received his Doctor of Theology degree from 
Zurich in 1913, and in this same year he began a two-year stint teaching in a high 
school in Leeds, England, while honing his skills in the English language. Upon the 
outbreak of the First World War, he returned to Switzerland and served in the Swiss 
militia. From 1916-1924, Brunner pastored in the mountain village of Obstalden, 
66 Leitch, A Theology o/Transition, 7-35. 
67 There is a helpful and well-written unpublished dissertation by Donald Corbett in which he inspects 
the soteriological aspects of Mackintosh's work. See D. J. M Corbett, "The Moral Aspect of the 
Atonement in Scottish Theology from David Dickson to James Denny and H. R. Mackintosh," 
Dissertation, New College, Edinburgh, 1965,232-248. 
68 Emil Brunner, "Intellectual Autobiography," in The Theology 0/ Emil Brunner, ed. Charles Kegley 
(New York: The Macmillan Company, 1962),3. 
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interrupted only in 1919 for a year of study at Union Theological Seminary in New 
York. From 1924-1955, he occupied the Chair of Systematic and Practical Theology 
at the University of Zurich. The title of this position is significant because Brunner 
always viewed the practice of theology as a service to the church. As a theologian, he 
regarded himself as a teacher of pastors, and he believed that the task of theology was 
the edification of the church and the increasing of the faith of Christian believers. 69 
From his position in Zurich, Brunner made frequent lecture tours around the world, 
and he considered the highlight of his career the time he spent in Japan from 1953-
1955 as he helped to build up the International Christian University in Tokyo. 
Despite suffering from several strokes late in his life, Brunner continued to preach and 
write in Zurich until his death on April 6, 1966. 
From individual monographs to his three-volume Dogmatics, Brunner's 
thought is highly inclusive of eschatological concepts and themes, and the twin 
concepts of eschatology and hope play central roles in Brunner's comprehensive 
theological outlook. As one of the outstanding theologians of the twentieth century, 
Brunner emphasizes the vital relevance of eschatology for faith, thereby greatly 
enhancing contemporary theology's approach to this doctrine. Brunner believes that 
hope is the essence of Christian belief, and as a consequence hope pervades the 
entirety of faith. One consequently finds in Brunner's theology an eschatological 
emphasis that informs numerous other areas of doctrine, including time and eternity, 
theological anthropology, sin, atonement, and more - all of which Brunner discerns 
as decisive for eschatology. Because Brunner contributed so immensely to the 
development of twentieth century Reformed eschatology, he serves as the second 
69 Echoing the sentiment of Mackintosh, Brunner says: "Real theology is not only for experts, but it is 
for all to whom religious questions are also a problem of thought." Brunner, Man in Revolt, trans. 
Olive Wyon (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1947), 11. 
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subject of this examination into the century of eschatology. Even though his 
influence was significant in mid-twentieth century theology, his role in the 
development of doctrine has been neglected by recent theological trends, and it is 
ironic that a recovery of his work should be necessary.70 
J\irgen Moltmann has been one of the most prolific theologians in the second 
half of the twentieth century, and his writings encompass numerous areas of 
theological inquiry and doctrine. Moltmann has been tremendously affected by the 
cataclysmic world events of the twentieth century, and it was out of these experiences 
that he developed such an astounding appreciation for the value of Christian hope and 
eschatology. He was born in 1926, and he points to the experience he had as a 
prisoner of war as his first real encounter with God.71 Moltmann experienced God as 
a source of comfort in suffering and as a source of hope for the future, and these two 
themes would come to dominate his theological perspective throughout his career. 
Clearly, his experiences as a prisoner and the reconciliation he found with former 
enemies were highly significant in the formation of his faith and theological outlook. 
God's presence in suffering and God's provision of hope would come to be the 
complementary pillars which support his work from top to bottom. 
70 Mark McKim asks: "Whatever happened to Emil Brunner? The prominent Swiss theologian, who 
died in 1966, has largely disappeared from the Protestant theological enterprise; certainly this is the 
case in North America. At fITst glance this appears most unusual. Brunner was a major figure in the 
neo-orthodox movement. Indeed, he was the fITst to introduce the new theology to the English-
speaking world, and a whole generation of seminary students were introduced to theology via Brunner. 
He lectured widely in Great Britain and the United States. A list of his publications runs to dozens of 
pages and includes major works on anthropology, soteriology, ethics, the nature of truth, and a 
systematic theology. Brunner's writing is not only more succinct than that of Karl Barth, it also places 
great emphasis on the practical mission of the church. Given the scope of his interests, many of which 
remain pressing issues for contemporary theology, and that his dialectic method often found a middle 
way between the extremes in which much contemporary theology is mired, revisiting Brunner would 
seem a worthwhile exercise." Mark G. McKim, "Brunner the Ecumenist: Emil Brunner as a Vox Media 
of Protestant Theology," in Calvin Theological Joumal32 (April 1997): 91-104. 
71 Jfugen Moltmann, The Source of Life: The Holy Spirit and the Theology of Life, trans. Margaret Kohl 
(London: SCM Press, 1997), 7. 
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The shaping of Moltmann's theological mind came at the University of 
Gottingen, where he began his studies in 1948 upon his return to Germany after the 
war. Moltmann has always been deeply indebted to the work of Barth, yet there are 
others who also guided his theological learning in crucially important ways. Otto 
Weber, Ernst Wolf, Hans Joachim Iwand, Gerhard von Rad, Ernst Kasemann, and, 
most notably, the Jewish Marxist philosopher Ernst Bloch all played significant roles 
in giving Moltmann his theological moorings.72 Moltmann's early impression as a 
student was that Barth's theology could hardly be improved upon, yet the above 
mentioned figures aided him in developing his own perspectives which would indeed 
move him in directions beyond Barth. 
There are many identifying markers that point the way through twentieth 
century theology, and Moltmann's Theology of Hope is just such a pointer that shows 
the direction of theology in the final one-third of the century. Moltmann is ultimately 
concerned with how eschatology pervades and informs all other areas of theology 
because all theology has an eschatological dimension to it. Indeed, one must point to 
Moltmann as a driving force behind the effort that made the twentieth century the 
"century of eschatology." 
Moltmann served as a Professor of Systematic Theology from 1967 to 1994 at 
the University of Tiibingen, and from there his theological influence has spread far 
beyond the Western world. In addition to Theology of Hope, Moltmann's best-known 
early works include The Crucified God and The Church in the Power of the Spirit. 
Although each of these works addresses a different aspect of theology, each one also 
72 See Richard Bauckham, The Theology of Jiirgen Moltmann (Edinburgh: T &T Clark: 1995), 1-3. 
Bauckham has enormously contributed to the interpretation of Moltmann in the last two decades. See 
his Moltmann: Messianic Theology in the Making (Basingstoke: Marshall Pickering, 1987), and a 
collection of essays edited by Bauckham, God Will Be All in All: The Eschatology of Jiirgen 
Moltmann (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1999). 
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underlines Moltmann's commitment to a commanding presentation of systematic 
theology. The 1980's and 1990's witnessed a burst of theological activity from 
Moltmann with the publication of several works that, when taken together, contribute 
to his overall exposition of doctrine.73 These works and innumerable essays by 
Moltmann demonstrate his deep knowledge of historical theology and his reliance 
upon the past to make his own invaluable contributions to modem theology. 
Assessing the respective places of Mackintosh, Brunner, and Moltmann within 
the Reformed Tradition begins with seeing their reliance upon some of its hallmark 
themes as well as their reactions to the larger theological and philosophical climate 
around them. Each of them sees their work in the continuum of Christian thought 
from the Patristic period through nearly two millennia of doctrinal development, and 
they are indebted to certain aspects of their particular tradition while remaining open 
and appreciative to other influences. 
Revelation in Scripture 
Mackintosh, Brunner, and Moltmann rely heavily on a theology of revelation 
as the starting point of all theological discussion. God's personal self-disclosure 
forms the foundation of the biblical concept of history, as God continually reveals his 
purposes and his will for humanity in a progression of revelations. Mackintosh, 
73 Moltmann The Trinity and the Kingdom of God: The Doctrine of God, trans. Margaret Kohl 
(London: SCM Press, 1981); God in Creation: A New Theology of Cre~tion a~d the Sp'irit of c:ro~, 
trans. Margaret Kohl (London: SCM Press, 1985); The Way of Jesus Chnst:. C.hnstol~gy m Me~slGmc 
Dimensions, trans. Margaret Kohl (London: SCM Press, 1990); The Spmt of Life: 1 Umversal 
Affirmation, trans. Margaret Kohl (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2001); and The Commg of God: 
Christian Eschatology, trans. Margaret Kohl (London: SCM Press, 1996). 
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Brunner, and Moltmann believe that humanity can never achieve knowledge of God 
within the framework of its own inherent possibilities. Therefore, humanity is 
dependent upon the divine revelations which make God accessible to human 
knowledge and devotion. The absolute "wholly other-ness" of God necessitates 
condescension on God's part if humanity is to have any saving knowledge of God 
whatsoever. Their zeal to emphasize the transcendence of God is driven by their 
desire to move in directions far away from a theological conception of the essential 
unity between God and humanity. They similarly agree that scripture should be 
trusted in its recording of the miraculous events of divine action that occur when God 
speaks, saves, heals, and calls. Even though scripture contains the ancient world-view 
of its writers, the revelation of God through scripture is larger than the world-views in 
which it is written and explained.74 
Each of them places great stress on the concept of divine revelation, as 
opposed to human aspiration, as the starting point for one's knowledge of God. The 
Reformed emphasis on revelation maintains that the sovereign and free God chooses 
to reveal himself to men and women in order to draw them into a saving relationship. 
While it is true that God reveals himself in the natural world, the Reformed Tradition 
has consistently viewed God's revelation of his saving will as occurring in scripture 
and, ultimately, in the person of Jesus Christ. In regard to God's written Word, each 
possesses a high regard for scripture as the locus of God's unique revelation of divine 
saving activity within the world. 75 The Westminster Confession affIrms that the 
74 For more on the Refonned Tradition's concept of revelation in scripture, see Donald G. Bloesch, 
Holy Scripture: Revelation, Inspiration, and Interpretation (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 
1994), chapter 3.; Avery Dulles, Models of Revelation (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1983),46. 
75 In many ways, this is a renewed emphasis in Refonnation-era theology, looking back to ancient 
views on the authority and uniqueness of Scripture's revelation, especially in figures like Origen and 
Augustine. See Origen, Contra Celsum, ed. & trans. Henry Chadwick (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1953); Augustine, City of God, ed. & trans. R. W. Dyson (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998), XV, 8 & XVIII, 41. 
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authority of scripture "dependeth not upon the testimony of any man or church, but 
wholly upon God (who is truth itself), the author thereof; and therefore it is to be 
received, because it is the Word of God.,,76 Each theologian agrees with the spirit of 
the confession as it proclaims the scriptures of the Old and New Testaments as the 
unique and authoritative witness to God, and yet their modem context demands a 
careful approach to Scripture that takes into account the massive shifts in biblical 
studies since the seventeenth century. 
As theologians of the twentieth century, they are highly aware of the critical 
views toward scripture brought about by contemporary methods of textual criticism 
and inquiry. Their methodology toward the Bible responds to the broad drive to 
"demythologize" biblical writings from a variety of vantage points, a move that began 
in the eighteenth century and gained momentum in the middle decades of the 
twentieth century.77 In regard to eschatology, especially, each theologian desires to 
value the meaning of eschatological symbols without being constrained to interpret 
these symbols with uncritical literalism. Against nineteenth century philosophical 
attacks on biblical theology, Mackintosh, Brunner, and Moltmann believe that 
scripture may be trusted as the authoritative revelation of God's will for the future. 78 
This agreement regarding scripture leads to a shared opinion that one of the 
main goals behind demythologizing is a desire to make eschatological themes in the 
Bible more palatable to modem minds.79 The rationale behind demythologizing is 
76 The Westminster Corifession of Faith, 1.4. 
77 See Henning Graf Reventlow, The Authority of the Bible and the Rise of the Modern World 
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1985). For another survey see Donald McKim, The Bible in Theology 
and Preaching (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1993). 
78 Examples of nineteenth century philosophical distrust of Scripture as the ground for revelation may 
be found in Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy, ed. Lewis S. 
Feuer (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1959); Sigmund Freud, Totem and Taboo, trans. James Strachey 
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1950); Freud, The Future of an Illusion, trans. W. D. Robson-Scott 
(New York: Liveright Publishing Corp., 1955). 
79 The basic premise of Ernst Troeltsch is the foundation of demythologization. He stated that all 
events in the history of religions have to be subjected to analogy and correlation mainly because the 
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that the world-view of the Bible IS primitive, mythological, and scientifically 
incompatible within the modem world. Theologians, embarrassed by the 
mythological and apocalyptic elements of the Bible, sought interpret and re-state them 
in terms acceptable to contemporary, scientific world-views. They profess that the 
Bible and theology must be purified of its inadequate, primitive expressions that no 
longer resonate with modem science and philosophy. The symbolic language of the 
Bible sounds crude, simplistic, and unintelligible to modem ears. 
As capable exegetes of Scripture, Mackintosh, Brunner, and Moltmann part 
ways with those who would insist on demythologizing scripture as part of the process 
of interpretation.
80 
They acknowledge that the task of a theologian is to restate and 
reinterpret the meaning of theological convictions in ways that incorporate a 
contemporary world-view. While granting that an ancient world-view employs 
expressions and symbols which are not adequate to the events that they attempt to 
convey, the language of the Bible is nevertheless the vehicle of God's revelation.81 
They likewise asses that the strength of a Reformed view of Scripture is the tradition's 
insistence upon the work of the Holy Spirit in guiding the task of interpretation. 
Calvin's view that "the testimony of the Spirit is more excellent than all reason" does 
not negate the tools of critical reasoning. Instead, these tools are used at the disposal 
of the theologian who trusts that the Spirit of God will enlighten the interpreter to the 
meaning of the text: "The same Spirit. .. who has spoken through the mouths of the 
New Testament documents are historically unreliable. These documents emerge, not from the time of 
Jesus himself, but from the years following his life and from the pens of enthusiastic followers who 
exaggerated the events surrounding his life. For more, see Wilhelm Pauck. Harnack and Troeltsch: 
Two Historical Theologians (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), 66-67. 
80 In particular, Brunner and Moltmann contend with the theology of Rudolph Bultmann in the second 
half of the twentieth century. For a first-hand look at Bultmann's thought behind demythologizing, see 
his "New Testament and Mythology," in New Testament and Mythology and Other Basic Writings, 
trans. & ed. Shubert M. Ogden (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1984); Bultmann, "History and 
Eschatology in the New Testament," New Testament Studies 1 (1954-55): 5-16; for Brunner's extended 
critique of Bultmann and an analysis of demythologization, see Dogmatics, v. 3, 263ff. 
81 I. Howard Marshall, Biblical Inspiration (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 
1982), chap. 3. 
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prophets must penetrate into our hearts to persuade us that they faithfully proclaimed 
what had been divinely commanded. ,,82 Mackintosh, Brunner, and Moltmann alike 
agree that Scripture reveals both God's past actions and God's current will to those 
who trust the Holy Spirit's illumination of events in history when they are examined 
by modem minds. 
In their respective approaches to revelation through scripture, they agree that 
the Bible contains "mythological" speech pertaining to God because God's actions 
and words must be accommodated to the human mind. 83 They acknowledge that 
many points of doctrine have their roots in apocalyptic symbols that defy easy 
interpretation, so they approach the interpretation of scripture with a desire to glean 
religious truth from acculturated words, while asserting that behind conditioned texts 
lie certain truths which are unconditioned and absolute. Each acknowledges modem 
theology's debt to historical criticism and the better understanding of texts which such 
criticism produces. It is especially true that many aspects of biblical eschatology are 
manifested in highly symbolic texts that portray a particular, cultural world-view. 
The truth and meaning of a text, however, are not negated when a particular world-
view or its symbols become obsolete. And so they can take into account the critics 
who unlock much of the cultural climate lying behind certain texts and acknowledge 
that historical circumstances and several pre-Christian elements helped to shape the 
thought-world of the New Testament. 
82 John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, ed. John T. McNeil, trans. Ford Lewis Battles; 
Library of Christian Classics, 2 vols. (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1960), 1.7.4. 
83 Accommodation has a long history in the Reformed Tradition. See Ford Lewis Battles, "God Was 
Accommodating Himself to Human Capacity," in Readings in Calvin's Theology, ed. Donald McKim 
(Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1984), chapter 2. 
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Departing from the tradition's earlier arguments on the strict merrancy of 
S · 84 h cnpture, t ese three theologians hold what may be termed as a "critically 
respectful" view of the divine inspiration of Scripture.85 This view acknowledges that 
scripture is not inerrant and that it does contain discrepancies, yet it is nevertheless the 
inspired Word of God. For each of them, the written Word is the means by which the 
living Word of God, Jesus Christ, is known.86 By concentrating on the Living Word 
of Jesus Christ as the content of Scripture's revelation, our three theologians avoid 
being trapped in a literalistic interpretation of each eschatological image in Scripture. 
The Centrality of Jesus Christ 
Although they use different terminology, each theologian subscribes to a view 
of Jesus Christ as the ultimate revelation of God and of God's will for human life. 
The core of God's revelation to humanity is his unique self-disclosure in the person of 
Jesus Christ, and in Christ God has freely chosen to make known the divine will for 
humanity. God has made himself available to humanity in definite places at distinct 
times, yet all revelation is subject to God's personal revelation in the divine-human 
person who perfectly revealed God. 
Mackintosh employs the christological principle of interpreting all of scripture 
through the teachings of Christ, and Christ serves as the final authority for all faith 
84 For an account of inerrancy in Calvin's thought, see Roger R. Nicole, "John Calvin and Inerrancy," 
Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society, 25 (December 1982), 425-442; Harvie M. Conn, 
Inerrancy and Hermeneutics: A Tradition, a Challenge, a Debate (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 
1988). 
85 For a detailed defmition of this critically respectful view, see G. C. Berkouwer, "The Testimony of 
the Spirit," in Holy Scripture, ed. & trans. Jack Rogers (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans 
Publishing Co., 1975), 139-142. 
86 The same sentiment captured by Barth in his Theological Declaration of Barmen: "Jesus Christ, as 
he is attested for us in Holy Scripture, is the one Word of God which we hear and which have to trust 
and obey in life and in death." Theological Declaration of Barmen, in Book of Confessions, 8.11. 
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and life. When perplexing issues arise in theology or in reading scripture, Mackintosh 
falls back on the centrality of Christ for all Christian understanding: "There is a 
criterion, and it may be formulated quite simply. It is the very criterion we use 
elsewhere in doctrine; and it is as good for eschatology as for truth about providence, 
or sin, or atonement. It is the Person of Jesus, in His sovereign redeeming power, as 
apprehended by the faith which in Him finds God. ,,87 All aspects of theology, ethics, 
and personal piety are guided by what Christ taught and revealed. Matters of 
controversy in doctrine and church life must be mediated through the lenses of the 
will of Christ as revealed primarily in the gospel accounts. 
Likewise for Brunner, the revelation of God in Jesus Christ forms the crucible 
of God's relationship and dealings with humanity. Jesus Christ reveals both God and 
what humanity should be in relation to is creator. Brunner's theology is in many ways 
christocentric because he continually states that the origin and goal of Christian 
theology are Jesus Christ as he reveals the love and holiness of the Father, Son, and 
Holy Spirit. 88 His entire approach to a theological understanding of time and history 
is based on the premise that both are given their meaning and direction through God's 
revelation of Jesus Christ within time. 
Moltmann also emphasizes the necessity of interpreting all of theology 
through the life and death of Jesus Christ. Moltmann gained much of this insight 
through the influence of his teacher Hans Iwand. Iwand, whose emphasis on the 
dialectic of cross and resurrection, had a profound impact on Moltmann's thinking 
regarding the centrality of Christ. It was I wand who taught Moltmann always to ask 
in what ways God reveals himself through nature as opposed to the type of "special 
revelation" through Christ that is heavily emphasized in Protestant theology from 
87 Mackintosh, Immortality and the Future, 128. 
88 Jewett, Brunner's Concept of Revelation, 70ff. 
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Calvin to Barth. Thus, knowledge of God is found in Christ only through the gift of 
faith through grace, and this is God's mediated, special revelation to humanity. 
The dominant themes of comfort and hope in Moltmann's theology draw upon 
his interpretations of the crucifixion and resurrection of Jesus Christ and their role as 
transforming events in the relationship between humanity and God. The cross is 
illustrative of life now with all its incumbent suffering, hardship, and injustice, while 
the resurrection reveals the direct opposite of this god forsakenness. Moltmann's 
theology resonates with this dialectic of cross/resurrection, so much so that they are 
always qualified by each other. The godlessness of the crucifixion is responded to by 
the hopefulness of the resurrection, and the newness of life promised in the 
resurrection incorporates the painful meaning of the cross. 
Ph i1osoph ical 1 nfl uences 
Each theologian possesses a trend in their theology that is open to maintaining 
a dialogue with many areas of ancient and modem philosophy throughout their work. 
They are indebted to certain aspects of philosophy without slavishly binding their 
theology to anyone philosophical system. Each goes to great lengths to analyze the 
ways in which Christian theology has been affected by humanity's advancements in 
philosophic world-views, from the days of the early church to their own day. Because 
each is attuned to the history of philosophy, they are each able to engage capably 
many viewpoints as they either correspond to or conflict with crucial elements of 
Christian theology. A survey of their work quickly reveals their intellectual grasp of 
philosophical trends in modem thought. They critically analyze nineteenth and 
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twentieth century philosophical movements, and there are important aspects of 
modem philosophy that each theologian relies upon to inform their respective 
approaches to theology. 
In response to the highly influential figure of nineteenth century philosophy, 
G. W. F. Hegel, Mackintosh, Brunner, and Moltmann alike continually engage the 
work of Hegel and his dominating legacy in twentieth century theology. Mackintosh 
believes that nineteenth century theology ignored vital components of biblical 
theology in favor of Hegel's ideal of unity between all things. According to Hegel, all 
of history and all changes in space and time are merely being enveloped by the all-
encompassing "Spirit of the universe." The universe/cosmic creation is a self-
contained entity, and history is the process of God's own self-realization. 
Man, for [Hegel] is a finite spirit; as such, however, he ultimately 
identical with infinite Spirit; and perhaps from the standpoint of 
Christian faith the most sinister feature in the entire construction is the 
emphasis laid on this further point, that it is in the development of the 
fmite mind that the Infinite and Absolute, or God, first rises to 
consciousness of self. "God," Hegel writes in words as plain as any, 
"is God only in so far as He knows Himself; His self-knowledge is His 
self-consciousness in man, is the knowledge man has of God, which 
advances to man's self-knowledge in God." This, it would appear, the 
Absolute has reality only in the thought of those who believe in Him. 
And history is now seen to be God's realization of Himself through, or 
. h fh . 89 m, t e process 0 uman expenence. 
This pantheistic unity between finite humans and the Infinite God is untenable for 
Mackintosh because God, the Absolute mind, is indeed not unified with humanity as 
the essence of all finite minds. Creation is distinct from the "wholly other" God, and 
in their theology individuals are not constituents of God in the process of a seamless 
absorption into the universe. 
Mackintosh, Brunner, and Moltmann, consequently, appreciate yet reject 
much of the theological impulses of Hegel because the differences between God and 
89 Mackintosh, Types of Modem Theology, 103. 
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the universe, between Creator and creation, between the Absolute and the relative, are 
collapsed at the expense of both the personal God and individual persons. The 
universe becomes an impersonal system that has no larger interest in any individual 
part, not the least of which is human life. An impersonal system has no desire for 
communion and redemption, and there is no sense of progression and development, 
for good or evil, in the world. The fate of each human being is met by the 
unsympathetic silence of the universe. If God and the universe are the same entity, 
then ethics and individuals becomes meaningless: the best a person can hope for as a 
result of this life is absorption into the universe. 
In contrast to Hegelian Idealism, Mackintosh emphasizes that the Christian 
doctrines of God and theological anthropology rely on a concept of related, yet 
distinct, personhood. Human persons, created in God's image, freely act with purpose 
and creative force. It is the endowment of God's image which makes a person 
capable of acting and of entering relationships. First and foremost in the universe is 
the will of a personal God. God is the supreme personality whose will propels the 
world into the future by a series of sovereign acts. God desires communion with 
individual personalities, and the loss of any person is a tragic event. Because creation 
is dynamic and is filled with personalities who act in freedom, there is real 
development and a real end, and the end comes out of the development of history. 
Like Mackintosh, Brunner seeks to steer a theological course between the 
legacies of nineteenth century scientific materialism and philosophical idealism. 
Brunner is exceptionally well-read in the history of philosophy, and he understands 
both the subtle and monumental ways in which philosophical approaches shape 
theological beliefs. It was through the mentoring of Kutter that Brunner developed 
his life-long engagement with the field of philosophy as he worked out a system of 
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belief that was scientifically and philosophically satisfying -- as well as faithful to 
Christian experience and doctrine. 
Brunner laments his perception that the legacy of Hegel in much of modem 
philosophy is philosophy's preference for abstract language to describe God. Deemed 
to be a purer language than biblical symbols, philosophy seeks to replace the vivid 
images of scripture with abstract concepts and explanations. Brunner criticizes the 
drive to replace biblical language with philosophical terms so that the more abstract 
the explanation is the more "spiritual" it appears to be. Brunner decisively refuses to 
allow theology to acquiesce to the abstract language of philosophy, as he sees it, 
because philosophical language too easily dismisses the rich symbols for the personal 
God of the Bible. Responding primarily to Hegel, Brunner observes that in Idealism 
"the 'Lord of all being' is supplanted by 'being' itself; the 'Thou' who addresses men 
is replaced by an 'it' which man himself conceives; instead of the God who acts, we 
find a changeless timeless being, a timeless truth. The Biblical world of the living 
God is transmuted into the Platonic world of ideas, into the ontology of timeless 
being. ,,90 Brunner maintains that if one is to speak faithfully about God then one must 
believe in the God who personally encounters human beings as distinct persons who 
were created to live in a relationship with God. 
The dominant philosophical impulse in Brunner is a form of "personalism," 
which came to Brunner through the work of Ferdinand Ebner and Martin Buber and 
has its roots in the work of Kierkegaard.91 Personalism is based on the assumption 
that to be a person ("I") necessarily means to be related to someone else ("thou"). 
90 Brunner, Eternal Hope, 116. 
91 Ferdinand Ebner, Das Wort und die geistigen Realitiiten, Pneumatologische Fragmente (Innsbruck: 
Brenner Verlag, 1921); Martin Buber, I and Thou, trans. Ronald G. Smith (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 
1937); See also Leon Hynson, "Theological Encounter: Brunner and Buber," in Journal of Ecumenical 
Studies 12 (1975): 349-366; Helmut Gollwitzer, "The Significance of Martin Buber for Protestant 
Theology," in Martin Buber: A Centenary Volume, ed. Haim Gordon & lochanan Bloch, (New York: 
KTAV Publishers, 1984). 
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God is the Thou who confronts human beings in personal encounter. Ebner and 
Buber, in many ways independent of each other, developed a personalistic philosophy 
of human existence based on the premise that the human person (I) is brought into 
existence and remains in relationship to God (Thou). Ebner writes: 
Presupposed that human existence in its kernel has a spiritual 
significance, viz., a significance which is not exhausted in its natural 
manifestation in the course of world event; presupposed that one may 
speak of something spiritual in man otherwise than in the sense of a 
fiction of a poetic or metaphoric nature, or of a fiction demanded on 
"social" grounds: then this spiritual something is essentially defmed 
thereby that it is fundamentally connected with something spiritual 
outside of it, through which and in which it exists ... .If then, in order to 
have a word for it, we call this spiritual entity in man, I, and that which 
is outside of him, in relationship to which the "I" exists, thou.92 
In a similar manner, Buber's small, but most famous work, I and Thou, emphasizes 
the personalistic ground of life by contrasting the personal nature of faith, which 
involves the whole person before God in the I-Thou relationship, to the impersonal, 
partial relationship between a person and a thing (I-It). A thing never demands total 
sway over the individual as God does in a relationship of faith. From his perspective 
as a Jewish existentialist, Buber believes that God addresses human beings m a 
personal encounter, and this is a liberating and life-giving experience.93 
It is important to note that both Ebner and Buber draw upon Kierkegaard's 
insight into the nature of humanity in relation to God. Kierkegaard reacts against 
Hegel's tendency to denude the individual person of his uniqueness, and Kierkegaard 
laments Hegel's failure to distinguish between God and the individual. Whereas 
Hegel emphasizes the unity or continuity between God and humanity, Kierkegaard 
accentuates, by way of contrast, the dissonance and gulf between God and humanity 
92 Ebner, Das Wort und die geistigen Realitaten, 12. As quoted by Paul Jewett, "Ebnerian Personalism 
and its Influence Upon Brunner's Theology," in The Westminster Theological Joumal14 (1952): 120. 
93 Buber, I and Thou, 106-120. 
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that God overcomes through personal encounter. Through Buber and Ebner, Brunner 
engages the Kierkegaardian insight that humanity exists in a relationship with God 
that is made possible -- not through humanity's immanent closeness with God -- but 
through God's encountering humanity so as to bridge the chasm that divides them. 
Each individual stands in the juncture of time and eternity at the moment of being 
addressed by God. 
The Kierkegaardian influence of personalism upon Brunner runs deep into his 
theology, and Brunner consistently maintains that Christian faith is always and only a 
personal relationship between the individual "I" and the "Thou" of God. God 
encounters the individual person to establish a relationship, and it is through this 
encounter that the individual understands his true existence.94 Brunner draws upon 
the Kierkegaardian conception of the human person to expound upon his belief that 
the human person, as distinct from God, is a free, decision-making being. This human 
freedom, which is intrinsic to human personality, is absolutely essential to the 
moment of confrontation between God and humanity in that one's freedom allows for 
the decision for or against God. Brunner emphasizes the personal nature of both God 
and humanity throughout so much of his work. Faith is the result of the divine-human 
encounter, and it is this sense of encounter that inspires and fuels human faith in 
God.95 
Moltmann is also well-versed in the history of Western philosophy, and he 
addresses much of modem philosophical thought throughout his work. He 
appreciates and engages the legacy of Hegel, among others, and he maintains a 
94 As Paul Jewett writes: "It is this Kierkegaardian Individual who becomes, in Brunner, following the 
lead of Ebner, a Person confronted with the divine Thou. And the mediation of time and eternity in the 
individual in the passionate decision of the moment (Kierkegaard) likewise furnishes the fundamental 
structure of Brunner's divine-human encounter." Jewett, "Ebnerian Personalism," 114. 
95 Brunner presents this theme of Kierkegaard throughout The Divine-Human Encounter (philadelphia: 
Westminster Press, 1943). 
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dialogue with Hegelian philosophy throughout his work. Iwand introduced Moltmann 
to Hegel's dialectic of the cross and resurrection, and in doing so he prepared the 
ground on which Moltmann would address and appropriate the work of Hegel into his 
theology. For Moltmann, this meant dealing with the alienation and meaninglessness 
of human existence that were brought about as a result of Enlightenment-age 
reasonmg. Hegel interprets the cross of Christ as part of the universal human 
experience of alienation and god-forsakenness. The human experience of suffering in 
history is met by the God's desire to reconcile the pain of humanity through the self-
giving and self-revealing love of the Spirit. For Hegel, the cross and resurrection of 
Christ become symbolic of the Spirit's universal self-revelation throughout history, 
and yet Hegel denies that these events have any particular and absolute significance as 
events in history.96 They are merely part of the Spirit's reconciliation of humanity 
with the universe. Moltmann relies on Hegel's dialectic of cross and resurrection, yet 
Moltmann's perspective of these events views their historicity as essential to God's 
dealing with humanity. 
In addition to those whom Moltmann studied under personally, one of the 
most significant conversation partners with Moltmann in his theology is the Marxist 
Jewish philosopher Ernst Bloch, whom Moltmann relies upon throughout his writings. 
Moltmann writes: "In 1960 I discovered Ernst Bloch's The Principle of Hope. I read 
it in the East German edition during a holiday in Switzerland and was so fascinated 
that I ceased to see the beauty of the mountains. My spontaneous impression was, 
'Why has Christian theology let go of its most distinctive theme, hope? . .I wanted to 
undertake a parallel action in Christianity on the basis of its own presuppositions. ",97 
96 Meeks, Origins of the Theology of Hope, 35. 
97 Moltmann, How I Have Changed: Reflections on Thirty Years of Theology (Harrisburg, P A: Trinity 
Press International, 1997), 15 
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Moltmann recognizes in Bloch the relevance of Jewish messianism for Christianity, 
and Moltmann's work is highly indebted to Jewish principles of hope that fmd 
fulfillment in Jesus ChriSt.98 Moltmann believes that orthodox Christian theology had 
transformed eschatology into other-worldly concerns, making it the appendix of 
Christian doctrine. From Bloch Moltmann ascertained that Christian hope must be 
placed within the framework of Messianic expectation and that Jesus is the Jewish 
teacher of hope and the kingdom of God.99 Hence, Moltmann's theological project 
has been to move eschatology from the appendix to the center of Christian doctrine 
through the means provided by Bloch. 
The magnitude of Bloch for Moltmann can be seen in many different areas, 
especially in Moltmann's treatment of the concept of revelation in history: history is 
not a limited, closed system with its own end determined by its own functioning 
principles. History is, to the contrary, open to the promises of God and to the 
fulfillment of these promises in the Kingdom of God. Bloch influences Moltmann 
toward an acute reliance on the concept of "promise" as it relates to the future of God. 
As Moltmann states: "The gospel of the revelation of God in Christ is thus in danger 
of being incomplete and of collapsing altogether, if we fail to notice the dimension of 
promise in it. Christo logy likewise deteriorates if the dimension of the 'future of 
Christ' is not regarded as a constitutive element in it." 100 It is the promise of God as 
revealed in Christ, especially through the resurrection that gives rise to Moltmann's 
98 Bauckham, Messianic Theology, 9-14. 
99 Miiller-Fahrnholz writes: "I would like to put it this way: the work of the Leipzig philosopher served 
as a catalyst for Moltmann's theological question. It opened his eyes to a theme which is one of the 
nuclei of the Christian message, but which lay hidden under a placid and assimilated Christianity, like a 
glow under a thick layer of ash. Moltmann recognized in the unruly and passionate temperament of the 
Marxist thinker, who was so unpalatable to his Marxist masters that in 1962 they forced him into exile 
in Tiibingen, his own passionate unrest, his own urgent impatience. Theology of Hope is none other 
than an attempt to free the glow and kindle the fIre afresh, faithful to Jesus' messianic cry: 'I have come 
to kindle fIre on the earth; and how I wish it were already burning! (Luke 12:49)'" Geiko Miiller-
Fahrnholz, The Kingdom and the Power: The Theology of Jurgen Moltmann, trans. John Bowden 
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2000), 43. 
100 .f Moltmann, Theology OJ Hope, 140. 
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future-oriented eschatology. The category of promise means that the future is open to 
the power of God because the divine promise pronounces a future that is not a present 
reality. The promise of God's future is not bound to the realities of the present but to 
the potentiality of God. The fulfillment of God's promise is what matters for the 
present, and the future that it promises determines the goal toward which history is 
moving. In many ways, the future of the promise of God stands in contradiction to 
the deadly realities of the present world, and Christians are compelled to live by the 
future history of God and not according to the world of death. 101 
The Legacy of Scientific Materialism 
Mackintosh, Brunner, and Moltmann know that they must incorporate into 
their theology aspects which deal with scientific materialism and a world-view that 
limits, at best, or excludes, at worst, the possibility of God's influence over the natural 
world. They are well-attuned to the contemporary scientific outlooks in their 
respective twentieth century contexts, and they consistently addresses the 
manifestations of materialism as they relate particularly to theology and eschatology. 
They are content to make theological assertions without assessing their ramifications 
for other areas of human knowledge. The legacy of eighteenth and nineteenth century 
materialism was a sweeping attitude that the laws of nature are such that they disallow 
any divine activity from outside the closed system that is the world. Anything that 
cannot be verified empirically cannot be accepted as true, especially in dealing with 
the ancient past and the claims of "primitive," unscientific people. Volumes such as 
Julien Offray de la Mettrie's Man as Machine and von Holbach's System of Nature 
101 Moltmann, Theology of Hope, 102-106. 
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sought to gIve psychological and empirical explanations to spiritual processes. 102 
They conclude that humanity is simply a product of the surrounding environment that 
operates only according to the powers of the natural laws around it. Materialism 
would have us believe that what is true conforms to what science ascertains regarding 
humanity, the world, and all reality. 
F or Mackintosh, science alone cannot become the ground which either 
validates or invalidates theological truths, but as a systematic theologian he realize the 
necessity of engaging other disciplines while serving their own. "A work of revision," 
Mackintosh writes, "is become necessary to detect the dead matter lodged in tradition, 
and to replace 'categories with which the mind will not work any more' by 
conceptions which really help us to exhibit the hope actually cherished by 
believers." 103 Mackintosh, especially in his earlier work, is often critical of the 
church's defense of rigid orthodoxy at the expense contemporary thought, and he 
seeks to engage fairly with science as he dislodges arcane arguments while 
maintaining the integrity of theology. 
In his engagement with modem science, Mackintosh is mainly concerned to 
show that science and theology are occupied with answering different questions 
regarding creation and humanity. Mackintosh believes that the scientific mind can 
conceive only cause and effect relationships between all things -- living or inanimate. 
F or science's purposes, the universe exists merely in a continual process of change 
without beginning or end. Each effect has a cause as far back as anyone can discern, 
and each cause engenders an effect into the unknown future. In the rationale of 
materialism, human life is part of the larger cosmological flux that is always in 
102 Julien Offray de la Mettrie (1709-1751), Machine Man and Other Writings, ed. & trans. Ann 
Thomson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Max P. Cushing, Baron d'Holbach: A Study 
of Eighteenth Century Radicalism in France (New York: B. Franklin, 1971); Georgii V. Plekhanov, 
Essays in the History of Materialism, trans. Ralph Fox (New York: Fertig Publishers, 1934). 
103 Mackintosh, Immortality and the Future, 109. 
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tunnoil, without a definable beginning or a discernable end. Christian eschatology, in 
contrast, with its pronouncements about the future of the universe, is opposed to this 
way of thinking. Christian eschatology espouses a hopeful vision by which life and 
the world will reach a fulfillment in God, while science can offer only approximations 
regarding the end of the physical system. 
Although he engages the perspectives of science and philosophy, especially in 
regard to eschatology, Mackintosh does so without surrendering theology to the 
arguments of materialism. While theology and faith do make claims on the powers 
and limitations of physical systems, Mackintosh contends that theology should not 
attempt to make claims regarding the mechanical functioning of the universe. 
Mackintosh prefers to draw a clear line of demarcation between the topics and areas 
that are unique to theology and science, and he believes that the arguments of either 
are compromised if this boundary line is crossed. It belongs only to theology to claim 
that life is created by God and that not even death can separate humans from God. By 
the same token, it is within science's domain alone to address the natural and physical 
processes by which people are born, live, and die. Mackintosh maintains throughout 
his writings a clear-cut distinction between the realms of expertise claimed by 
theology and those claimed by science and philosophy. 
While affirming that questions concerning the physical and natural future of 
the universe are best answered by scientists and not theologians, Mackintosh claims 
that the reality of the eschatological future is not doomed or affirmed by scientific 
theories of the human race or the destruction of the planet. From theology'S point of 
view, the extinction of humanity would make no difference to what God has promised 
for those who love God. While Mackintosh never advocates an irresponsible ethic 
toward the natural world, he does state that the final history of the universe is 
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irrelevant to the Christian hope for humanity: "The new transcendent order belongs 
to a new plane of being. How or when reality will be vouchsafed to the perfect 
kingdom -- after the disappearance of the earth or before -- we have no interest in 
deciding, even if decision were possible, for Christian hope is set not upon a future 
condition of the world, but on God.,,104 Eschatology's claims for God's kingdom and 
eternal life would not be contradicted by the extinction of the human race because it is 
not ourselves and our continuation that matters most for the future -- but God's. 
In a way similar to Mackintosh, Brunner endorses the advances of modem 
sciences on many fronts, and he especially addresses the implications which complex 
and contemporary scientific outlooks have for eschatology. Throughout his work, 
Brunner strives to interpret the eschatological proclamations of the Bible in a manner 
that is both faithful to the source and cognizant of a contemporary world-view. 105 As 
Brunner interprets the symbolic language of the New Testament concerning history 
and eschatology, he is aware of a fundamentalist strain in Christianity that ignores the 
views of modem science regarding the universe and natural laws. Eschatological 
hope based solely on a literal reading of biblical material is not possible because the 
images are contained within the world-view of the ancient writers. Also, because the 
Bible provides too many descriptions and visions of the eschatological future, anyone 
of them should not be accepted as dominant over the rest. The Bible's depictions of 
the eschatological future are too varied for there to be a literal reading of the texts 
which excludes a modem world-view. 
104 Mackintosh, Immortality and the Future, 121. 
105 More recently, Michael Welker demonstrates how "eschatological symbol systems" should be used 
in the process of interpreting scriptures manifold witness to the eschatological future. Michael Welker, 
"Theological Realism and Eschatological Symbol Systems," in Resurrection: Theological and 
Scientific Assessments, ed. Ted Peters, Robert J. Russell, and Michael Welker (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 2002), 31-42. 
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At the other extreme from unscientific fundamentalism there is a scientific 
demythologizing of scripture which virtually disregards nearly every account of 
biblical eschatology. To the materialist, biblical expressions of the eschatological 
future are merely mythological expressions of less sophisticated and more primitive 
cultures. If fundamentalism accepts as literally true every account of biblical 
eschatology, then existentialism rejects as false every account of the eschatological 
future. Coupled with a demythologizing approach, in Brunner's opinion, is a belief 
that one can maintain the core elements of Christian faith without believing in the 
New Testament's unverifiable promises of future, eschatological events. Brunner 
disregards demythologizing along scientific methods for many of the same reasons 
that he finds fundamentalism unfaithful. The sheer abundance of the New Testament 
witness to an eschatological future means that eschatology is part of the core of 
Christian kerygma, and without an orientation toward the future, faith is not consistent 
with the biblical witness. Nevertheless, Brunner appreciates what the behavioral and 
empirical sciences have to say about so many aspects of human life and the cosmos, 
and he seeks to speak relevantly to science throughout his theology. 
In a recent volume, Moltmann writes that "from early on, the theological 
discussion with scientists fascinated me. When I was a schoolboy I dreamed of 
studying mathematics and physics.,,106 His fascination is evident in the ways in which 
he seeks to engage science philosophically in his works. He frequently notes how 
since the scientific revolution, people have exhibited hostility toward theological 
claims out of materialistic arguments which arise from an increasing awareness of the 
world's functioning processes. The processes of a dynamic universe in all its 
complexities lead to an uncertain relation between theological and scientific 
106 Moltmann, Science and Wisdom, trans. Margaret Kohl (London: SCM Press, 2003), 1. 
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pronouncements in many areas. Yet for Moltmann these areas touch upon each other 
in significant ways. 
We see Moltmann engage the legacy of scientific materialism by analyzing its 
vigorous attempts to demonstrate the inability of theology to verify its truth claims 
along traditional lines. Especially critical of Christian eschatology, Feuerbach, as one 
example, asserts that faith in immortality and the eschatological future is merely a 
projection of humanity's survival instinct and fear of death. Whatever lives does not 
want to die, and the fear of death is translated into a desire for a better life after death. 
"All proofs of immortality are insufficient," claims Feuerbach, because "unassisted 
reason is not capable of apprehending it, still less proving it.,,107 Feuerbach speaks for 
materialists who disdain the importance given to something as unverifiable and as 
mythical as the resurrection. For him, "materialists are rationalists" because whatever 
is material is reasonable, and the resurrection is immaterial and unreasonable. 
Therefore, Christianity's belief in a soul and its life in heaven, apart from material 
corporeality, is non-rational and impossible.108 
Moltmann addresses such materialist viewpoints in his theology as he poses 
metaphysical questions to the physical sciences. He offers insightful critiques to the 
claim that there is nothing spiritual beyond the material. His theology is an attempt to 
deny the materialist assumption that humanity is progressing in its technological 
advancement. Technological progress, for Moltmann, is in many ways a sign of 
humanity's sinfulness and not progress. New technology enables the subjection of 
one people to another through advanced methods of warfare and oppression. The idea 
that humanity does not need religion because humanity will be perfected in the future 
107 Ludwig Feuerbach, The Essence o/Christianity, 135. 
108 Ludwig Feuerbach, "Die Unsterblichkeitsfrage vom Standpunkt der Anthropologie," in Gesammelte 
Werke, ed. Werner Schuffenhauer (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1973), 10:214. 
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from within is unacceptable to a theologian who advocates so strongly for the coming 
of God. 
Theology and Social Transformation 
One final aspect of the Reformed Tradition should be noted because it is 
prevalent throughout the work of each theologian, and that is their view that theology 
necessarily involves both individual and social transformation. The belief that 
theology has a positive contribution to make to society impresses itself in their work 
as they discuss the tightly wound connection between theology and ethics - faith and 
praXlS. This aspect of the tradition is obvious from its inception with Calvin's 
writings on the relationship between church and state and the Christian's role within 
society. 109 Calvin's argument surrounds the ethical practice of the Christian in 
relation to the civil government, and he demonstrates the necessity and importance of 
the Christian's conduct as a shaping influence on civil society. This theme is 
continued in our three modem theologians of the Calvinist tradition as the importance 
of Christian ethics runs throughout their work. Personal transformation extends 
beyond the actions of the individual to include the church's life as the redeemed 
community of God. The church is meant to live out its calling as a prophet to society, 
embodying the holiness of God and influencing the surrounding culture as a witness 
to God's liberation from sin. 
Ethics is prominent theme in Mackintosh's work as he insists on the essential 
link between theology and ethics, and he consistently demonstrates that eschatology is 
109 See Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, 1.4.10. 
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not aloof from the cnes of injustice in the contemporary world. Picking up the 
challenge of Marxist criticism of religion, Mackintosh asserts that faith deals head on 
with the realities of a suffering world: "Contemporary injustice deserves the tears and 
toil of the present generation, so much so that to sit idly by and dream about the future 
would be irresponsible and unethical toward the raging needs of the present. ,,110 For 
this reason, his writings focus on the ethical ramifications of different areas of 
doctrine. Like successor theologians, Mackintosh refuses to separate ethics from 
eschatology, and he criticizes those for whom eschatology inculcates laxity and 
irresponsibility toward this world and the practice of Christian ethics. 
Mackintosh anticipates later arguments by believing that biblical 
eschatological visions actually fuel the causes for a better world and that eschatology 
invigorates moral power in the present. F or Mackintosh, the Christian's future 
destiny is closely related to present attitudes, and Mackintosh calls it a comical 
endeavor to portray Christianity as irresponsible other-worldliness. The believer 
prepares himself or herself for a better, richer, fuller future life by living according to 
its truth and principles here and now. The content of Christian hope is morally 
qualified and assimilated into the actions and decisions of believers in the present 
world. Mackintosh resolutely affirms ethical responsibility throughout his 
eschatological writings, and he often illustrates the inseparable link between 
eschatology and ethics for Christian faith. 
Many of Brunner's works are shaped by his concern for Christian ethics and 
the necessity of living a life of discipleship based on Christ's example. The Religious 
Socialist movement in Switzerland played an important role in the shaping of 
Brunner's thought early on in his career. This movement was introduced to 
110 Mackintosh, Immortality and the Future, 124. 
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Switzerland through the work of the two Blumhardts, Johann and his son Christoph, 
both of whom were Lutheran pastors in southern Germany. The religious socialist 
movement came to the fore in Protestant churches as German and Swiss pastors 
became increasingly sensitive to the terrible plight of the working class and laborers 
in an industrialized society. One of the younger Blumhardt's close Swiss followers 
was Brunner's pastor and friend Kutter, and it was his book, Sie miissen, that opened 
Brunner's eyes to the necessity of a Christian response to the social ills of the 
Industrial Revolution. 
Known for his passionate preaching, Kutter inspired and organized Swiss 
pastors into the Swiss Religious Socialist movement with fiery zeal and rhetorical 
flair: "Our society makes a parade of morality because it has none; it grows furious 
over a little scandal to hide its own great scandal. Its morality is the painted shield of 
immortality."Ill Two of Brunner's professors at the University of Zurich, P. W. 
Schmiedel and W. Kohler, schooled Brunner and his contemporaries in the study of 
Scripture and its application along the lines of social ethics. While in England, 
Brunner advanced his socialist concerns by becoming familiar with the writings of the 
leaders of the Christian Labor Movement, including Ramsay McDonald and Philip 
Snowden. Within the scope of this movement, he became acquainted with William 
Temple, with whom he would remain a personal friend. II2 
The greatest formative influence on Brunner as a developing theologian was 
his involvement in the 1920's in the school of thought that would develop the 
dialectical theologians of the mid-twentieth century. Brunner was highly 
complimentary of Barth's 1919 Commentary on Romans, which is often cited as the 
spark that ignited the world's interest in dialectical theology. Brunner had already, in 
III Hennann Kutter, They Must; or, God and the Social Democracy, American edition (Chicago: Co-
0gerative Printing Co., 1906), 176. 
I 2 Brunner, "Intellectual Autobiography," 7. 
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fact, come to many of the same conclusions as Barth, and together, these two 
theologians led the charge in a recovery of the study of Luther, Calvin, and 
Kierkegaard, among others. I 13 
The mark of this movement was its disillusionment with liberal theology 
brought about by the total devastation of the First World War. The war confirmed 
that theological liberalism was bankrupt as a social force, and Brunner became 
engrossed in moving theology beyond Schleiermacher to address the massive ethical 
needs of the twentieth century. The aims of religious socialism needed to be re-
appraised in light of the failure of the movement's ability to address successfully the 
cultural and political crisis brought about by the war. The fact that so many of 
Germany's best theological leaders, including Harnack and Herrmann, had sided with 
Kaiser Wilhelm II's call to war disgusted Brunner and Barth and led them to 
incorporate ethics into the respective theologies. 
Likewise, the praxis of theology is central to Moltmann's theological project. 
All of Moltmann's early mentors were influenced by Barth's theology and his 
leadership in the Confessing Church, and all three heavily criticized the German 
church's complicity with the state under National Socialism. From these gifted 
teachers, Moltmann learned that the Christian church has a responsibility to be 
ethically involved in critiquing and examining the society that surrounds it. Like 
Mackintosh and Brunner before him, Moltmann believed that the purpose of theology 
was to ground the life of the church in the practical outworking of God's will in 
people's lives and in the world. Theology is not the domain of heady intellectuals 
isolated in academia, and therefore one of the main tasks of theology is to keep the 
church morally engaged with its world and the sins of humanity. In each generation, 
ll3 Granted, this statement is based on Brunner's own account of the situation. Brunner, "Intellectual 
Autobiography," 14. 
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the church relies on sound theology in its campaign to highlight the enormity of 
human sin and the grandness of God's mercy. Much of Moltmann's appreciation for 
the church's role in creating a just society can be attributed to the influence of his 
theological teachers during his student days, and their sway over him may be seen in 
his writings throughout his career. 114 
In regard to Moltmann's teachers and early influences, the work of Ernst Wolf 
must be mentioned as another key component in Moltmann's desire to link theology to 
social critique, ethics, and praxis. Wolf greatly influenced Moltmann's development 
of political theology because Wolf insisted that the church be open to and influenced 
by the social-political realm in which it carries out its mission. Moltmann builds into 
his theology defmite parameters for the practice and implementation of theological 
beliefs, and he has devoted much thought to the necessity for political theology. 
Moltmann's appreciation of both the cross and the resurrection inspires him to connect 
human suffering with political action aimed at eliminating the injustices that cause 
suffering. His strong considerations for praxis lead him to advocate for human rights 
in many places within his writings. His doctrine of creation feeds his understanding 
that human beings have been created in God's image, and that therefore all people 
possess aspects of dignity and honor that must not be trampled on by powerful people 
or institutions in the world. Praxis has an eschatological edge as well in that human 
rights lead to people living as God intended them to be -- in freedom and with dignity. 
114 The best examination of the influences upon Mol1mann's thought is by Meeks, Origins of the 
Theology of Hope (philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1974). 
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In the work of Arnold van Ruler and J. C. Hoekendijk, Moltmann found an 
expression of the linkage between eschatology and mission. II5 Speaking of van 
Ruler, Moltmann says: "Through him I became acquainted with eschatology (a field 
lying fallow), with the missionary initiative of Christianity, and, not least, with the 
joys of theological imagination.,,1l6 From this school of theology, Moltmann 
developed his theology of mission as a function of the church. Moltmann's overall 
theological project of eschatological hope gains its direction in the process of 
promise-commission-mission that comes to the church as it learns its identity and 
purpose.II 7 Established by God's promises and commissioned by Christ, the church 
fulfills its role of mission to the world in the proclamation, participation, and 
spreading of the Kingdom of God's peaceful reign. Moltmann relied on this insight 
from Hoekendijk in ecclesiology to move his own theology beyond Barth's "church 
dogmatics" to a position of "missionary dogmatics." What this means is that 
theology's true objective is not to serve the church in its own struggles of belief 
against heresy. Rather, theology's purpose is to serve the mission of the church in the 
world as it proclaims God's kingdom. In this way, theology is intimately connected to 
the struggles of all peoples in the arena of contemporary history. Through 
Hoekendijk, Moltmann came to believe that 
theology involves not only an internal struggle over doctrine but also 
an external contest over truth in the world. In view of the universal 
horizon of the future which is opened up in the action of the apostolate, 
the church finds possible a new cooperation with social and political 
movements of liberation and humanization in society. . .. Just as God's 
battle with and for the world is waged through the church's mission to 
the world, theology cannot surrender its solidarity with its 
contemporaries' struggle with reality nor can it forsake its inevitable 
115 For more on the intricacies of recent Dutch theology, see "Dutch Theology: Focus on A. A. Van 
Ruler," in Reformed Review 26 (1973): 67-147; see also Hendrikus Berkhof, "Moltmann Zwischen 
Zwei Niederlandem," in Gottes Zukunft -- Zukunft der Welt (Munich: ehr. Kaiser, 1986),469-480. 
116 Moltmann, "Politics and the Practice of Hope," in Christian Century 87 (1970): 289. 
117 Meeks, Origins a/the Theology a/Hope, 26. 
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conflict with their views of reality. The real task of theology must 
therefore be sought in the historical and world horizons of Christian 
thought and action. I IS 
Theology serves as the theoretical basis of the church's mission to the world, and 
theology shifts the church's emphasis from orthodoxy to orthopraxis. Theology sets 
its sights on God's future transformation of all things in the Kingdom, and theology 
then becomes part of that practical transformation as well. Any student of Moltmann 
will quickly recognize the major place of ethical praxis in his work and his theology's 
insistence on social transformation. 
The Continuum of Their Work 
Macintosh's stature and place in twentieth century Reformed theology make 
him a worthy subject for examination on the development of the eschatological 
subjects of time and eternity. In some ways, his work on time and eternity is a rough 
diamond because it is not as fully developed as that of his successors; it is nonetheless 
a jewel of early twentieth century theology. His wide-ranging command of nineteenth 
century European theology makes him an important link between that century's most 
important thought and that of the twentieth century. He has been acknowledged by 
subsequent theologians as playing a significant role in shaping British theology and 
serving as a precursor to mid-twentieth century theology, of which Brunner was a 
leading figure. 
Brunner's career extended for over forty years in length, and several of his 
works pulsate with eschatological themes. While he treats the subjects of time and 
eternity in other works, his 1954 book entitled Eternal Hope is solely dedicated to 
118 Meeks, Origins of the Theology of Hope, 29. 
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enumerating a systematic approach to these topics within an eschatological 
framework. Volume three of his Dogmatics also covers an extensive analysis of 
eschatology. Brunner's first major work, The Mediator, expresses many christological 
views that he would change over time, but the undercurrent of eschatology remains 
strong in his christology. It is in his massive work on theological anthropology, Man 
in Revolt, that one finds eschatological definitions of the human condition before an 
eternal and righteous God, and this work, among others, demonstrates how 
eschatological emphases affect other areas of doctrine. Given his place in the middle 
one-third of the twentieth century and his influence within Reformed theology, I have 
chosen Brunner as the second subject of this project because he makes important 
contributions to the understanding of the relationship between time and eternity. 
Moltmann serves as the representative of the twentieth century's close because 
he analyzes time and eternity throughout his writings. His views on history, the 
promise of the eschatological future, and christo logy all contain the theme of the 
time/eternity dialectic. For Moltmann, faith recognizes in Christ the temporal 
beginning of the eternal kingdom of God and the accompanying hope that is given 
toward the future. For Moltmann, the meaning of human life hinges on God's 
promises to renew life and creation, and this promise engenders hope in the present 
before the ultimate fulfillment of God's promises. As we have seen in the work of 
others, one of the top priorities of eschatology is to avoid the Marxist criticism that 
religion is the opiate of the masses and that Christian hope for the future advocates a 
laxity toward the evils of this present world. Moltmann insists that eschatology is 
meaningless if the faith of the church does not lead to mission, which must always 
point forward in hope to the kingdom of God. 
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N ow the work of critical analysis begins as we see how each theologian 
addresses what Schwabel highlights in his essay on the century of eschatology. As he 
points out, many ramifications for theology emerge from the ongoing emphasis placed 
on the relation between time and eternity. There is a continuity that runs throughout 
the work of Mackintosh, Brunner, and Moltmann as each theologian continues and 
develops certain themes from previous generations, and there are important changes 
in theological perspectives made as the century of eschatology moves forward. 
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Chapter Two 
Redefining Time: The Present 
In the introductory chapter, I stated my agreement with the conclusion that 
reality is dynamic and that a tensed view of time is correct. I also affirmed my 
preference for the view that time is defined and understood best through the tensed 
predicates of past, present, and future. Now I will analyze specific points of doctrine 
that, in my opinion, are best described by assigning them to one of these three 
temporal categories. Turning to the categories of tense, I start with the present mainly 
because it is given primacy over the past and future in a tensed view of time. The 
present is the crucial "time-bridge" linking the past and future. Since reality is 
dynamic, what does this lead us to affirm about God's "present" in relation to 
creation? In this chapter I shall begin by looking at the nature of God's eternity, 
which I categorize as present on account of the concept of simultaneity. Simultaneity 
has been part of the discussion of God's eternity since the Patristic period. 1 God's 
simultaneously present life in relation to temporal events is addressed in the theology 
of Mackintosh, Brunner, and Moltmann as each one differs from the classical 
understanding of God's timeless simultaneity. I will attempt to ascertain in their work 
if describing God as eternal means that God's life is dynamic, static, or some 
combination of both, and I will do so by focusing on the descriptions of God's 
eternity in the work of these three theologians. 
Also included in the present chapter is an analysis of the ways in which human 
beings experience time. Like all creatures, we are subject to the irreversible 
movement of time from the future into the present and into the past. This flow of 
1 For in intriguing comparison of the concept of simultaneity in the history of theology and literature, 
see Paul S. Fiddes, The Promised End: Eschatology in Theology and Literature (Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishers, Ltd, 2000), 110-147. 
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time, which we measure by different units, is as irreversible as the aging process into 
which human beings are born, live, grow older, and die. In addition to this linear 
experience of time, human beings possess an ability to transcend the linear flow of 
dynamic time. The human experience of time includes a type of simultaneity by 
which the linearity is suspended through memory and anticipation, thereby making 
the past and future contingently present. I will consider how each theologian 
describes our experience of time as creatures who share, in a limited way, in the 
eternity of God. 
Finally, I will follow their guidance that all doctrine be interpreted 
christologically by looking at the crucifixion of Jesus as an eschatological event. This 
event is categorized as present because even with the goodness and enjoyment of 
human life, which cannot be denied, life in the present includes the experiences of 
suffering and sin and eventually ends in death, and Christian theology has always 
drawn a connection between sin and death. For Mackintosh, Brunner, and Moltmann 
the cross represents God's experience of human suffering in its depths, while also 
revealing the eternal love of God and the divine will to redeem humanity from sin. 
Jesus' death on the cross is God's willingness to identify completely with the despair 
of human life. 
The Eternity of God 
The long history of Christian thought regarding God's eternity primarily views 
God as being above, beyond, and outside the passage of time -- as transcendently 
timeless - and measurements of time cannot be applied to God.' Influenced as he was 
by Platonism, Origen' s Alexandrian theology offers the first glimpse of divine 
65 
timelessness.2 God is beyond all time, and "the statements we make about the Father , 
Son, and Holy Spirit must be understood as transcending all time and ages and all 
eternity.,,3 It was Augustine who would take up the relation of eternity and time in a 
comprehensive, systematic way that would set the tone for Medieval theology. For 
Augustine, God is the creator of time, and God necessarily exists timelessly and 
changelessly apart from creation, of which temporality is an inherent feature. It is the 
phenomenon of change upon which Augustine based his view of eternity as 
timelessness, and his was the opinion that would endure for centuries: "The 
distinguishing mark between time and eternity is that the former does not exist 
without some movement and change, while in the latter there is no change at all.',4 
Augustine introduces here the theme of God's immutability as the ground upon which 
eternity is defined as distinct from all temporal processes which involve change, 
becoming, and decay. Thus, for Augustine and most subsequent theology, God's 
immutability is the basis for God's eternity, and a timeless God exists all at once in a 
simultaneous present: 
In you it is not one thing to be and another to live: the supreme degree 
of being and the supreme degree of life are one and the same thing. 
You are being in a supreme degree and are immutable. In you the 
present day has no ending, and yet in you it has its end: "all these 
things have their being in you" (Romans 11 :36). They would have no 
way of passing away unless you set a limit to them. Because "your 
years do not fail" (Psalm 102:27), your years are one Today.5 
2 Origen was steeped in the thought of Parmenides (ca. 510-540 BC), which dominated ancient Greek 
concepts of eternity. See Pannenides, Parmenides of Elea: Fragments, trans. David Gallop (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1984); see also the work ofOrigen's contemporary Plotinus, Enneads III, 
trans. A. H. Armstrong (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980). 
3 Origen, On First Principles, trans. G. W. Butterworth (Gloucester, Mass: Peter Smith, 1973),4.4.1. 
4 Augustine, The City of God, trans. Marcus Dods (New York: Modem Library, 1950), 11.6. 
5 Augustine, Confessions, trans. William Watts (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), 8. 
"It follows that he does not will ftrst one thing and then another, but that he will all that he will 
simultaneously, in one act, and eternity." Augustine, Confessions, 11.15. 
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Since time involves change and God is incapable of changing, it follows for 
Augustine that God lives in a single "today," a timeless, simultaneous moment which 
has no temporal extension into the past or future. 
Augustine's thought on God's simultaneously-lived "present" moment was 
further developed by Boethius, who gave Medieval theology its definition of God's 
timeless eternity. As he worked out his views on the nature of divine foreknowledge, 
Boethius offered his famous definition of eternity which would stand unaltered for 
centuries: 
It is the common judgment, then, of all creatures that live by reason 
that God is eternal. So let us consider the nature of eternity, for this 
will make clear to us both the nature of God and his manner of 
knowing. Eternity, then, is the complete, simultaneous and perfect 
possession of everlasting life; this will be clear from a comparison with 
creatures that exist in time ... Whatever includes and possesses the 
whole fullness of interminable life at once and is such that nothing 
future is absent from it and nothing past has flowed away, this is 
rightly judged to be eternal. 6 
God is the perfect being in that God's life and God's knowledge lack nothing, and the 
transience of time, which renders the past as gone, is not a factor within the 
omniscience of God. God cannot "lose" the past or be ignorant of the future. All 
events exist in an eternal "now", meaning that past and future are known 
simultaneously with the present with no distinguishing features between them for 
God. Otherwise, God would know temporal events in a series and thereby exist 
temporally as well. 
Since God does not experience the distinctions of past, present, and future, 
such tensed terms, while vital for the human experience of time, are inapplicable to 
God. God possesses "everlasting" life, the "whole fullness of interminable life," and 
temporal predicates do not apply to a life with no temporal extension into the past or 
6 Boethius, The Consolation of Philosophy, trans. V. E. Watts (Harrnondsworth, U. K.: Penguin, 1969), 
5.6. 
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the future. God's present is not like the human present, which is forever in flux as 
one moment passes away before the next: "He is ever, because 'ever' is with him a 
term of present time, and there is this great difference between the present of our 
affairs, which is now, and the divine present: our 'now' connotes changing time and 
sempiternity; but God's 'now,' abiding, unmoved, and immovable, connotes 
eternity.,,7 God's "now" is not sempiternal, meaning endlessly enduring through time. 
Again, for Boethius, God's immutability is the basis for timeless eternity, for if God 
were to experience change as everything created does, God would be temporal. 
Another model of divine timelessness is found in the subsequent thought of 
Anselm, who, like Boethius, asserts that God's life cannot be viewed in a series and 
thus divided into "parts." Essential in Anselm's approach is his view of God's 
simplicity, meaning that God is indivisible in his attributes, which include eternity.8 
God exists as a whole everywhere to all times. Anything that exists at one time and 
then at another is made up of different parts, which Anselm believes cannot be said of 
God: 
If this Nature were to exist as a whole distinctly and successfully at 
different times (as a man exists as a whole yesterday, today and 
tomorrow), then this Nature would be properly be said to have existed, 
to exist, and to be going to exist. Therefore, its lifetime -- which is 
nothing other than its eternity -- would not exist as a whole at once but 
would be extended by parts throughout the parts of time. Now, its 
eternity is nothing other than itself. Hence, the Supreme Being would 
be divided into parts according to the division oftime.9 
Again we see that God's unchangeableness is the defming concept for asserting that 
God exists in a timelessly eternal present. 10 Because time is the measure of change, a 
changeless being must be timeless. Since God's perfect being is unified and simple. 
7 Boethius, The Consolation of Philosophy, 4.2 
8 Anselm, Monologion, 18, in Anselm of Canterbury, v. 2, trans. J. Hopkins and H. W. Richardson 
(London: SCM Press, 1974). 
9An . selm, MonologlOn, 21. 
10 
Anselm, Monologion, 24. 
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i.e. indivisible, God cannot develop in any way that would make God greater in the 
future than who God is the present. 
We may conclude from this brief analysis that the classical view of God's 
eternity is one of timelessness, based on the immutability of a God who exists in the 
perfection of indivisible simplicity. I I This view would be maintained by orthodox 
theologians through the Reformation period and into modernity, so that we can safely 
say that Calvin's statements of God's eternity do not differ greatly from those of 
Schleiermacher. Like those before him, Calvin sought to define God's eternity by 
appealing to God's immutability, as he writes in his commentary on Psalm 90 that 
"God is here contrasted with created beings, who, as all know, are subject to continual 
changes, so that there is nothing stable under heaven. As, in a particular manner, 
nothing is fuller of vicissitude than human life, that men may not judge of the nature 
of God by their own fleeting condition, he is here placed in a state of settled and 
undisturbed tranquility.,,12 Schleiermacher makes a similar claim as he denies any 
temporal description of God: "We must therefore reject as inadequate all those 
explanations which abrogate for God only the limits of time and not time itself, and 
would form eternity from time by removal of limits, while in fact these are 
opposite.,,13 It is this classical, almost monolithic view of God's eternity as 
timelessness, based on God's immutability, that undergoes serious challenge and 
11 Aquinas similarly developed his perception of God's timelessness out of the principle of God's 
simplicity, and specifically cites Boethius as the source of his own definition of eternity. See Thomas 
Thomas Aquinas, Summa theological, tr Fathers of the English Dominican Province (New York: 
BenzigerBrothers, 1947-1948), 1.10.1; 1.14.9; 1.14.5. 
12 John Calvin, Commentary on the Book of Psalms, trans. James Anderson (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 
1949), Psalm 90. In a way similar to Boethius, Calvin also addresses God's simultaneous present in 
regard to his foreknowledge: "When we attribute foreknowledge to God, we mean that all things have 
been and perpetually remain before his eyes, so that to his knowledge nothing is future or past, but all 
things are present; and present in such a manner, that he does not merely conceive of them from ideas 
formed in his mind, as things remembered by us appear to our minds, but he holds them and sees them 
~s if.ac~ally placed before him." John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, 3. 20.2. 
Fnedrich Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, trans. H. R. Mackintosh and J. S. Stewart 
(Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1989),205. 
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refinement in the twentieth century, as evidenced by the work of our three 
representative theologians. 
The trend of twentieth century theology is an increasingly visible move away 
from eternity as timelessness toward a doctrine of God that incorporates time and 
change as part of God's being in eternity. Rather than eliminate the tenses of past, 
present, and future in regard to God, our three theologians claim that God does, in 
fact, experience temporality while remaining transcendent over history. Thus, what 
we see is that eternity takes on two new aspects in the work of Mackintosh, Brunner, 
and Moltmann. 
First, eternity becomes a qualitative, descriptive term for a certain kind of life, 
the eternal life of God, and in this way it maintains continuity with the classical 
definition. This definition of eternity is altered by our theologians to include the 
understanding that eternity includes time and that God, therefore, incorporates time 
and its ongoing changes as part of his being in relation to creation. Second, we see 
that the classical interpretation of God's eternity relies on the tenseless theory of a 
static reality, while our three theologians offer views, to varying degrees, on the 
fluidity of dynamic time at the disposal of God. With a fresh approach to God's 
immutability and impassability14 as discerned through christological lenses, our 
theologians offer perspectives which include divine change within God's eternal 
being. This redefmition of time and eternity includes an examination of the ways in 
which God shares eternity with human beings and how God, through the Son, suffers 
the effects of the transience and fmitude of temporal life. 
14 I do not mean to imply that these two terms can be used interchangeably, as if often the case in the 
literature on God's timelessness. There is an important distinction, and our three theologians discuss 
both, while emphasizing the inadequacy of impassability for God as he reveals himself in the passion 
of Christ For analysis of this distinction, see See Richard E. Creel, Divine Impassability (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1982), 82ff; Craig, God, Time, and Eternity, 74. 
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Time becomes the vehicle of a God who loves and suffers with his creation , 
and the connection between immutability, impassability and eternity is redefmed 
along christological lines by the Son of God who sacrifices himself for humanity's 
sake. Our three theologians agree that God's eternity is much different from a static 
notion of divine timelessness. Moving away classical theology, they defme eternity 
along the lines of a personal God who shares himself intimately with creation, and 
who, through the Son, experiences the pain and suffering that come with transience 
and death 
With the traditional link between God's eternity and impassability, it is no 
wonder that questions and doubts about God's power would emerge in the twentieth 
century during traumatic events where God's relationship to history is called into 
question. Can God not intervene in history to prevent human destruction or tragedy 
because time cannot contain the eternal? Events such as the two World Wars caused 
much agonizing confusion regarding God's love and God's lordship in history, and 
the question of theodicy raged among those who agonized over the suffering of 
humanity. Mackintosh was well into his theological career by the time of the First 
World War, and with the reality of Europe's monumental destruction and death toll, 
Mackintosh found himself surrounded by questions regarding the eternal God's 
relationship to time. I5 
Mackintosh begins his assessment of God's relationship to time by 
challenging the concepts of immutability and impassability that are assumed in the 
classical definition of eternity that we have seen. He contends that God is personal, 
and to be personal is to be capable of growth and change. God must experience 
15 Mackintosh asks the theodicy question in his own words: "Can God rightly be called infmite or 
omnipotent when such enormities as the recent conflict occur in His universe? . .It has never ceased to 
be a question of how a perfect God can rule so imperfect a world." Some Aspects of Christian Belief, 
39-40. 
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changes in his relations to humanity, and thus temporality becomes an element of 
God's relationships: "Is the relation of God to man of a static kind as immutable and 
intrinsic as the ratio holding between two given numbers, or is it interpretable in 
genuinely personal categories; susceptible, therefore, of change, growth, enrichment, 
consummation?,,16 He answers this question in the affirmative by taking into account 
the numerous biblical examples of God's engagement of human beings at various 
times in history. Because God is the divine person who engages human persons 
through love, some form of change is elemental in this relationship, so that in relating 
with people throughout history, "God's love has changed in its manifestations within 
time.,,17 This alone does not necessarily imply that God's being is strictly temporal, 
but it opens up a fissure in the classical contradiction between immutability and 
temporality. Mackintosh will not let the starting point of defining God's eternity be 
the traditional concept of God's unchangeableness. 
He develops this thought further by emphasizing the actions of personal God 
who is related to that upon which he acts. F or God to act upon another being or upon 
history itself in any kind of providential way connotes the necessity of change in 
God's relation to creation. God's changes in relation to creation are real changes 
within God himself. "The living God, clearly, is a God possessed of Will, and 
expressing that will in action. He is not unrelated to the changes that occurring in the 
world; and if His relation to them be positive, we cannot speak of Him as sheerly 
unchangeable, since He must change in acting upon a developing universe if He is not 
to change in a deeper, sinister sense.,,18 It is not clear what Mackintosh means by this 
"deeper, sinister sense," but he appears to be referring to the classical doctrine of 
immutability. If God does not change in regard to that which he loves, then it is 
16 Mackintosh, Some Aspects o/Christian Belief, 19. 
17 Mackintosh, Some Aspects o/Christian Belief, 52. 
18 Mackintosh, Some Aspects 0/ Christian Belief, 50. 
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possible that God is responsible for the evil of the world. 19 If everything, including 
suffering, is statically fixed in the time-stream, then God would be either incapable or 
unwilling to respond to respond in love and mercy. For God not to be merciful would 
be contradictory to his character, inciting this "sinister" change in God. The 
personality of God is such that he responds to the cries of his people who suffer and is 
changed by his response as he delivers, guides, and loves his creatures. 
The changes that God experiences in relation to creation are real changes that 
affect God's life in such a way that God is capable of incorporating temporal change 
within his eternal life. Mackintosh is willing to admit that this view appears to be a 
contradiction because it is hard to describe how an omniscient God could be affected 
by changes that he can foresee. Nevertheless, Mackintosh asserts that temporal 
changes affect God's being because God is not impassable toward that which he has 
created: 
Relief from antinomy may be sought by declaring boldly that God has 
a career like anyone of us - that, in short He is growing ... To cut the 
Divine life away from all positive connexion with the stream of events 
would be to land ourselves in sheer theological agnosticism .... Thus by 
a vital need of religion we seem driven to assert that God has new 
experiences. If for Him the temporal succession is other than a vain 
and transient drama, if He does more than eternally contemplate the 
succession as a whole, then His will projects into history, and 
somehow its issues are for Him again. 20 
From this we ascertain that Mackintosh views God's eternity as a dynamic process in 
which time's passage is real and important. Reality is not static, and neither is the 
God who interacts with it. It follows then that God is not strictly timeless, but 
incorporates time into his etemallife. 
19 Augustine states the same conundrum in his debate about free-will and divine foreknowledge. See 
Augustine, "On Free Will," in Augustine: Earlier Writings, trans. 1. H. Burgleigh, v. 6 (Philadelphia: 
The Westminster Press, 1953),11.2.4. 
20 Mackintosh, Some Aspects o/Christian Belief, 56-57. 
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Mackintosh strongly resists, however, the logic of Process Theology that God 
is instrumental in but not sovereign over the movement of history and its events. 
Although God experiences changes in relation to time, Mackintosh denies the 
extension of this thought to say that God is not yet able to exert supreme authority 
11 . 21 over a creatton. An element of Process thought is the belief that God is so 
connected to creation that God cannot be transcendent over the events of time and 
history. Rather than defining God as the Creator of the world "out of nothing," 
Whitehead views God as the shaper and organizer of a world process by which God is 
attempting to bring his kingdom to reality as part of the outworking of his divine life. 
This belief leads Whitehead to say that "since God is actual, He must include in 
himself a synthesis of the total universe. There is, therefore, in God's nature the 
aspect of the realm of forms as qualified by the world, and the aspect of the world as 
qualified by the forms.,,22 This divine life includes creation, and God moves the 
world through the power of love and divine empathy. 23 God is not, in contrast to 
Mackintosh's view, a sovereign God who intervenes in history to determine its 
outcome.24 
While Process thinkers are reacting against classical notions of divine 
impassability, they do so by affirming a form of naturalism that envisions God as part 
of the creative process within the world.25 This, in turn, implies that God's being in 
eternity is contingent upon the temporal process. God is incapable of directing the 
course of creation in any sense because such direction necessarily implies a Lordship 
over history. The idea that God is somehow limited within the immanent functioning 
21 Donald G. Bloesch helpfully points out the differences between Refonned and Process approaches to 
sovereignty in his "Process Theology and Refonned Theology," in Process Theology, ed. Ronald H. 
Nash (Grand Rapids: Baker Book, 1987),35-56. 
22 A. N. Whitehead, Religion in the Making (New York: Macmillan, 1929),93. 
23 Whitehead, Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology, ed. David R. Griffm (New York: Free 
Press, 1929) 73. 
24 . ' 
25 WhItehead, Adventures in Ideas (New York: Free Press, 1967), 121. 
See Bloesch, "Process Theology and Refonned Theology," 390. 
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processes of the world is therefore irreconcilable to God's transcendent Lordship over 
history. 
Even though Mackintosh affirms that God changes through the experiences he 
has with creation, these changes do not mean that God is growing in his attributes, 
such as in his omnipotence or omniscience. God simply cannot be limited by the past 
or unknowing toward the future: "If to apply the conception of growth to God 
involves His subjection, on a par with men, to time's passage and duration, we shall 
have no choice but to attribute to Him, to select but one example, such an ignorance 
of the future as will wreck Christian faith in providence from end to end. ,,26 For 
Mackintosh, there is an inseparable connection between God act of creating, including 
the creation of time, and God's Lordship, which is omnipotent over that which he has 
created. The idea of God's growth in omnipotence destroys the eschatological goal 
toward which God draws creation because there may be unknown entities stronger 
than or wiser than God that can prevent the goal from being achieved: 
To believe that the world is under no supreme control, that there are 
events in the future which God does not know and cannot rule and 
overrule, is to cut faith at the root. The notion of such a God, 'of 
limited liability' if we may put it so, reduces life to anarchy, and when 
taken seriously cannot but alter gravely the relations of men to the 
Father. 27 
If God is not sovereign in his freedom over time, then God and all creation will 
forever remain in flux, and God may lack the necessary ability to bring creation to its 
consummation. If God were to lack sovereign wisdom and power, then we would 
have to claim that God is also incomplete in holiness and love, so that God is more 
26 Mackintosh, Some Aspects of Christian Belief, 51. God is not fmitely limited by historical events 
because "to God the course of the world is not external fate by which He is confronted, and with which 
He too must somehow come to tenns; its multiplicity and mutation, with the reality of progress and 
movement these imply, constitute a sphere for creative action that weaves into the cosmic texture this 
dominating pattern of redemptive love. History then is such that salvation may come by way of it." 
Mackintosh, Some Aspects of Christian Belief, 16. 
27 Mackintosh, The Christian Apprehension of God (London: SCM Press, 1929),229-230. 
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loving and holier today than a few years ago. While it is true to say that the 
manifestations of God's love have changed over time, it is not conceivable that these 
manifestations were a result of God's increasing wisdom and love in regard to 
creation. This would make the eternal God subject to time, rather than time's 
subjection to the Lordship of God. 
Thus, to sum up Mackintosh's understanding of God's eternity, we see that 
Mackintosh defines eternity in relation to God's sovereignty, yet he makes an 
important qualification on the omnipotence of God. He argues that God's providential 
guiding and directing of history must be understood in relation to God's redemptive 
purposes and not God's raw power as such.28 God guides history toward a goal, and 
the Christian understanding of eternal sovereignty never depicts raw power as such 
but redemptive power exercised through the choices of God. God does not exercise 
sovereign power for the sake of power alone, but God does exercise power graciously 
for the purpose of bringing redemption. Mackintosh contends that the intent of God's 
sovereign will is a redemptive love that is exercised on behalf of others, namely 
human beings. At issue is the question of human freedom and, in a larger sense, the 
freedom of creation as a separate entity from God. 
When we see that Mackintosh's doctrine of God's eternity allows for some 
elements of temporal change while denying progress and growth to God's character 
and attributes, we may say that Mackintosh arrives at a conclusion similar to Alan 
Padgett's view of God's "relative timelessness.,,29 Padgett argues that God is timeless 
in the sense that God is not measured by time or subject to the negative aspects of 
temporal loss or transience. God does transcend created time, but God also enters into 
relationships with temporal creatures and is affected by their lives. Padgett further 
28 See Barth's similar analysis in Church Dogmatics, WI, 524. 
29 Padget, God, Eternity and the Nature a/Time, 120-130. 
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argues that the ancient view of God's timelessness is true only if the tenseless view of 
reality is true. God's personal interaction in sustaining creation, however, implies that 
God changes in relation to creation and that therefore God's life is tensed and 
dynamic: "God's choice, then, to live a certain kind of life - to be dynamic, active, 
changing - is the ground of the temporality of the universe.,,3o What this means for 
Padgett is that as the creator of time, God is also the Lord of time, and God "has a 
design or a plan which he is enacting in history." Mackintosh would agree 
wholeheartedly with this understanding of God's plan/1 but even more than that, 
Mackintosh would fmd much kinship with Padgett in their mutual understanding that 
while God's dynamic life involves change, God's eternal attributes are timelessly 
unchanging. 
Brunner's doctrine of eternity offers a critique similar to Mackintosh's 
regarding the traditional account of God's timelessness, and Brunner dismisses the 
classical definition as unrepresentative of the God revealed in scripture. Like his 
ancient and medieval predecessors, Brunner begins his understanding of eternity with 
the immutability of God. The living God "is the absolutely living One to whom is 
proper nothing of transience, the existence in death, which cleaves to all temporality. 
God's being is changelessness and immortality.,,32 Brunner's language is also 
reflective of Boethius when he describes the unity of the past and future in the 
simultaneous present of God: "God embraces past and future in an unqualified sense, 
time does not flow away from Him, He controls it; He has therefore absolute duree 
reelle, real undivided, unconquered, indissoluble fullness of life in the present. The 
divine moment thus holds together past and future in an indivisible unity.,,33 This 
30 Padgett, God, Eternity, and the Nature o/Time, 123. 
31 A collection of Mackintosh's sermons is entitled Life on God's Plan. 
32 
Brunner, Eternal Hope, 55. 
33 
Brunner, Eternal Hope, 55. 
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may initially lead one to believe that Brunner will strictly follow the classical line of 
God's timeless eternity, but this is not the case as Brunner continues to delve into the 
meaning of God's eternity's and his relation to time. 
Citing the origins of timelessness in Platonism, Brunner sees that the idea of 
divine timelessness as developed by classical theologians is concerned with the static, 
timeless truth of Ideas, one of which is God's negative relation to temporality?4 
Brunner contends that God's eternity must be defmed in the opposite way: as it 
positively relates to time. God is positively related to time as its creator and Lord, so 
"the relation of God to Time and temporal development is not negative but positive. 
God is infinitely 'interested' in the time-process .... God takes part in temporal 
happenings, indeed He even involves Himself in the temporal; He reveals Himself in 
historical time.,,35 Brunner then goes on to declare that God must be understood as 
changeable in his dealings with humans and creation because God reacts to the 
changes in people's lives, and this reaction precipitates a change in God. 
God is moved by what happens on earth and to his creatures, and God is 
attuned to and concerned by changes in the world. God hears the prayers of his 
people, a fact which demonstrates God's deep interest in their lives. What affect them 
affects the God, who is their maker and sustainer: "In so far as He hears prayer, in so 
far as "He repents Himself', in so far as He is concerned about man, God is not the 
Unchangeable. He is not Unchangeable because, and in so far as, He has created 
Time, and takes part in temporal happenings.,,36 In this sense, Brunner, too, presents 
34 For Plato, eternity is an ideal state, of which time is a faint copy. See Plato, Timaeus 37d, in Plato, 
The Complete Works, ed. John M. Cooper (Indianapolis, IN: Hacket Publishers, 1997), 1241. "This 
'Eternity" (of Platonic philosophy) is the negation of Time, as the Absolute is the negation of the finite. 
It makes Time an illusion, which has no share in timeless truth. Time must be depreciated, denied, as 
the creaturely must be depreciated and denied. The eternal godhead of Plato has no relation - least a 
merely negative one - to all that 'is becoming' within Time." Brunner, Dogmatics: The Christian 
Doctrine of God, v. 1, trans. Olive Wyon (London: Lutterworth Press, 1949),266. 
35 B 
36 runner, Dogmatics, v. 1,268. 
Brunner, Dogmatics, v. 1,269. 
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God's eternity as a dynamic state which allows for change and becoming in relation to 
creation, while God also maintains a Lordship over time as its sovereign creator. 
Based on this positive affectation between time and God, Brunner develops the idea 
that God's eternity is not timelessness because God includes time in his being.37 
Dynamic time is part of God's life, and time is positively fulfilled in by presence of 
God: "God includes and comprehends Time within His Presence; He does not 
eliminate it, but He fulfils it. God's Being is not timeless; but it is full of time, 
fulfilling time; all that is temporal is present in Him in the same way, or, to put it 
more correctly: He is present in the Temporal as a whole as He wills.,,38 Thus, 
Brunner concludes that it is not inconsistent to claim that God exists in a simultaneous 
present because time is a constituent of God's life and experiences. 
Like Mackintosh, Brunner does not allow God's temporal changeableness to 
be further developed into a theory of God's dependence upon time in the outworking 
of his will for creation. Even though God's life includes dynamic time, God's 
immanent sharing of time with creation does not mean that God is bound by the 
process of creation's continuance within time and space. Brunner is opposed to any 
hint of God's growing, along with the world, in love, holiness, and especially in 
sovereignty: 
Were God Himself One who is 'becoming' then everything would 
founder in the morass of relativism. We can measure nothing by 
changing standards; changeable norms are no norms at all; a God who 
is constantly changing is not a God whom we can worship... The 
Kingdom of God comes; and God is infinitely concerned about its 
Coming. But He Himself stands high above the sphere of becoming; 
for Time is His creation. God stands above Time because He is its 
37 Barth arrives at a similar conclusion in presentation of the Eternal Word of God as spoken by God: 
"Here the dilemma does not arise, between a present that disappears midway between the past and 
future, and a past and future that dissolve for their part into a present. Here there is a genuine 
present ... The Word of God is. It is never 'not yet' nor 'no longer' ... The Word spoken from eternity 
raises the time into which it is uttered (without dissolving it as time), up into His own eternity, as now 
~is own time." Barth, Church Dogmatics, 112, 52. 
Brunner, Dogmatics, v. 1,270. 
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Creator and Lord. The God who creates Time, who makes a 
beginning, who 'allows' time, and who will one day say: 'Now it is 
ended!' -- this God is not Himself involved in the Time-process.39 
Brunner mires himself down in contradiction with this statement in that, on the one 
hand, he affirms God's positive relation to time, yet on the other hand he denies 
God's involvement in the time-process. It is of critical importance to note, however, 
that Brunner is addressing here the sovereignty of God over time versus the idea of 
God's development within time. God's immanence within time does not dictate that 
God be subject to time and dependent upon the temporal process.40 God's eternity, 
then, is equivalent to God's Lordship over time. Without being the Lord of time, God 
would be unable to foresee and overcome the obstacles to redemption that humanity 
and evil continually use to thwart God's purposes. God also would be subject to the 
transience which accompanies the progression of time, including evil. 
The main way in which Brunner addresses the classical definition's linkage of 
God's eternity and impassability is to delve into the meaning of God's love as 
revealed in history and how this love affects temporal creatures. Brunner seeks to 
distinguish his concept of God's eternal simultaneity by making a connection between 
the "present" of God and God's never-ending love. God reveals himself to be self-
giving love, and this love has always existed between the Father and the Son in a 
"dialogue of love in eternity." In this way, he sees God's eternal present as "not the 
silence of sheer self-existence, but the conversation between the Father and the Son 
which has no beginning and no ending.,,41 Therefore, God's always present, eternal 
39 Brunner, Dogmatics, v. 1,269. 
40 Macquarrie states the difficulty of relating God's transcendence over history to God's immanence 
within it by saying: "There is no doubt a sense in which God transcends history, yet history is also the 
region or medium in which he realizes his purposes, and surely this is important to him and makes 
some difference to him. God is not simply above history, unaffected and unchanged by it, nor is he 
simply within history as a kind of evolving God in a way that some empiricists have visualized him. 
He is both above and within, however difficult it may be for us to conceive this." John Macquarrie, 
Thinking About God (London: SCM Press, 1975), 113. 
41 
Brunner, Eternal Hope, 56. 
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life is lived in loving relationships, and God bestows this "presence" of love upon 
human beings.42 To live in eternity is to live in the fullness of love, and the love of 
God is always present within God's eternal, Trinitarian being. Through the Holy 
Spirit, our present experience of God's love is a reflection of God's eternal present. 
God wills to share this loving eternal present with temporal creatures, so that God's 
presence is love, which is given to human beings in time -- in the present. God's 
present presence of love is the experience of the Christian who lives in a relationship 
of faith and trust with God. 
Brunner's thought on God's eternal temporality finds interesting parallels in a 
proposal by Craig in which he proposes a unique angle on a change in God's life --
from being timeless to being temporal. Brunner initially contends that God is timeless 
in his transcendence and sovereignty over time, but then he quickly describes the 
ways in which God is personally affected by the events which occur within time. God 
personally encounters human beings and is personally affect by their lives and 
circumstances. In a similar vein, Craig offers a novel, and in his own words 
"curious," account of how God takes on temporality by being actively creative within 
the world.43 Craig argues that if God is truly related to the temporal world in a 
personal way, then God must possess temporality as part of his own being. A loving 
God cannot remain untouched by the temporal world he has created, and therefore 
God has a history because God has a relationship with the temporal world that he has 
made. This fact reminds us of Brunner's assertions regarding the acute importance of 
God's personal being in relation to other personal beings. It is through this personal 
relationship that God has a history with temporal creatures he has made. 
42 See the translator's note in Eternal Hope, p. 58, for Brunner's stylistic play on the words Gegenwart 
and Gegenwiirtigkeit to describe God's presence in love in the present. 
43 W·II. 
I lam Lane Craig, "Timelessness and Omnitemporality," in God and Time: Four Views, ed. 
Gregory Ganssle (Downers Grove, IL: Intervarsity Press, 2001), 140-153; see also Craig, God, Time, 
and Eternity, 270-280. 
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Craig advances from this view of God's temporality to propose that God's act 
of creating time serves as the boundary between God's timelessness and God's 
temporality. The act of creating, out of nothing, a universe that God loves brings 
about a change in God's own being - from tenseless to tensed, from timeless to 
temporal: 
It seems to me, therefore, that it is not only coherent but also plausible 
that God existing changelessly alone without creation is timeless and 
that he enters time at the moment of creation in virtue of his real 
relation to the temporal universe. The image of God existing idly 
before creation is just that: a figment of the imagination. Given that 
time began to exist, the most plausible view of God's relationship to 
time is that he is timeless without creation and temporal subsequent to 
• 44 creatIOn. 
This line of reasoning resonates with Brunner's assumptions of the empathetic 
relationship God has with creation, and in particular, with humanity. For God to be 
aware of events in temporality, God must also possess a sense of time and its 
correlation to events. The history of Israel and the church is a relationship with God 
that changes over time, and divine timelessness would negate the interaction of the 
personal God with the world.45 
Moltmann's descriptions of the eternity of God are similar to the preceding 
theologians in some regards, but he incorporates into his views several different 
aspects to emphasize the dynamic nature of God's eternal life. Echoing the thought of 
his predecessors, Moltmann agrees that we cannot turn to the classical notions of 
immutability and impassability as the starting point to define God's eternity. 
Moltmann judges that when it comes to describing eternity, the classical language of 
God's superlative characteristics is inadequate when compared with the revelation of 
God in history through Jesus Christ. The classical line starts with all of the 
44 Craig, Craig, "Timelessness and Omnitemporality," 160. 
45 Craig, "Timelessness and Omnitemporality," 171. For critiques of Criag's view, see the responses to 
his essay in God and Time, 161-174. 
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superlative attributes that distinguish God from humanity -- i.e. impassibility, 
ommSCIence, omnipotence, and omnipresence - and then moved toward 
understanding Christ's life and mission from within the classical definition of God. 
Moltmann, in contrast, believes that one must start first with the revelation of 
God in Christ, and in particular his cross, and then arrive at the definition of God's 
eternal attributes: "If, in the manner of Greek philosophy, we ask what certain 
characteristics are 'appropriate' to the deity, then we have to exclude difference, 
diversity, movement and suffering from the divine nature ... But if we tum instead to 
the theological proclamation of the Christian tradition, we fmd at its very center the 
history of Christ's passion. ,,46 In the negation of what it means to be human, God is 
defined as omnipresent, omniscient, and omnipotent. Moltmann begins, conversely, 
from the standpoint of who God is as revealed by the Son incarnate in Jesus, and he 
works back from the revelation of Jesus to speak of God's being in eternity. He 
concludes, therefore, that immutability and impassability are insufficient for 
describing who God is in eternity. 
To be eternal, according to Moltmann, is to possess God's unlimited eternal 
ability to suffer with and for others. Rather than being dispassionate, God is, quite to 
the contrary, deeply affected by events and circumstances within creation. We know 
this primarily from the witness of Jesus Christ, and Jesus is in time what God is in 
eternity. Moltmann refuses to begin discussions of God from the speculative starting 
point of God's absolute, eternal nature because Christian theology should begin with 
the temporal person of Christ, who embodies God's eternal passion for humanity. In 
this rationale there is a similarity between Mackintosh, Brunner, and Moltmann as 
both draw attention to the cross as the ultimate revelation of eternal love. For both 
46 
Moltmann, The Trinity and the Kingdom, 21. 
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there is no greater revelation of the pathos of God than the cross of Christ, and the 
cross must be the starting point for understanding God's eternal being.47 What the 
Son does and who the Son is in time, God is the same in eternity. 
Moltmann follows Brunner in making a connection between God's eternity 
and God's love so that eternity and love are descriptive terms of God's inner-
Trinitarian life, and therefore eternity cannot simply be the negation of temporality. 
Since the loving eternity and eternal love of the Triune God are revealed by the Son in 
the temporal life of Christ, it follows that temporality is experienced by God.48 God's 
immanent love in time is no different from God's transcendent love in eternity, and 
the eternal nature of God's love is revealed in the love that Christ exhibited in the 
temporal sphere: 
If we follow through the idea that the historical passion of Christ 
reveals the eternal passion of God, then the self-sacrifice of love is 
God's eternal nature ... God is love; love makes a person capable of 
suffering; and love's capacity for suffering is fulfilled in the self-giving 
and the self-sacrifice of the lover. Self-sacrifice is God's very nature 
and essence .... God sacrifices himself in eternity, and his whole nature 
is embodied in this act. He is the lover, the beloved, and the love 
itself.49 
Working first from Christ's revelation of God's suffering pathos allows us to say what 
God's eternal being is like. God's suffering love and eternity are bound together, and 
these constitute a life that is unique to God. Steen believes that Moltmann affirms a 
contradiction within the Trinitarian Godhead at this point in that Moltmann too 
severely separates the relationship between the Father and the Son in Moltmann's 
theology of the cross.50 The Father is opposed to the Son in the Son's role as 
47 Moltmann, The Trinity and the Kingdom, 31. 
48 Barth similarly works out his views on God's incorporation of time in his analysis of the tinitarian 
life of God, so the he can speak: of "before" and "after" within God's life. See Barth, Church 
Dogmatics, III!, 615. 
49 
Moltmann, The Trinity and the Kingdom, 32. 
50 M. Steen, "Jurgen Moltmann's Critical Reception of Barth's Theopaschitism," in Ephemerides 
Theologicae Lovanienses, v. 4, Dec. 1991,287. 
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humanity's representative before God. The Father and the Son are separated as the 
Father delivers the Son up to god forsakenness. Moltmann's response is based on his 
belief that although they are separated by the god-forsakennes in the cross, they are 
united in love by the Spirit. The Spirit serves as the inner-Trinitarian link as the Son 
and Father suffer separation on the cross. The Son's willingness to suffer for others in 
obedience to the Father, yet to be united in love through the Spirit, is indicative of the 
eternal, inter-Trinitarian relationship. In this sense Moltmann can say that God 
sacrifices himself in eternity. To be eternal, therefore, is to be unlimited in ability to 
suffer on another's behalf, and just as Christ does this within history, so also does God 
do it in eternity. 
Moltmann wants to maintain God's sovereignty over time as its creator and 
Lord in ways that affirm God's transcendence: "God must undoubtedly be thought of 
as 'above the times'. We express this with the idea of his eternity."Sl However, 
Moltmann's writings on the nature of eternity see this transcendence as inclusive, not 
exclusive, of time. In The Coming of God, Moltmann makes the case for his future-
oriented eschatology by emphasizing the scriptural anticipation of God's coming to 
and eventual arrival in the world. The temporal past and present are open to the 
future of God's coming, and the future of God, therefore, is the source of the future of 
time. Temporality will be filled with the glory of the coming and so that "what comes 
is eternal life and eternal time."s2 Moltmann denies, therefore, a static view of God's 
eternity as a timeless simultaneity because eternity is the "power of his future over 
every historical time." With the coming of God, temporality, as oriented toward 
God's future, ends "and eternal time begins." This concept of eternal time as it relates 
51 
52 Moltmann, The Coming of God, 297. 
Moltmann, The Coming of God, 23. 
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to God's "absolute eternity" reqUIres closer examination to understand what 
Moltmann means by this term. 
When he describes the relation between eternity and time, the term that 
Moltmann repeats in his exposition of God's being is that of "absolute eternity," 
which is inclusive of time in several ways. Despite his objections to the notion of 
time and history as an "eternal present" to God,53 the absolute eternity of God is 
clearly a type of simultaneity in which all times -- past, present, and future -- are 
"now" for God. Human beings experience simultaneity, a "relative eternity," when 
the mind makes the past present through memory and makes the future present 
through expectation, thus making simultaneous that which occurs at different times. 
Moltmann takes this concept a step further in applying it to God: "This (human) 
simultaneity, however fragmentary in kind, of past and future in the present is a 
relative eternity, for simultaneity is one of the attributes of eternity. Universal 
simultaneity would be absolute eternity as 'the fullness of time' .,,54 God possesses 
absolute eternity because he possesses this "fullness," a fullness of time with is 
equivalent to the fullness of life. 55 
Time itself is transformed by God's coming to it to bring it the qualities of this 
fullness, and this transformation of time by God endows it with a "relative eternity" 
that participates in God's absolute eternity. Moltmann terms this relative eternity as 
aeonic eternity, which is cyclical and reversible, as opposed to the irreversible 
experience of linear time56: 
Eternity in time, fmally, is nothing other than the other side of the 
present. ... Present always makes-present past and future. Present thus 
53 Moltmann, The Coming of God, 281. 
54 Moltmann, The Coming of God, 287. 
55 Here we see Moltmann's agreement with Boethius' terminology: "The whole, simultaneous and 
complete possession and enjoyment of life is the fullness of time in the fullness of the loved life." 
~oltmann, The Coming of God, 291. 
Moltmann, The Way of Jesus Christ, 331; 
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always makes-present eternity in time, since eternity is the simultaneity 
of past and future. 'As long as we can say today' eternity reaches into 
time. That is not the absolute eternity of the 'Wholly Other' God, but 
it is, surely, the aeonic eternity of the invisible world of heaven, which 
is bound up with the time of this visible world of the earth. 57 
The coming of God transforms temporality into aeonic eternity, which, in turn, is 
dependent upon God's absolute eternity. In God's absolute eternity, time extends 
forwards and backwards in all times so that all times are always present to God. 
Like Brunner, Moltmann defines eternal life along qualitative lines as the 
fullness of creative life. There is an important difference, however, between 
Brunner's opinion regarding the "eternal present" of God and Moltmann's view on the 
openness of the future. Whereas Brunner ascribed the eternal present to God's 
experience of all times simultaneously, Moltmann's desire is to leave the future open 
as a realm of possibility, meaning that all times are not immediately present to God. 
One of the emphases in the first chapter of Theology of Hope is Moltmann's 
separation from the dialectical notion of God's eternity confronting every moment in 
time. Instead of following this line, Moltmann draws a distinction between the 
present and the future of God. If to God all time is strictly present, then Moltmann 
believes this undercuts the notion of real process, growth, and change within history. 
Mackintosh was quick to affirm the reality of change within history, yet Moltmann 
claims that the classical concept of God's eternal present means that there is no room 
for promise and fulfillment if all times are simultaneous to God. For Moltmann, there 
must be an outstanding future for God, particularly the future of Jesus Christ. The 
future is yet to be determined by God, and that future is dependent upon the continual 
activity of Christ in the process of redemption. Viewing time as a process which 
contains the promise of the future means that 
57 
Moltmann, The Coming o/God, 290. 
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the word of God -- Deus dixit -- would not be the naked self-proof of 
the eternal present, but a promise which as such discloses and 
guarantees an outstanding future. Then the result of this revelation in 
promise would be a new perception of history's openness towards the 
future. Not all ages would have an equally immediate relation to God 
and an equal value in the light of eternity, but they would be perceived 
to be in a process determined by the promised eschaton.58 
Although the eschaton is a promise spoken over time, the fact that it is still in the 
future means that God himself still awaits the outcome of history, and as such, not all 
history is present to God. It is on account of the promise of God's future that 
Moltmann sees a need for distinguishing between present and future, a difference that 
is just as real for God as it is for humanity. 
This is an important shift away from the thinking of Mackintosh and Brunner, 
who repel the notion of "growing God" whose knowledge of the future is subject to 
the passage of time. While Moltmann maintains that the future goal of creation is in 
the kingdom of God, he leaves room open for the development of God in relation to 
history. This is a central theme for Moltmann: that Christ, hence God, is "on the way" 
to his Lordship over all creation. Because the eschaton is yet to happen, there is 
development in God's Lordship over time, because time is part of creation. Whether 
or not Moltmann would claim that God is holier and more loving now than yesterday 
is questionable, and Moltmann seems to leave open the possibility of a God who 
grows in eternity as time passes on toward the consummation. 
In sum, what we have seen within the work of Mackintosh, Brunner, and 
Moltmann is a continual move away from the classical line of God's eternity as 
timelessness. This move has been accompanied by a shift in thinking regarding the 
capability of God to include time within his eternity. All three see change as 
instrumental in God's relationship with human beings, and it is disingenuous to claim 
58 
Moltmann, Theology of Hope, 58. 
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that God is not affected by the changes and events of the creatures he loves. 
Mackintosh and Brunner want to draw a line between God' mutability and God's 
omniscience to say that even in his perfect knowledge, God is personally affected by 
events even ifhe "knows" them before they happen. They similarly assert that God's 
mutability in response to creatures should not imply a limit on God's sovereignty, as 
if God lacks control over creation and is bound by its own laws and processes. 
Moltmann, however, affirms God's sovereignty over creation but proposes that God is 
limited in his knowledge of the future. Christ is on the way to his Lordship and full 
sovereignty, but he is not there yet. The future is open due to the promise spoken 
over it by God. While the outcome of God's kingdom is not in doubt for Moltmann, 
the events and means by which it is achieved are. 
The Human Experience of Time 
Given this complex connection between eternity and time in the life of God, 
what may be said about the ways in which human beings, as part of creation, 
experience time? People are similar to all living creatures in that their lives are 
transient, marked by change, growth, decay, and, eventually death. Yet human beings 
are also unique among creatures through their special relationship with God, and this 
relationship allows them to transcend time, if only in a limited way. Each of our three 
theologians acknowledges that human beings experience time in ways much different 
from the rest of creation. Humanity possesses the distinction from other creatures of 
being both bound by the temporal process and able to see past it. We are limited by 
the transience of time, and human life is subject to temporal events beyond its control. 
Yet men and women also possess a way of rising above time to share in the eternity of 
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God, and God wills that human beings should not be limited by time. The life that 
humans live in relation to God means that we can overcome the strict boundaries of 
past, present, and future in our experiences. 
From the outset it must be noted that Mackintosh's thought on the human 
experience of time is considerably less-developed compared to that of both Brunner 
and Moltmann. This fact is a sign of the significant transformation of the 
understanding of time within the twentieth century. Yet even so, we see III 
Mackintosh a fledgling understanding of human transcendence over time that would 
grow tremendously in the generations that follow him. 
Mackintosh's limited rationale on the human expenence of time revolves 
around his perception that the eternal love of God and historical events are woven 
together "by the unbreakable strands of living fiber." The strongest strand is that of 
Jesus Christ, to whom the believer is united in a relationship beyond time. Christ was 
an historical person, yet he is also the transcendent Lord, and Christ unites himself 
with Christians in such a way as to allow them to transcend time. The Christian looks 
back (in memory) to the historical events of Christ's life, and these past events reveal 
the living Christ as he joins himself to the believer through faith. 
Mackintosh does not deal with humanity in general, but he does maintain that 
Christians posses an ability to transcend time through memory and hope based on 
their mystical union with God through ChriSt.59 This mystical union does not imply 
the intermingling of divine and human "substances" in a pantheistic manner, but, 
instead, the union is between the personalities60 of God and the Christian in a spiritual 
59 Mackintosh, "The Unio Mystica as a Theological Conception," in Some Aspects of Christian Belief, 
99-120. 
60 "We have to put aside the category of 'substance' and construe the facts freshly in terms of 
personality. On the accepted principle of modem philosophy that there are degrees of reality, a 
personal union ought to be regarded as infinitely more real than a 'substantial' one." Mackintosh, The 
Doctrine of the Person of Jesus Christ, 334. 
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way: "it is a spiritual union; a mutual appropriation and interpenetration of spirit by 
spirit.,,61 The Christian's personality is joined to that of Christ, so that temporal 
events in Christ's life become the personal experience of the one united with him: 
"Our solidarity with Christ is such that in His death we also die; in His grave we are 
also buried; with the Risen Lord, and in Him, we too rise to newness of life. ,,62 The 
events in the life of Christ, real historical events, take on a larger spiritual significance 
for the Christian who remembers these events yet also experiences them in the 
present. 
An interesting conception of the human experience of time develops out of 
this union with Christ because this union offers a commingling of past, present, and 
future within the Christian experience. Mackintosh does not use the term 
simultaneity, but he clearly sees that one's relationship with the transcendent Lord 
changes one's experience of time: "There is the ever recurrent form 'in Christ,' with 
its converse 'Christ in you'; both to be found now and then almost within the limits of 
a single verse. How the words 'in Christ' stretch through all time! How they cover 
not the present merely, but eternity before and after!,,63 Mackintosh speaks of this 
union in ways that remind us of a dynamic conception of time, and this dynamism is 
continued in the eternal relationship between Christ and the Christian. The present 
experience of the Christian is such that she is united to the love of God in a way that 
"stretches" that experience to "before" the foundation of the world and "after" 
Christ's parousia in glory. The Christian experiences a union with Christ that is both 
tensed and tenseless. 
The fact that history is this dynamic arena means that there is no clear line of 
demarcation between past events and present experience in one's relationship with 
61 Mackintosh, "The Unio Mystica as a Theological Conception," 104. 
62 Mackintosh, "The Unio Mystica as a Theological Conception," 104. 
63 Mackintosh, "The Unio Mystica as a Theological Conception," 103. 
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Christ. It is the Christian's experience of God's love revealed in Christ that allows one 
to approach time in a transcendent way, seeing time as part of the larger whole of 
God's activity. God acts in, through, and by historical events to bring to fruition 
God's redemptive purposes for the world. Redemption through Christ envelops the 
Christian's life so that he may be included in something much larger than his own life: 
the kingdom of God. Through history, God's kingdom is coming to the world, and a 
redemptive purpose is being executed on a grand scale within historical reality. God's 
redemption has an eternal origin and an eternal goal, and the Christian experiences 
eternity by joining with God's eternal purposes. Therefore the Christian, along with 
all of history, is always on the move toward its final goal. 
Memory plays an important role in Mackintosh's VIew of the human 
experience of time, and it is through the memory of Christ's life and work that one is 
transformed in the present. The contemporary Christian accepts the truth of past 
historical realities, not because the past is by itself capable of redeeming the present, 
but, instead, because the Christ of the past is still alive and at work in the present. 
The Christ who encountered people in ancient Galilee continues to encounter people 
today, and therefore past events attested to in scripture hold tremendous sway over the 
present. The Holy Spirit makes past events in history come alive and have meaning in 
the present. This appeal to pneumatology and time is important because the Holy 
Spirit enables us to believe that the Jesus of history and the Christ of faith are one and 
the same living, present person, made real to human experience through the Spirit of 
God. For Mackintosh, it is the Christian's relatedness to Christ through the Spirit that 
allows for a partial transcendence over time. 
Brunner contributes to his understanding of the human experience of time by 
concentrating on the nature of the temporal boundaries which frame human life. 
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There is a visible link between Mackintosh and Brunner in their emphasis on the 
importance of personhood and that Christians are encountered by a personal God who 
invites them to attach themselves through faith to God's saving activity in the world. 
As we have seen, "personalism" is one of the dominant themes of Brunner's theology, 
and Brunner's personalistic approach has ramifications for his understanding of the 
human experience of time. Christian faith is extremely personal because it involves 
the Christian's act of trusting in the events in Christ's life, and Christians freely choose 
to live in response to him. Faith is willfully joining in the crucifixion and death of 
Christ, and this completely subjective decision for faith changes the direction of the 
history of one's life. In this act of faith, past events become part of the on-going 
livingness of history. A person's present is changed by the Christ event of the past. 
It is the nature of something created to have a history, and each individual 
has his or her own unique, personal history, and this history continually shapes 
personality and experiences. In the ongoing development of one's personal history, 
people experience time in a tensed manner as it irreversibly flows from the future (not 
yet) toward the present (now) and into the past (no longer). This primal experience of 
the time factor greatly affects human emotions and perceptions because it reminds us 
of our transience and mortality as we realize that we have no control over time's 
passage. The past is gone and cannot be revisited, and the future always lies beyond 
our knowledge and control. Because time is irreversible, human transience infuses 
feelings of ambivalence toward the passage of time during a lifetime. The past causes 
regrets for mistakes and the future, because it is unknown, causes anxiety. 
There is another way of experiencing time, however, which returns people to 
that which has already been and which offers humans a partial experience of the 
future, and it relates to the concept of simultaneity. The divisions between past, 
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present, and future are more fluid than solid, and one's life is in constant movement 
between events of the past, through memory, and the future, through anticipation. The 
past and future have tremendous significance for the present, and they exert enormous 
influence over people's decisions: the past and future provoke mixed feelings of pain 
and joy, anxiety and hope in the present. 
Brunner incorporates into his theology the philosopher Bergson's notion of the 
duree reelle, which is a vastly different experience of time from the strictly linear 
passage of the future through the present and into the past. 64 Bergson describes the 
psychological dynamic within a person's life where "even the simplest psychic 
elements possess a personality and a life of their own, however superficial they may 
be; they are in a constant state of becoming, and the same feeling, by the mere fact of 
being repeated, is a new feeling.,,65 Brunner employs this concept of duree reelle, to 
describe the "lived-time" or "time-as-experienced" of each person. According to our 
lived-time, the way in which we experience past, present, and future is much more 
complex than the mere chronological passage of tensed time. 
To illustrate what he means, Brunner measures time according to the two ways 
in which humans experience it: as a punctum mathematicum and as duree reelle. The 
one-way flow of time from the future through the present into the past is experienced 
linearly as each moment is a unique point -- a punctum mathematicum -- in the 
movement of dynamic time. Linear time remains constant regardless of human 
activity and circumstances. Humanity measures the flow time according to units of 
punctum mathematicum, and this experience of time is commonly marked by the 
turning of the calendar to denote the passage of days, months, and years. We may 
64 Brunner relies especially on Bergson's Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of 
ConSciousness (New York: Macmillan, 1910). 
65 B. . ergson, Tzme and Free Wzll, 200. 
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speak of time by dividing it into large units of epochs and ages and miniscule units of 
nano-seconds. Lived-time emerges out of the linear experience of time, but it is more 
than linear: it is the reflection upon and interpretation of events that occur during the 
passage of linear time. Consideration upon one's lived-time, the tenses of one's life, 
involves human transcendence over tense through memory and anticipation, and 
through such reflection, time extends away from the present in the directions of the 
past and future. In contrast to linear time, lived-time is a complex intermingling of 
past, present, and future so that both the past and future influence the present. It is in 
contemplation of the lived-time that people fathom the meaning, or meaninglessness, 
of their lives and their actions. 
The life of every organism, human and non-human, shows the effect of lived-
time in that past experiences have palpable effects on present life. Brunner invites us 
by analogy to imagine the life of a tree to discern the impact of its experiences in 
time. What is now a fully-grown tree was once only a seed, yet the seed contained the 
essence of what would become a tree. The knots and scars of a tree's early life are 
still visible in later years. The same principle of lived-time operates in a human life 
because the tiniest infant grows and matures into an adult, always carrying the scars 
and experiences accumulated over a lifetime. Who a person is now is intricately 
related to whom she was and what she experienced in the past, and yet in the present 
she is also distinct from herself in the past. The key to lived-time is that it is mind-
dependent through one's capacity for memory and anticipation. In human life the 
mind functions to make formative past experiences continually present, and through 
memory one builds a bridge between the present and the past. In lived-time, memory 
suspends the time-stream by making a past experience readily available in the present. 
When one recalls past experiences of either joy or pain, happiness or sadness, the 
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sentiment caused by the past event affects the person in the present, and this sentiment 
influences one's present choices in anticipation of the future. 
For Brunner this capacity for memory and anticipation is the major factor that 
distinguishes human beings from other creatures, and Brunner claims that the 
boundaries which exist between past, present, and future are largely diaphanous.66 
Because humans have the power of decision, they shape their living in relation to 
others and their experiences within time. Being a morally responsible creature means 
being accountable for the decisions one makes each day, and past, present, and future 
are linked because one cannot address the future in full hope without a present 
acceptance of past decisions. The role of faith in "lived-time" depends upon one's 
acknowledgment of responsibility for past sin, as well as one's hope for a future that is 
free from guilt and sin. Human beings, unlike other forms of life, are largely capable 
of anticipating the future, and through this remarkable freedom, the future impinges 
heavily on the present. As one plans for the future, every expectation, fear, hope, and 
dream impresses upon present experience. Whatever one hopes for or dreads in the 
future makes its presence known in current living. It is exclusively within the domain 
of "lived-time" that both past and future exert tremendous influence over the present. 
Brunner describes "lived-time" in this manner: 
I am never without my past and I am never without my future. Even 
today I am he who I once was, I am my own history; it belongs to me; 
without it, without the knowledge of my past, and the persistence of 
my past in me, I am not a man; the presence and the responsibility for 
my past gives to me being in its human character. Even so it is in 
regard to the future. Only as one who anticipates his future in 
expectation and aim can I be human; for only in reference to my future 
do I experience my freedom. Just as I am my past I am also my future. 
What I plan, am anxious about, fear or hope, belongs to my present. 
The fact that my past belongs to me I experience particularly in the 
66 In addition to Bergson, Brunner relies heavily Heidegger for this lin~ of thought. See Martin 
Heidegger Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robmson (Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishers, 1962), 236-237. 
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sense of guilt; the more man feels responsibility for his past, i.e. bears 
his guilt, the more is he a human being. The more a man penetrates 
into his future, in planning or expectation, in fear or hope, the more 
does he experience his specifically human experience. 67 
Without recalling the past and anticipating the future, a person's humanity IS III 
jeopardy, and only through both of these functions of lived-time does a person truly 
appreciate the unique aspects of human historical being. Brunner is completely 
reliant upon the categories of tense to define his notion of lived-time and the 
simultaneity of past and future in the present, and we see in his work how this 
simultaneous experience of tense reveals how human beings share in the eternity of 
God. 
Brunner writes that God possesses a divine "lived-time," meaning that all 
events are simultaneously present to God. God is the Lord of time in that it is 
experienced simultaneously in the "now" of God's life. God's mode of being is that 
of duree reelle, and God experiences all time in the present in an unrestricted and 
immediate form of live-time. Likewise, although it is limited compared to God's 
lived-time, within our human lived-time we experience a provisional access to all 
tenses of time through memory and anticipation. The past becomes present and the 
future becomes present in moments of simultaneity that are related to God's eternal 
present. 
Moltmann agrees that people experience time in the three modes of past, 
present, and future, yet it is the present, which is always experienced as a single point 
in time, which serves as a link between what is past and what is future. The present 
lies between the past and the future and makes them distinguishable, but it is the 
ability to transcend the present that gives meaning to the human experience of time. 
67 
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The present is the hermeneutical key to all time because the past no longer is and the 
future is not yet. One must employ memory and anticipation in order to transform the 
past and the future into the present. Future and past may be brought into being from 
not-being through expectation and remembrance, and in these mediated forms future 
and past are experienced as present. 
In his views on the human experience of time, Moltmann desires to distance 
his views from the Barthian position that every moment in history is confronted by 
eternity, yet Moltmann nevertheless believes that it is possible to have an admixture 
of time and eternity so that people have a momentary experience of eternity within 
temporality. While human beings live within the earthly, single-track movement of 
time, they do experience moments of "eschatological fervor," when eternity breaks 
into history and offers a glimpse of the fulfillment of time. Within the Christian 
experience, the eternity of heaven occasionally intersects the linearity of earth, and 
this moment of eternity within time offers a brief perspective of God's own experience 
of eternity. Moltmann also relies on the concept of simultaneity to describe how 
eternity is an element of the human experience of the present through simultaneity, 
when the past and future are present through memory and expectation. Eschatological 
moments occur within time when the eternity of God manifests in meaningful 
experiences in the present. These moments of eternity within time have the 
characteristic of God's own simultaneous eternal life. 
The interwoven nature of memory and expectation, of past and future made 
present, is an "inter-lacing of the times" and is fundamental to the human experience 
of time. 68 There is much similarity between Brunner's concept of lived-time and 
Moltmann's descriptions of human simultaneity in which the past is remembered and 
68 
Moltmann, The Coming a/God, 288. 
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the future anticipated. "Being-that-is-no-Ionger" and "being-that-is-not-yet" are being 
through the creative abilities of memory and expectation. The simultaneous 
experience of time is a person's act of creating in the present that which is not. This 
simultaneity is possible because "experiences and expectations extend to different 
modes of being -- here to reality, there to possibility.,,69 Moltmann describes this 
creative simultaneity as eschatological because when the past and future are present, it 
is a "relative eternity" which reflects the "absolute eternity" of God. 
Moltmann does not deny, however, the reality of the irreversible "flow" of 
time in human experience and the world, and this flow is marked by transience, 
change, and death. This earthly time in which human beings live emerges from the 
moment of inception, but it is part of a "double form of time" in creation, the other 
form of which is aeonic or cyclical. Through the patristic concept of aeonic time 
Moltmann describes how human creatures can experience eternity even as temporal 
beings. This aeonic form of time is reflective of God's own eternity, without 
beginning or end and which continually touches upon earthly time. While earthly 
time is transitory and inevitably runs along the irreversible time-line of future to 
present to past, aeonic time is cyclical. These two forms of time, linear and aeonic, 
are reflected in the creation of time: "Earthly creation exists within the context of 
passing time, but this earthly time, for its part, belongs within the context of the 
Aeonic time of the 'invisible world', continually touching it and being touched by 
it.,,70 Humans describe time teleologically because the world's linear experience of 
time moves in the single direction from future to present to past. Aeonic time, 
however, is circular in nature, and it is the continuing of the present without the loss 
of the past or the fear of the unknown future. 
69 
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Surpassing Brunner, Moltmann goes farther to describe the expenence of 
eternity within time as the "eternal moment." His use of aeonic time distinguishes 
between the absolute eternity of God and the relative eternity of humanity. Aeonic 
time is the time of the new creation, and it is relative to God's absolute eternity. 
When he speaks of the consummation of history, he relies on a form of aeonic time to 
describe how humanity and creation will share in, but not be overwhelmed by, God's 
eternity. The unrestricted presence of God's absolute eternity will be relatively 
experienced by creation through its participation in God's de-limited self. In the 
consummation of creation, the time of the world will not end, but it will be changed 
from linear time to aeonic time. Time will have arrived at its destination in the aeon 
of consummation, and rather than standing still in aeonic time, God's creation will 
exist in the cyclical joy of God's presence. Created time, which is aligned toward the 
future, will be transformed into the circular movements of the aeonic time of the new 
creation. The aeonic time of eternity is defined not according to length or passage of 
time but according to the qualitative experience of time. The new creation will exist 
in an unmediated relation to God, and aeonic eternity is a dimension of the joyful 
quality of life in relation to God. 
Aeonic time intersects the present in a moment which is, for Moltmann, a 
mystical experience of time. Aeonic moments surface within people's experiences of 
God through faith, changing their comprehension of the present: 
As an atom of eternity, the fulfilled moment drops out of the sequence 
of time, interrupts time's flow, abolishes the distinction of the times 
past and future, in an ecstasy that translates out of this temporal life 
into the life that is eternal. Eternity in time is a category, not of the 
extensive life, but of the intensive life. The presence of eternity comes 
about in the wholly and entirely lived moment through undivided 
. th 71 presence m e present. 
71 Moltmann, The Coming of God, 291. 
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In the midst of historical time this moment of eternity, this eschatological moment, is 
only a fragmentary moment, but it is an experience of aeonic eternity. A moment of 
eternal life manifests itself in one's temporal experiences, and this moment is an 
intense possession of the enjoyment and love of life. Because eternal life is not mere 
timelessness or the absence of death, but it is, rather, full-filled life, humans 
experience this fulfilled life in the present in an aeonic moment. 72 Eternity is the 
dimension of life in depth and the intensity of the lived life instead of time's endless 
extension. 
The result of aeonic moments in the human present is a hunger for the 
completeness of life lived in the presence of God. Through each momentary 
experience of eternity, one longs for the fullness of eternal life: "The experience of 
temporal life is different once an exit from time in the fulfilled moment is experienced 
as an entry of eternity. Then eternal life already begins here and now in the midst of 
the life that is transitory, and makes of earthly life a prelude to itself. ,,73 The effect of 
this eschatological moment is to make one more desirous of the eternal life which 
awaits people in the future and of which the eschatological moment is only a 
precursor. 
As a way of summanzlng their viewpoints, we may say that in their 
descriptions of the human experience of time, we see a great similarity in the thought 
of Mackintosh, Brunner, and Moltmann. All three rely heavily on the concept of 
human memory and expectation, and it is through the human mind that people are 
able to live in the present moment with their past and future available to them. The 
concept of simultaneity is vital to all three theologians' work on the subject of the 
72 Barth describes the eschatological moment as the time when one is faced by the call of God's Word 
to decision: "This is the secret of time which is made known in the 'Moment' of revelation, in that 
eternal Moment which always is." The Epistle to the Romans, trans. from the 6th ed. E. C. Hoskyns 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1966), 76. 
73 Moltmann, The Coming of God, 291. 
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human experience of time. Human are essentially temporal beings and past, present, 
and future are wrapped together in the human experience as present. In quite similar 
ways, Brunner and Moltmann tie the human ability to transcend time to aspects of 
God's transcendence over time. Humans experience time in a way that is similar to 
God's eternal present. 
Crucifixion, Suffering, and Eschatology 
No matter how one defines the human expenence of time, there is an 
undeniable truth that each human's time will end in death. Despite the human ability 
to transcend time within the mind, there is nevertheless an irreversible flow of time in 
which each person experiences change, decay, and death.74 Added to these physical 
realities are the metaphysical experiences of sin and suffering?5 Human beings create 
their own misery by sinning against others, themselves, and God. Each theologian 
affirms that the relationship between God and humanity must take into account the 
fact that this relationship is shattered by sin and death. 
The relation between time and eternity is highly relevant for the theological 
definition of death. Death must be understood according to the purposeful 
relationship that God has willed to have with human beings, a relationship meant to 
be one of mutual love and communion. Because humans were created to live in a 
loving relationship with God, sin is a denial of the only purpose for which one exists. 
74 A point made especially well by Karl Heim throughout his book, The World - Its Creation and 
Consummation, trans. R. Smith (Philadelphia: Muhlenberg, 1962). 
75 The fact of transience and death is for Moltmann not the result but the cause of sin: "The frailty of 
the temporal creation of human beings is like a detonator for the sin of wanting to be equal to God and 
to overcome this frailty .... The vulnerability of creation in the beginning makes the act of violence 
against life possible. So there is a certain relationship between what we may call sin and what we call 
death. Even if death is part of the temporal creation, it does not have to be called natural in the sense of 
being self-evident as a matter of course; and if it is called natural, this 'nature' by no means has to be 
taken as final. If we turn back from the end to the beginning, then the death of all the living is a sign of 
the first, temporal and imperfect creation." Moltmann, The Coming a/God, 91. 
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When a person contradicts his purpose in God through sin, he is dead toward God, 
and the death of the body is only the final and fullest manifestation of the 
consequences of sin which separates one from God. Death, therefore, is not only a 
physical phenomenon that takes place only at the end of one's life: death is present 
and working throughout a person's life, continually separating him from God. 
Because each person has turned away from God, who is and who grants life, each 
person dies in relation to God, and each person, through sin, forfeits life and 
experiences death. Death is laden with the manifestations of sin and reminders of evil 
because death signals separation from God, the origin of life and love, as well as 
separation of people one from another. Death is a reminder that human life is frail, 
that each human life is corrupted by sin, and that human beings are totally dependent 
on God for life. Separation and isolation are not the intended ends for the children of 
God, and without Christ's redeeming activity, death would be the ultimate end for 
human life. 
Human beings were created in God's divine image, yet the image of God in 
humanity is so marred by sin that eternal life in God's presence is no longer possible; 
only death remains for the future of humanity. Each person is responsible for his sin, 
and each person is responsible for his death in relation to God. Through sin, death has 
become the ultimate consequence for a responsible self: created in the image of God, 
yet sinful. Human beings who exist in a wrong relation to God through sin are dead, 
and the godlessness of death is a present experience. For these, the living dead, the 
present is an experience of separation from the eternal God.76 
76 "When man as a sinner denies his dependence upon God and turns it into independence, he is 
severed from God, the original source of all life; his guilt stands between the living God and himself as 
he actually is. The creature destroys the root of its own life, its fellowship with God." Brunner, 
Dogmatics, v. 3, 386. 
103 
What is God's response to the temporal sin, suffering, and death of human 
creatures? It is the likewise temporal assumption of sin and suffering by God's own 
self in the cross of Jesus Christ. In the theology of Mackintosh, Brunner, and 
Moltmann, the death of Jesus is an eschatological event because it is located in 
history, yet it transcends the historical. It is a temporal event that reveals the love of 
God and his eternal willingness to suffer for the sake of his beloved human creatures. 
All three of our representative theologians emphasize the overall eschatological 
significance of Jesus' life from start to finish, yet they also give particular emphasis to 
the death of Jesus on the cross. The crucifixion uniquely marks the defining moment 
in the relationship between God and humanity. With the God-human relationship as a 
key component of their theology, each theologian examInes the 
eschatological/soteriological elements of this relationship through the cross, and our 
three theologians speak of the death of Jesus as an event that is filled with 
eschatological significance. 
In regard to time and eternity, what we see in their interpretations of the cross 
is another strike against the classical definition of God that would equate eternity with 
impassability. The common themes that run through each theologian's presentation 
of the cross is that God is not the impassable God as defined by classical theology. 
To the contrary, Christ's death reveals the ultimate compassion of a God who suffers 
extremely on behalf of his creatures in order to be reconciled to them. The fact that 
the Son of God suffers in history is indicative of God's eternal passion and 
willingness to suffer for human beings. The temporal suffering and death of Jesus 
reveals God's transcendent love for humanity which is beyond time. The passion and 
suffering of Christ connote areas of great theological concern for Mackintosh, 
Brunner, and Moltmann because Christ's vicarious suffering on humanity's behalf 
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occurs as part of his eschatological mission. Jesus' death is never removed from the 
larger context of the world's suffering, and Jesus suffers on behalf of the world before 
God. The suffering and death of Christ is part of the larger eschatological drama 
which surrounds his entire life and which reaches a climax on the cross. 
Mackintosh's most thoughtful work on the cross is found in The Christian 
Experience of Forgiveness, in which he examines the concept of atonement from a 
variety of positions. The Christian Experience of Forgiveness shares many 
similarities with his earlier thought in The Doctrine of the Person of Jesus Christ, and 
both works reveal that the concept of atonement through the cross is the pillar of 
Mackintosh's theology. In The Christian Experience of Forgiveness, Mackintosh 
delves into the history of the doctrine of atonement before entering his own 
theological discourse in the latter half of the book. He never wavers from the view 
that the forgiveness of sins is the cardinal religious experience and central doctrine of 
the Christian faith.77 In The Christian Experience of Forgiveness, Mackintosh also 
makes several valuable contributions to an eschatological understanding of the cross. 
F or Mackintosh, the very nature of God is sacrificial love, and while this love 
is manifested in the whole life of Jesus, it is especially evident in his cross. Through 
Jesus, the transcendent God is willing to share immanently in the suffering of 
humanity, thus revealing his love within history. Far from being impassable, God is 
passionate in his solidarity with human sinners. 78 The application of impassability to 
God is not sustainable when one looks at the suffering love of God revealed on the 
cross. Hence, Mackintosh may state his conclusion that "ideas of the Divine 
77 Mackintosh, Christian Experience a/Forgiveness, 1-6. 
78 "In the Gospels we do see Jesus entering, in just this way, into the lives of sinners by loving 
communion with their misery. He placed Himself beside the guilty; conscious of the gulf fixed 
between God and sinners, He crossed in spirit to our side of the breach and numbered Himself with the 
transgressors .... Face to face with Jesus, we become aware, by intuition, that he love in virtue of which 
He does this amazing thing is positively the love of God Himself." Mackintosh, "The Christian 
Experience of Forgiveness," 191-192. 
105 
impassability derived from ages which were very far from humane, and which too 
often regarded suffering unconcernedly as a mark of the weak and the vanquished, 
can now make little appeal.,,79 The opposite of impassability is the agony God 
willingly undertakes on the cross: 
To us pardon is free because for Him its realization came through 
agony. The cross represents God's anguish, an awful grief answering 
to the greatness of remitted sin. In Him eternally that mind towards the 
sinful has existed which we behold in the dying Christ. ... Thus at 
Gethsemane and Calvary most of all, faith discerns such an exhibition 
of Divine reconciling passion, such a tragic extension in which God 
spares Himself nothing, as makes our heart faint within us and stops 
every mouth before God.80 
God is opposed to sin, yet God is also sacrificially disposed toward his human 
creatures. God is so passionately moved by the human condition of alienation that he 
would spare nothing for our reconciliation. In a way that anticipates those who follow 
him, Mackintosh knows that the cross reveals God's capacity to suffer on behalf of the 
human creatures he loves. Far from being impassable, God undergoes tremendous 
suffering in order to make forgiveness possible because there cannot be forgiveness 
without judgment and condemnation of sin. In the redemption of humanity, it is God 
who takes on the great suffering, and forgiveness is granted with a great cost to GOd.81 
In Mackintosh's interpretation of the crucifixion, the relation between God's 
eternity and temporality is seen vividly as the cross is an event that reveals both God's 
transcendence over and immanence within time. On the cross God immanently 
redeemed the world from within, while at the same time God transcendently 
transformed Jesus' suffering into the redemption of the world. God's eternal freedom 
79 Mackintosh, Christian Experience a/Forgiveness, 218. 
80 Mackintosh, Christian Experience a/Forgiveness, 192. 
81 "The power to forgive, to send forgiveness home to the needy heart, cannot be had for nothing; in 
God or man it is bought at a price. It is bought only with the suffering of the offended spirit. The 
electric current that pervades the whole wire flashes into light at its sensitive point; so the timeless pain 
of God over human evil becomes visible in Christ's passion." Mackintosh, Christian Experience of 
Forgiveness, 216. 
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becomes evident not through God's instantaneous annihilation of all evil but rather " , 
through God's conversion of evil into an act of redemption. Evil is as real as God's 
transcendent purpose, but God reforms evil into unconscious subservience of his 
eternal purpose.82 Rather than being limited by historical events, God is able to shape 
even the evils of history toward his loving goal for humanity. The cross of Christ is 
the greatest act of God's eternal sovereignty over history and its events. 
Mackintosh builds up his eschatology of the cross by claiming that the cross 
offers a special revelation regarding humanity's eschatological standing before God. 
The cross is an event of great eschatological magnitude because in it God discloses 
the awful scope of human sin that separates humanity from God. Christ's death on 
the cross is the historical event that convicts human sinners of their depravity in 
relation to God. A terrible gulf exists between the moral perfection of Christ and the 
corrupt desires of humanity, and this sharp distinction between humanity is most 
evident in what happened to Jesus on the cross: "By its treatment of Jesus Christ, 
man's sinfulness was exposed: its sheer evil was laid bare to the bone, reprobated, 
doomed, sentenced without appeaL ... The fact that God gave Christ to men, and they 
could do no better than crucify Him, cast a terrible light upon our nature.,,83 The cross 
represents all of humanity's sinfully negative behavior toward God, which is summed 
up in the violent rejection of God through crucifixion.84 The cross has this revelatory 
power in Mackintosh's work, and it shows the great divide that exists between God's 
goodness and humanity's depravity. 
Mackintosh's understanding of the cross' eschatological significance focuses 
on what may be described as the cross' dual "negative" and "positive" aspects. The 
82 Mackintosh, Christian Apprehension o/God, 212. 
83 Mackintosh, Christian Experience o/Forgiveness, 198-199. 
84 Mackintosh, Christian Experience 0/ Forgiveness, 200: "By letting sinful men vent their utmost hate 
upon Himself, He revealed and condemned sin as the absolute contrary of love." 
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'negative' statements relate to God's judgment of humanity and resulting 
condemnation on account of sin. Humanity's sinfulness is revealed in all its terror in 
the events of the cross, and God's condemnation of sin is complete and frightening. 
And yet, even as the cross negatively reveals the sinfulness of humanity, it positively 
reveals the magnanimous love of God. The cross is the vehicle of divine love because 
Jesus is willing to suffer on humanity's behalf and in its place. The vicarious 
suffering of Christ is a major theme in Mackintosh's soteriology, and it is on the cross 
that God, through Christ, reveals the depth of love that God has for humanity. The 
cumulative effect of both the negative and positive aspects of Christ's suffering is that 
the events of the cross bring a new status for humanity in its relationship with God. 
Mackintosh seeks to bring the eschatological significance of God's judgment 
against sin from the future into the present through the cross. He does this through his 
criticism of Ritschl's move to lodge God's wrath and judgment in the eschatological 
future without God's wrathful reaction to sin having great bearing in the present. 85 
God's eschatological judgment of sin is a present experience as well as a future event 
because the current manifestation of the eternal wrath of God against sin is the cross 
of Christ. While God's wrath must always be understood in conjunction with God's 
love, God's anger toward sin must be maintained or else the cross losing much of its 
significance. Mackintosh sees in the cross the divine, eschatological punishment for 
sin that Ritschl believes is only held in the future: "The reaction of God against sin is 
evidenced, as we have seen, by loving wrath; and this wrath, it now appears, finds 
expression in punishment.... All sins are punished by God, and they are punished 
with a view to their being forgiven. The punishment is an essential part in the very 
85 Mackintosh, Christian Experience o/Forgiveness, 160 ff.; Types of Modern Theology, 159. See also 
Ritschl, Justification and Reconciliation, 321-325. 
108 
grace that effects reconciliation at its own cost. ,,86 It follows, therefore, that the cross 
is the means by which God exercises his angry punishment on the sins of humanity 
with a loving purpose in mind. 
When he describes the consequences of sin in the terms of God's wrath , 
judgment, and condemnation, Mackintosh speaks of the inevitability of God's 
negative judgment over and against that which is untenable to God's holiness.87 
Mackintosh also wants to emphasize, however, the positive aspects of the crucifixion 
because throughout his work he continually views the cross as a vehicle of God's 
etemallove for humanity. For this reason Mackintosh always speaks of God's wrath 
in close proximity to God's love. The cross may be the revelation of God's wrath 
against sin, but it is similarly the fullest expression of God's love for sinners. 
Humanity receives great benefits on account of Christ's willingness to face death on 
the cross. Through Jesus' facing the cross, God is personally acting to transform 
humanity's eschatological future from death to life, and the eschatological future is 
changed by the cross in a way that no other event could do.88 
For Brunner the cross serves as an eschatological vehicle which is 
instrumental in bringing in the kingdom of God. He follows a Reformed 
understanding of the three-fold office of Christ as Prophet-Priest-King to claim that 
Jesus fulfills the priestly office of the Old Testament because the death of Jesus is the 
act of God's grace that brings atonement for human sin. While maintaining that all of 
Christ's life is an atoning act, Brunner does give special significance to the death of 
Jesus on the cross. It is the death of Christ - the ultimate descent of God into the 
86 Mackintosh Christian Experience of Forgiveness, 164. 
87 Mackintosh, Christian Experience of Forgiveness, 198: "The cross is the irreversible condemnation 
of sin and a condemnation which is God's act." 
88 P. T. Forsyth makes the same argument in his The Work of Christ (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 
1910), 103-105. 
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abyss of human sin - that is the completion of his life's work and the establishment of 
the kingdom. Like Mackintosh, Brunner argues that the cross of Christ can be 
understood only as a result of his life and that his death is the highest point of his 
saving work. Brunner's main focus, however, is to emphasize how Jesus establishes 
the eschatological kingdom of God through his death on the cross. 
Brunner commends Luther for recognizing that the cross of Christ is the 
defining mark of Christian faith, and it is in the cross where God offers his most 
mysterious and marvelous revelation of love. The title The Mediator is highly 
indicative of Brunner's view of Christ as eschatological figure. Jesus earned his title 
as the Mediator between God and humanity as he willingly showed the tremendous 
obedience that took him to his death on the cross. Brunner states that humanity's 
relation with God is always mediated through Christ: 
Between the soul and God, between humanity and God, between the 
world and God, there stands a third element, or rather a third Person, 
who, although He unites man with God, yet equally maintains the 
absolute distinction between them; through Him alone that 
reconciliation takes place through which God reveals Himself: the 
Mediator. 89 
With this fundamental understanding of Christ's mediating role, Brunner builds a case 
for Christ's suffering and death within an eschatological framework. The cross is the 
event through which God reveals the true nature of the identity Christ as Mediator. 
The meaning of the cross becomes clear only through the actions of the Mediator, and 
conversely, the Mediator can only be perceived through his personal activity on the 
Cross.90 As the true Mediator between God and humanity, Christ assumes 
eschatological significance in carrying out his role on the cross. 
89 Brunner, The Mediator, 30. 
90 Brunner, The Mediator, 492. 
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As he writes on the eschatological meaning of the cross, Brunner seeks to 
maintain the tension between God's holiness, on the one hand, and God's love on the 
other. Only by focusing fully on both God's wrathful response to sin and God's 
merciful response to sin can one truly arrive at an eschatological understanding of 
Christ as Mediator between God and humanity. Brunner is combating elements of 
modem theology that diminish the importance of the cross and Christ's atoning death. 
Brunner condemns theological attempts that remove the need for reconciliation 
between humanity and God. These attempts have occurred because theologians have 
sought to minimize the reality of human sin and the gulf between God and humanity 
on account of sin.91 Like Mackintosh, Brunner views the cross as God's means of 
revealing the truth about humanity's great moral distance from God and humanity's 
urgent need for reconciliation with God. The cross is an event by which God 
encounters humanity -- all humanity -- personally through the death of Christ. The 
cross reveals the objective truth about all humanity's sin before a holy God. 
The cross reveals the fact that human sin is an affront to the holiness of a 
righteous God. As in Mackintosh's theology, holiness and love of God remain twin 
pillars throughout Brunner's work, and he maintains that what is objectively revealed 
in the cross is God's absolute holiness and absolute love: 
At the same moment that we perceive the Divine Will to forgive we 
perceive also the Holiness of God, and this is the Divine Will to 
punish. And only where this fact, the Cross of Christ, is understood to 
mean the working out of this condemnation, do we see in it the 
revelation of the living, holy, and merciful God .... The Cross is the 
only place where the loving, forgiving, merciful God is revealed in 
such a way that we perceive that His Holiness and His Love are 
11 . fi' 92 equa y In mIte. 
91 Brunner cites Schleiermacher as a prime example. Dogmatics, v. 2, 288. 
92 Dogmatics, v. 2,469-470. 
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The main idea that Brunner is protesting against in theology is the idea that God 
cannot be wrathful or desirous of punishing a human being for his sin. Punishment is 
viewed to be too anthropomorphic because it carries the notion of revenge. Brunner 
sees in his day a decay of the church's preaching because the wrath of a holy God has 
been rejected as an attribute of God: "So long as we continue to reject the scriptural 
ideas of Divine Holiness, of divine wrath, and of divine righteousness in punishment, 
the process of decay within the Christian Church will continue. ,,93 Appreciating the 
eschatological character of atonement means recapturing the biblical understanding of 
sin as an affront to the holiness of an eternal God. 
The passion and suffering of Christ are the Mediator's ultimate act of 
identification with sinful humanity in its separation from God.94 Divine suffering 
becomes part of the identity of Christ through the cross. Moltmann will also 
emphasize the suffering of Christ, but we see in Brunner a clear call for theology to 
remember the eschatological significance of Christ's passion. For Brunner, the deep 
suffering of Christ is a result of his identification with humanity and the necessity for 
humanity to suffer for its sinful retreat from God: 
The suffering of Christ means both surrender for man and unreserved 
solidarity with the whole human race; but above all, it means solidarity 
with that which separates humanity from God, with that therefore 
which from the point of view of God is a necessity, with the divine 
wrath which works death. The Mediator gives himself up completely 
to thi~ suffering wrath which comes to man from God.95 
The major difference between Moltmann and Brunner is that while Brunner connects 
Christ with all humanity in his sufferings, Moltmann does this also by focusing on the 
victims of sinful human history. Moltmann is, as we shall see, aware of all humanity's 
93 Dogmatics, v. 2, 468. " 
94 See also Dorothee SolIe, Christ the Representative: An Essay in Theology after the ''Death of God , 
trans. D. Lewis (London: SCM Press, 1967), 139-140. 
95 Dogmatics, v. 2, 495. 
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separation from God, but he more closely identifies the victims in history as the ones 
with whom Christ is in solidarity through suffering. 
For Moltmann, the basis of Christ's eschatological sufferings is found in the 
very nature of a God who suffers with and on behalf of his people. This marks a 
distinction in Moltmann's theology from the classical doctrine of God that disdained 
the thought of a suffering God. Classical theism held that only human beings, things 
that are temporal, and created entities suffer because they are transitory, while God is 
eternal and impassable. Seeking to follow Luther's line that only a "theology of 
glory" could dismiss God's suffering on account of impassability, Moltmann, 
following Luther, argues fervently for a "theology of the cross" which takes seriously 
the suffering of God.96 While Moltmann has been criticized for trying to "spin the 
whole of theology out of a single principle,,,97 Moltmann draws on both Old 
Testament and New Testament witnesses to show that God is not only capable of 
suffering on behalf of his people, but that he does so in a way that reveals suffering as 
the ultimate sign of God's love.98 
Moltmann has been identified as a theologian of the cross, yet what is most 
relevant for us to note is how his views on the death of Jesus contain an eschatological 
motif.99 Moltmann often states that the cross is the focal point for Christian theology: 
"The death of Jesus on the cross is the center of all Christian theology. It is not the 
only theme of theology, but it is in effect the entry to its problems and answers on 
earth. All Christians statements about God, about creation, about sin and death have 
96 Moltmann, The Crucified God, 227ff.; Bauckham, Messianic Theology in the Making, 65. 
97 Carl Braaten, "A Trinitarian Theology of the Cross," in The Journal of Religion 56 (1976): 120. 
98 Moltmann The Trinity and the Kingdom of God, 2 Off. 
99 Don Sch;eitzer, "Ji.irgen Moltmann's Theology as a Theology of the Cross," in Studies in Religion 
24 (1995): 95-107. 
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the focal point of the crucified ChriSt."IOO In a manner that is both similar to and 
distinct from the work of Mackintosh and Brunner, Moltmann develops out of the 
cross a profound understanding of divine suffering from an eschatological position. 
The divine pathos of God is focused most intently on the cross, making it the focal 
point of God's eternal, eschatological suffering on behalf of and in response to the 
temporal suffering of creation. He is rightly concerned with the problem of theodicy 
for theology in the modem world, which for him is summed up in the godforsaken 
horror of Auschwitz. 101 
Because he takes the problem of evil so seriously, Moltmann moves beyond 
previous theologians in addressing the problem of evil from both an eschatological 
and christological standpoint. As a result of this, in Moltmann's theology there is a 
fusion of eschatology and christo logy that is unprecedented in Mackintosh and 
Brunner. Moltmann's eschatological christology therefore adds the dimension of the 
godforsaken experience of suffering by human beings. Christ suffers not only in a 
soteriological sense for all humanity, but in his cry of dereliction he identifies with all 
human beings who have suffered and died as the victims of human injustice and sin. 
In The Crucified God, Moltmann states that the cross is the truest test of 
Christian theology and whether or not theological statements are authentically 
Christian. 102 The highest revelation of God must be found in the cross, and all 
theological talk must be grounded in a discussion of the cross if that talk is to be 
faithful to God's revelation in Christ. By making this his starting point for 
Christology, Moltmann seeks to correct the early Christian tradition which sought to 
100 Moltmann, The Crncified God, 204. . ". 
101 Bauckham notes how several events in the late 1960's, including Germany's dealmg WIth the 
Holocaust caused Moltmann to shift his focus toward the cross as the main interpretive method for , 
theology. Bauckham, Messianic Theology in the Making, 53-56. 
102 Moltmann, The Crncified God, 7. 
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separate the two natures of Christ in order to protect the impassability of God. He 
believes that the Patristic-era church councils made an error by claiming that the 
divine nature of Christ was incapable of suffering. Attributing suffering to only the 
human side of Christ denied the importance of the suffering within God's own self, 
and Moltmann asserts that the cross effects a change within God's own being.103 
For Moltmann, the cross has consequences for the inner-Trinitarian 
relationship between Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. 104 If the cross is to be rightly 
appreciated, it must be seen to reveal how God suffers within the Trinitarian 
relationship on behalf of humanity in eternity.105 For Jesus, his death is as God's 
child who is abandoned by his Father. The intimacy of Jesus' relationship to God, 
whom he called Abba, makes his cry of dereliction a cry of despair and complete 
isolation. Jesus' fellowship with God is shattered during Jesus' passion and death: 
God-forsakenness is the final experience of God endured by the 
crucified Jesus on Golgotha, because to the very end he knew that he 
was God's Son. God's silence, the hiding of his face, the eclipse of 
God, the dark night of the soul, the death of God, hell: these are the 
metaphors for this inconceivable fact that have come down to us in the 
traditions of Christian experiences of God. They are attempts to 
describe an abyss, a sinking into nothingness; yet they are only 
approximations to Jesus' fmal experience of God on the cross, his Job-
like experience. The uniqueness of what may have taken place 
between Jesus and his God on Golgotha is therefore something we do 
well to accept and respect as his secret, while we ourselves hold fast to 
the paradox that Jesus died the death of God's Son in God-
forsakenness. 106 
This profound suffering by Jesus unites him with all those who have suffered the Job-
like experience of being abandoned by God. Moltmann's serious engagement with 
103 Moltmann, The Crucified God, 215. 
104 Richard Bauckham has illustrated how Moltmann's doctrine of the Trinity developed as a way of 
understanding the meaning of the cross for the whole of God. See Bauckham, Moltmann: Messianic 
Theology, 172. 
105 Moltmann, The Trinity and the Kingdom of God, 80ff. See also Paul Fiddes, The Creative Suffering 
of God (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1995), 135-140. 
106 Moltmann, The Way of Jesus Christ, 167. 
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theodicy inspires him to connect Jesus' eschatological sufferings with those of human 
beings who suffer immensely within history. 
In ways that incorporate history into the larger eschatological portrayal of 
Jesus' mission, Moltmann describes the dual nature of the cross as both temporal and 
atemporal, and so he speaks of the "historical" and "eschatological" trial of Jesus. 
Moltmann believes that what Jesus underwent as he faced a trial before a human court 
and as he suffered and died on Golgotha has both historical and eternal dimensions. 
This distinction between the historical and eschatological trial allows Moltmann to 
portray the cross in light of its human and divine meanings. 
On the one hand, Moltmann focuses on the historical setting of Christ as 
Israel's Messiah under Roman rule. He asserts that Jesus died at the hands of his 
adversaries who were threatened by his actions. His death must be understood in 
accordance with the message he preached in the face of the religious and political 
leaders of his day.I07 The historical trial of Jesus necessarily includes the temporal 
circumstances and events at a specific time in history which led to Jesus' passion. 
Through his suffering, Jesus displays his solidarity with all the victims of history who 
die from oppression and injustice. Jesus died at the hands of a Roman government 
that killed opposition to its authority. Jesus threatened the authority of the Roman 
government by claiming an allegiance to God above the emperor, and it acted brutally 
to end any sedition he could incite among the people. His execution by crucifixion 
could be carried out only by a Roman governmental decree, and so he was a victim of 
Rome's oppressive attempt to control its empire. Despite his actions and words to the 
contrary, the Roman rulers crucified Jesus as one who defied the authority of the 
government. Jesus also proclaimed a new interpretation of the Law that placed him 
107 Moltmann, The Crucified God, 127. 
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above Moses, and he offended the religious leaders of his day by appealing to a new 
standard of righteousness in relation to God. Thus we have the human elements that 
frame the historical setting of Jesus' passion. 
While Moltmann illuminates these elements of the historical trial of Jesus, 
there is another side to the crucifixion in which it may be regarded as ahistorical. The 
cultural/religious/political factors alone do not account for the ultimate significance of 
Jesus' death. Indeed, there is eschatological meaning behind the human events that 
caused Jesus' death on the cross: "As a merely historical person he would long have 
been forgotten, because his message had already been contradicted by his death on the 
cross. As a person at the heart of an eschatological faith and proclamation, on the 
other hand, he becomes a mystery and a question for every new age.,,108 Jesus' 
crucifixion must also be viewed as an eschatological event of judgment over humanity 
and its forms of power that are exercised through both religion and government. 
Jesus' sufferings constitue redemptive suffering on behalf of a world wounded by sin 
and destruction: 
In the context of his message about the kingdom of God, his sufferings 
are not his own personal sufferings, which he suffers for himself. They 
are the apocalyptic sufferings which he suffers for the world. They are 
not fortuitous sufferings. They are necessary. They are not fruitless 
sufferings, through which something good is shattered. They are 
fruitful sufferings which, like labor pains, bring forth what is good. 109 
The eschatological suffering of Jesus is a vicarious suffering for all people throughout 
history, and they are redemptive for all as Jesus incorporates suffering into the life of 
God. 
Throughout Moltmann's theology, the problem of theodicy is directly 
connected with the eschatological desperation of Jesus' suffering on the cross. 
108 Moltmann, The Crucified, 162. 
109 Moltmann, The Way of Jesus Christ, 153. 
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Moltmann seeks to answer the criticism of protest atheism which cannot accept belief 
in an all-loving Creator God while there is such tremendous suffering in the worldYo 
Coupled with protest atheism against a God who allows innocent suffering is the view 
of traditional theism that describes God as an omnipotent King who fails to alleviate 
suffering. The cross of Christ, claims Moitmann, negates the argument of both of 
these views of God because "a theology of the cross which understands God as the 
suffering God in the suffering of Christ and which cries out with the godforsaken 
God, "My God, why have you forsaken me?" For this theology, God and suffering 
are no longer contradictions, as in theism and atheism, but God's being is in suffering 
and the suffering is in God's being itself, because God is love." 111 Here we see how 
Moltmann addresses the theodicy problem by combining it with the traditional 
understanding of justification through the cross. Temporal suffering is assumed and 
taken into the eternal life of God. While previous theologians focused on humanity's 
redemption through the cross, Moltmann adds an approach to understanding how God 
identifies with the problem of evil. 
God's way of dealing with suffering is not to ignore it by remaining aloof. 
Instead, God's own self suffers evil through the cross, thereby revealing the love of 
God which suffers with humanity in godforsaken evil. Adding the dimension of 
suffering to the doctrine of God has been criticized mostly by proponents of feminist 
theology who protest that Moltmann's soteriology turns God into a dominating sadist 
who abuses his Son. 112 Moltmann addresses this criticism by saying that the 
surrender of Jesus to God by obedience must not introduce a false distinction between 
the Father and Son as members of the Trinity. Brunner's emphasis on the cross as the 
110 Moltmann's main conversation partner in protest atheism is Albert Camus in The Rebel: An Essay 
on Man in Revolt (New York: Vintage, 1956). See also Bauckham, Messianic Theology in the Making, 
76-84. 
111 Moltmann, The Crucified God, 227. 
112 For example, Dorothee SolIe, Suffering (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1975), 145-150. 
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appeasement of God's wrath may deserve the feminist critique, but Moltmann avoids 
it by insisting on the oneness of the Father and Son: "In the suffering of the Son, the 
pain of the Father finds a voice." 113 Because God himself was in Christ, the Son's 
suffering was also the Father's suffering. God's love is a suffering love that is 
prepared to suffer in the Son's suffering and abandonment. 
The belief in the cross's revelation of God's love is the shared idea of all three 
theologians. The suffering of Christ reveals a deeper suffering within God's 
Trinitarian life, and this suffering is part of God's character in all eternity. God's 
desire to redeem humanity from sin find personal expression in Jesus' suffering on the 
cross. Crucifixion is God's act of judgment against sin, and this judgment is issued in 
the present over every life. Christ's death is efficacious for every life throughout 
history, just us God's love for humanity is efficacious throughout all eternity. 
113 Moltmann, The Way of Jesus Christ, 176. 
119 
Chapter Three 
Redefining Time: The Past 
If a dynamic view of time is preferred over the static in order to speak of the 
nature of reality, what does this mean, by consequence, for the status of events in the 
past tense: of events that have occurred but are over and no longer real? What past 
events remain vitally significant for Christian faith even if they are unrepeatable, and 
how does the past impinge upon the present? Within this category of the past, I wish 
to examine several topics that have eschatological significance in the work of our 
three theologians, and I hope to accentuate the underlying theories of time and 
eternity that are inherent in their descriptions of these events. 
Events have occurred in the past which are essential for the meaning of the 
present even if those events no longer exist, and Christian faith depends on a dynamic 
interpretation of history - a fact which is evident in the work of Mackintosh, Brunner, 
and Moltmann. The fact that time is dynamic does not mean that it extends endlessly 
into the past. To the contrary, time itself had a beginning, and history has a history. 
The dynamic view of time that I am pursuing is dependent upon God's act of creating 
time out of nothing. Under the category of the past, I will examine our theologians' 
views of the beginning, or creation, of time itself. Creation was an act of God which 
occurred in the past, and along with physical matter, time was created as an element 
of reality. While Mackintosh is relatively quiet on this topic, Brunner and Moltmann 
enunciate their views on the creation of time and pronounce God's Lordship over it 
and the events of history. I will also examine their views of the significance and 
meaning of history. The time of history is the realm of God's revelations, most 
importantly the revelation of the Son of God in the person of Jesus of Nazareth. 
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Therefore, I will focus attention also on their views on the incarnation and the aspects 
of time they assume in order to describe the event which fused time and eternity in the 
person of Jesus Christ. 
The Creation of Time 
What does it mean to assert that God has created something other than 
himself? Christians believe that the triune God has been inspired by love to make 
everything: a creation and all its derivative forms of life. The living God has 
graciously become the source for other forms of life, all of which require not only a 
space for existence apart from God but also a duration - a time - in which to live. 
God endows creation with a distinct space and time in which to exist: dependent upon 
yet also free from God. 
Once again, we turn to Augustine for the classical definition of God's creation 
of time. In chapter eleven of his Confessions, Augustine maintains that time is a 
consequence of creation. Augustine writes (to God): 
You are the originator and creator of all ages. What times existed 
which were not brought into being by you? Or how could they pass if 
they never had existence? Since, therefore, you are the cause of all 
times, if any time existed before you made heaven and earth, how can 
anyone say that you abstained from working? You have made time 
itself. Time could not elapse before you made time. But if time did 
not exist before heaven and earth, why do people ask what you were 
then doing? There was no 'then' when there was no time ... There was 
therefore no time when you had not made something, because you 
made time itself. No times are co eternal with you since you are 
permanent. If they were permanent, they would not be times. l 
Time itself was created with the universe, and time has dependent status because 
God's relation to time is the same as God's relation to the rest of the physical world--
that of transcendent creator. There were no "times" before creation because all that 
1 Augustine, Confessions, 11.1.4. 
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existed was God. In this sense, Augustine articulates, as he does elsewhere/ his 
belief that God's eternity is equivalent to timelessness. If time itself existed with God 
in eternity, then God also would be strictly temporal, which Augustine denies. The 
important point to note is that Augustine draws a clear line between a God who is 
above and beyond time and a creation which is, by nature, temporal. 
Dynamic time requires a doctrine of creatio ex nihilo. Granted, there are those 
who argue that this doctrine is not strongly advocated in scripture or essential to a 
doctrine of creation.3 I am convinced, though, of its scriptural warrant and theological 
necessity through the defense of creatio ex nihilo by both biblical scholars and 
systematic theologians over the centuries.4 This doctrine affirms that God brought the 
universe into being and that creation has a fmite beginning. Time is an element of 
creation that, along with everything else, emerges from God's act of "speaking" 
creation into existence, of creating everything out of nothing. 
It is not enough to say merely that God sustains the universe at every time of 
its existence. Even the theologically-minded defender of a static universe could agree 
to this statement and that whatever exists is tenselessly sustained by the will of God. 
Without a doctrine of creatio ex nihilo, the world exists timelessly with God, as Brian 
Leftow, a defender of static reality claims: "God need not begin to do anything, then 
in order to create a world with a beginning. That action that from the temporal 
perspectives is God's beginning time and the universe is in eternity just the timeless 
2 Augustine, The City of God, 11.6 
3 For views against the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo, see Langdon Gilkey, Maker of Heaven and Earth, 
(Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1959); Ian Barbour, Issues in Science and Religion (New York: Harper 
and Row 1971) 384' Arthur Peacocke Creation and the World oifScience (Oxford: Clarendon, 1979), , , , , 
78-79. 
4 See Gerhard May, Creatio ex nihilo: The Doctrine of Creation Out of Nothing in Early Christian 
Thought, trans. A. S. Worrall (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1994); Richard Sorabji, Time, Creation, and 
the Continuum (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), 193-252; George Hendry, "Eclipse of 
Creation," in Theology Today 28 (1972): 406-425; Paul Coppan, "Is Creatio ex nihilo a Post-biblical 
Invention?," in Trinity Journal 17 (1996), 77-93; Thomas Senor, "Divine Temporality and Creation ex 
Nihilo," in Faith and Philosophy, 10 (1993), 86-92; and Richard Swinburne, "God and Time," in 
Reasoned Faith, ed. by Eleonore Stump (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993),204-222. 
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obtaining of a causal dependence or sustaining relation between God and a world 
whose time has a first moment."s The doctrine of creatio ex nihilo involves much 
more than a timeless dependence of the universe upon God. Scripture implies that 
God exists alone "before" bringing the world to exist out of nothing.6 Dynamic time 
emerges from God's creative act in which time had a starting point. 
Brunner states a similar belief in the correlation between the beginning of time 
and creation by claiming that God's Lordship over all as the creator includes God's 
ability to create time. Brunner writes: 
When we say that the world is God's world, we say that it had a 
beginning. Greek philosophy knows no real creation, because it knows 
no beginning of the world. For it the world is co-equal and eternal 
with God. It knows no beginning to the world because it does not 
know the world as the work of the personal God. When we say: The 
world has a beginning, we are uttering a paradox, namely that Time 
has a beginning. In positing the world God also posits Time. Just as 
he posits Space so also He posits Time. Time and Space are the 
fundamental constituents of the world as posited by God. This, 
however, means that Time and Space are finite, not infmite .... From 
the standpoint of belief in the Creation we maintain the finite character 
both of actual Time and actual Space.7 
Brunner is unable to conceive of time as anything other than a fmite entity. Time is a 
"fundamental constituent" of created reality, which also means that it is distinct from 
God, just as space, all matter, and all creatures are. It would be inconceivable for 
Brunner to speak of time as infinite because there would therefore be a blurring of the 
lines of distinction between creator and creation. Temporality exists, therefore, within 
the boundaries God has set for it, namely the boundaries of a created universe. 
Nothing exists outside these boundaries: not even time because it is finite. 
5 Brian Leftow, Time and Eternity, Cornell Studies in Philosophy of Religion (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1991),290-291. . 
6 See John 17:24, Ephesians 1:4, 1 Peter 1:20, Matthew 13:35, Luke 11:50, & RevelatIOn 17:8. 
7 Brunner, The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Redemption: Dogmatics, v. 2, Olive Wyon, trans. 
(London: Lutterworth Press, 1952), 14-15. 
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What is the nature of this "boundary" that Brunner believes there is between 
finite time and that which is infinite, i.e. God? Brunner defines this boundary as 
God's kenotic disposition toward creation. God possesses a willingness to limit his 
infmite freedom in order to allow for a creation. God has created something over and 
against himself, which means that at some point God acted upon his desire to create 
by limiting his being.8 The existence of creation and its temporality reveals God's 
decision to limit himself in order to put his creative will into action. God and the 
world are two distinct entities because God, the Creator, has freely chosen to limit 
himself in order to make room for the space and time of creation: 
It is His will that a second existence, and indeed a very varied and 
many-sided second existence, a world of very varied creatures, should 
be over against Himself.... This, however, means that God does not 
wish to occupy the whole of Space Himself, but that He wills to make 
room for other forms of existence. In doing so, He limits Himself. He 
limits Himself by the fact that the world over against Himself is a real 
existence.9 
Brunner seems to imply here that Space is a separate entity which is filled by God, 
thereby making space co-existent and eternal with God. We have seen above, 
however, that this is not Brunner's intent. Space and time together form a reality that 
is distinct from God and which finds its origin in God's desire to create. 
It is this choice of God to limit his own being that makes creation a separate 
reality. This kenotic, creative resolve of God is exercised "before"l0 God creates, 
8 The question of why God created when he did is addressed from a variety of angles. Brian Leftow 
observes that God must have changed in such a way as to acquire a reason to create the world. See 
Leftow, "Why Didn't God Create the World Sooner?" Religious Studies 27 (1991), 157-172. 
9 Brunner, Dogmatics, v. 2, 20. 
10 Brunner does not speculate on a temporal location for God's decision to create: "When we say: 
'Time has a beginning', we are not, of course, saying that we know what this beginning is .... The fInite 
character of Time, the fact that time has a beginning, does not mean that we know this brief beginning 
or that we shall ever know it." Brunner, Dogmatics, v. 2, 16. Modem cosmology has the benefIt of the 
Big Bang theory to postulate ideas about the beginning of time and creation, so that Davies can write: 
"An initial cosmological singularity therefore forms the past temporal extremity to the universe. We 
cannot continue physical reasoning, or even the concept of spacetime, through such an extremity. For 
this reason most cosmologists think of the initial singularity as the beginning of the universe. On this 
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and Brunner ties this decision to create to God's attribute of omnipotence. It is within 
God's power to limit himself and enable a creation to exist. Whereas Moltmann links 
God's self-restriction with God's omnipresence and omniscience, Brunner draws a 
connection between God's omnipotence and self-limitation. Brunner writes: 
The course of Nature in the created universe has, it is true, some 
connection with certain limitations to God's power, and this is the 
second important element in the idea of Omnipotence; namely, that 
God limits Himself by creating something which is not Himself, 
something "over against" Himself, which he endows with a relative 
independence. Thus it is God Himself who creates this limitation --
hence He is also free to remove it. He creates it, He limits Himself, in 
order that a creature may have room alongside of Himself, in whom 
and to whom He can reveal and impart Himself. Thus from the very 
outset the Biblical idea of God as Almighty is related to revelation. It 
can only be understood in its correlation with this divine self-limitation 
which lies in the nature of His Creation. I I 
God must be capable of limiting himself or otherwise a creation could not exist. For 
anything to exist, it must have "room" or a space, as well as a time in which to exist. 
God powerfully limits his own being to create the criteria necessary for created life. 
Brunner recognizes the need to understand creation in relation to God's self-imposed 
limitation of his attributes. The nature of God's existence is such that without some 
form of a chosen, self-limitation on God's part, creation could not exist. Time is, 
therefore, an outcome of God' self-imposed limitation of his eternal being. 
Like Brunner, Moltmann follows the classical line that time has a created 
beginning and that time is not co-eternal with God. Moltmann, however, goes into 
greater detail than Brunner does as he describes the "order" of time's creation, and he 
elaborates on why this order helps to clarify the difference between Creator and 
creature. Moltmann also employs a similar kenotic approach in order to avoid any 
view the big bang represents the creation event, the creation not only of all the matter and energy in the 
universe, but also of spacetime itself." Paul Davies, "Spacetime Singularities in Cosmology and Bla.ck 
Hole Evaporations," in The Study of Time Ill, ed. J. T. Fraser, N. Lawrence, and D. Park (Berlin: 
Springer Verlag, 1978), 78-79. 
11 Brunner, Dogmatics, v. 2, 251. 
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blurring of the lines between time and eternity, and he does so by delineating between 
different "moments" of creation. These moments spell out the ways in which God 
limits his own being in order to make room for another "being" -- a creation that is 
other than himself. Brunner began this line of reasoning within his doctrine of 
creation, and Moltmann advances it farther as he demonstrates the beginning of time 
in the creative "resolve" of God. 
In his views on the creation of time, we can see Moltmann's reliance upon 
aspects of Jewish theology to describe the manner in which God limits himself in 
order to dwell with humanity in creation in an immanent way. For example, the 
transcendent God of Israel restricts himself in order to concentrate his being in such 
places as the Temple. Immanent communion between God and humanity is possible 
only through an inversion of God's transcendence in order to make God immanently 
available to human beings within time and space. This kenotic principle of self-
limitation lies behind Moltmann's distinctions of different "moments," the primordial 
moment and the moment of inception, in regard to creation of time. 
For Moltmann, all creation is contingent upon the gracious will of the free 
creator to decide in favor of something other than himself. It is this power of decision 
that Moltmann seizes upon to illustrate how God chose in favor of another form of 
being - a temporal creation - that is different from God's own existence in eternity. 
God resolved to restrict his eternity and omnipresence in order to allow time and 
space for creation. Moltmann speaks of God's creative resolve as the "primordial 
moment" of creation: 
In his omnipresence God makes a place for his creation, by 
withdrawing his presence from this primordial space. God restricts his 
eternity so that in this primordial time he can give his creation time, 
and leave it time. God restricts his omniscience in order to give what 
he has created freedom. These primordial self-restrictions of God's 
precede his creation ... Only when God withdraws himself to himself, 
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and restricts and concentrates himself within himself, can he call into 
existence something other than himself and outside himself, something 
that is not divine in nature, and is thus not eternal and omnipresent. If 
a person resolves for himself to do something for someone else, this 
resolve already implies a concentration of many possibilities to this 
particular one. Self-determination and self-restriction are the same 
thing. Both presuppose a self-alteration on God's part in eternity.12 
We may quickly wonder about Moltmann's logic and the meaning of such ideas as 
God's "withdrawing himself to himself' and "concentrating himself within himself." 
He intends to state a kenotic limitation on God's part, yet how can God withdraw 
further and further into himself? Is there a point where God "withdrawing" creates a 
vacuum? 
The primordial moment was the action of God's deciding to restrict and to 
limit his eternity and omnipresence, thereby making a time and a space available for 
creation that is other than God's own eternity and omnipresence. Prior to God's act of 
creating, God chose in favor of a creation, and the event of this choosing was the 
primordial moment. Time, which was made along with every other created entity, is 
possible only because God first chose a self-limitation in order to make beings and 
entities other than himself. 
The moment of the inception of time is the point at which time began with the 
rest of creation. It follows the primordial moment, and time and space spring from 
the moment of inception. In the act of creation, time emerges from eternity and 
begins the movement of what is understood as the linear advance of time and the 
distinction of time as past, present, and future. The moment of inception coincides 
with the "speech" of God which calls forth creation out of nothing. The simultaneous 
creation of time and matter extends from the moment of inception, from which time 
12 Moltmann, The Coming of God, 281-282. 
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and matter continue to extend and will continue until creation's consummation in the 
kingdom of God. 
The Lord of History 
Following this consideration of God's creation of time, we now turn our 
attention to the question of time's continuance: what is history? Is the temporal 
stream of events that forms history random and subject to chaotic forces with no 
discernable movement toward an End? Or is history, as a place of change and 
becoming, a dynamic realm in which God is bringing creation toward a fmal goal in 
God's will? The dynamic view of time that I am favoring sees history as the field of 
temporal events by which God is indeed bringing redemption -- to humanity and to 
creation as a whole. God gives a freedom to creation through his kenotic act of 
creating, yet this freedom is not absolute independence. This freedom allows for the 
possibility of opposition to God, yet this opposition is not stronger than God's moral 
will acting in history to bring creation to God's desired goal in his glory. As we 
examine our three theologians' views on history, we shall see that they adhere to a 
dynamic, tensed view of time in order to maintain God's Lordship over what he has 
created. 
Writing as he did in the early years of the twentieth century, Mackintosh finds 
himself in a struggle against philosophical impulses which deny the importance of 
temporal events in relation the eternal, unchanging Truth of God. G. E. Lessing states 
this impulse by claiming that "accidental truths of history can never become proof of 
the necessary truths of reason.,,13 Mackintosh reacts strongly to this philosophical 
13 G. E. Lessing, "On the Proof of the Spirit and of Power," in Lessing's Theological Writings, ed. and 
trans. Henry Chadwick (Stanford University Press, 1956),53. 
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denial of the reality and significance of historical events because such a dismissal of 
history results in a disdain for the necessity of God's interaction with the world 
through historical events. Mackintosh critiques this disdain of the philosophical view 
of history by engaging the work Hegel, whose thought, while in some ways 
sympathetic to Christian doctrine, is nevertheless a great challenge to it. Hegel denies 
any lasting importance to events in history, and Hegelian appraisals of Christianity, 
such as that of A. E. Biedermann, scorn the specific redemptive acts garnered by the 
life of the historical Jesus.
I4 
An Hegelian approach disregards the teachings and 
actions of the historical Jesus in favor of the ideal of a divine-human unity in the 
figure of the God-Man, and the life of the world is fused with God's own being. I5 
Mackintosh sees Hegel's thought as a merging of God and humanity into a 
pantheistic, indistinguishable unity, and as a consequence of this, time and history 
fade away into the ether of eternity.I6 The notion of a personal God who interacts 
with and is involved in people's lives is replaced by Pure Being, to which the human 
mind must be united. Hegel regards theology, not with absolute hostility, but with a 
14 Biedermann's Hegelian approach favors the principle of Redemption over the historical person of the 
Redeemer so as to render Jesus of Nazareth as largely irrelevant. See C. Welch, Protestant Thought in 
the Nineteenth Century, I (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972), 160-167. 
15 Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, ed. Peter C. Hodgson, trans. R. F. Brown (Los 
Angeles: University of California Press, 1984),288. 
16 Mackintosh's further summarizes Hegel's thought with this paragraph from his articulate essay on 
Hegel in Types of Modern Theology: "To Hegel philosophy is the supreme court of appeal, and faith, to 
be justified in its claims to real truth, must obtain a certificate of competence from the speculative 
examiner, whose verdict is fmal. It is true, Christian doctrine has a price to pay for any such 
philosophical certificate. Thus no more must be heard regarding the uniqueness of the historical Christ, 
or the once-for-all character of His mediation; that too is a symbol or earthen vessel enshrining a grand 
metaphysical idea. The doctrine of the God-man is a picture, and a sublime one, by means of which 
human thought has in the past been enabled to rise to, and grasp, the ultimate truth that Divinity and 
Humanity are one in essence, that the life of man is the life of God in temporal form, and that the two 
natures, the Divine and the human, can only realize themselves through vital unity with each other. In 
like manner, the death, resurrection and exaltation of Christ are noble imaginative presentations of 
ideas to which philosophy must ever attach a high importance. They are, so to speak, parabolic 
statements of the fact that fmite man, construed merely as finite, is inevitably the prey of negation and 
decay; yet view him in the light of his unity with the Infmite, and straightway he rises and mounts to a 
lofty and positive participation in the pantheistic world-process. Thus the story of man is the history of 
God's becoming, the self-evolution of Absolute Reason spelling itself out in the medium of space and 
time. In this sense, but no other, the Word took flesh and dwelt among us." Types of Modern 
Theology, 107-108. 
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simplicity that appreciates theology as a stepping stone to the more valid and more 
important path of Speculative Rationalism. Hegel concludes that the symbols of faith 
are merely lower forms of philosophic reflection on the nature of the Eternal. For 
Hegel, speculative philosophy offers a purer, clearer access into the Infmite Mind of 
the Universe, which is, in fact, in the same process of development with the finite 
mind of humanity. 
The effect of Hegel's approach is to render events in history as largely 
inconsequential in the relation between God and humanity. Truth is found by Hegel, 
not in God's revelations in history, but in the developing unity of the fmite and the 
Infinite. The main problem with Hegel's approach is his failure to appreciate the 
validity and reliability of historical events and the fact that these events are not merely 
ephemeral but are the very events by which God redeems and saves humanity.17 
Mackintosh determines that in Hegel's thought "each part of history tells the same 
story, as each uniform leaf betrays the nature of the tree. Hence no event may claim 
unique significance, nor can faith rightly profess to see one majestic Divine purpose 
guiding all to a sovereign consummation. All historical facts are but transient 
individualizations of an eternal and unchanging content.,,18 If all historical events are 
insignificant occurrences in the passage of temporal un-reality, then the specific 
events in Israel's history, and, most importantly, in the life of Christ, are likewise 
unnecessary in the saving relationship between God and humanity.19 
17 For a similar assessment of Hegel by a contemporary of Mackintosh, see Friedrich von HUgel, 
Eternal Life: A Study o/its Implications and Applications (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1913),201-223. 
18 Mackintosh, Types 0/ Modem Theology, 109. 
19 Mackintosh's adamant reinforcement of the necessity of history is a continuation of the work of other 
19th Century thinkers, namely Albrecht Ritschl and Ernst Troeltsch. One of the great stren~s of the 
Ritchlian influence on Mackintosh is his adamant appreciation for the necessity of the hIstOry of 
Christianity's claims. In opposition to the 19th Century disregard for the hi~toricity of the li~e of ~hrist, 
Mackintosh maintains that faith is grounded in specific events, locatIOns, and espeCIally m the 
historical person of Jesus Christ. Mackintosh, Types of Modem Theology, 105-106. 
130 
Mackintosh focuses primarily on the concept of history and the necessity of 
real, historical events through which God works to redeem humanity, and his intent is 
to demonstrate the importance of history as containing the means by which God is 
enacting the divine plan for humanity's redemption. His eschatology depends on the 
sense of a dynamic historical process under the willful guidance of a loving and holy 
God. Against any scientific or philosophical view of history that excludes God, 
Mackintosh writes: 
The concept of a material cosmos ruled by inflexible laws has caged 
the modem mind, at times even though that mind is Christian; and we 
look out to the face of God, often, sadly and half-mistrustfully through 
the bars of the uniformity of Nature. If we listen to Christ, He can 
impart to us the certitude of an almighty Father wielding all that is 
meant by Nature for the accomplishment of unspeakably gracious 
ends. Faith in Him as Redeemer renders sheerly unthinkable the 
notion of the world as a closed and calculable system of effects and 
causes.20 
Mackintosh believes that scientific discoveries of the laws of nature should not 
exclude the activity of God in sustaining and redeeming the world. He senses an 
attempt to "cage" humanity in a world that is not subject to God's Providence or 
power. It is a denial of God's Lordship to propose that God is unable to act in the 
natural processes of the world. Scientific discoveries on the processes of the natural 
world that deny God the ability to encounter human beings and act on their behalf 
within the space and time that God has created would be to deny God's Lordship over 
what he has made. 
To the contrary, the phenomenal world is the very place in which God is 
acting for the very purpose of bringing about his kingdom. It is God's will to act in 
powerful and redeeming ways to ensure that his kingdom is not thwarted by the 
20 Mackintosh, The Christian Apprehension a/God, 205. 
131 
freedom God has given to creation. Creation is laden with a purpose that God is 
achieving within temporality: 
The J?ivine purpose will be interpreted, not as I hope unnaturally, as 
meamng the Kingdom of God, which He is realizing in time and will 
make perfect under eternal conditions. By the word "Kingdom" is 
signified, after the pattern of Scripture, a phenomenal order which 
gives full expression or embodiment to God's holy and loving will for 
all His children .... Time, even for the leading minds of classical 
antiquity, tended to be mere barren phantasmagoria. It was not 
conceived as laden somehow with Divine purpose working out a 
mighty consummation, the earlier periods throwing their results 
forward into the coming ages, and the denouement of the End 
gathering up into itself the abiding issues of the whole process.21 
History, then, must be dynamic because within time there is change and becoming as 
creation is led to something greater than itself. For Mackintosh, there is a richness to 
history that it gains from being the subject of God's loving and holy will and 
guidance. History for Mackintosh is a field of progress and purpose in which all 
events are connected and impinge upon later stages in their relation to the End toward 
which God is guiding history. Nothing, in the end, will be lost to God as all periods 
and results (or events) of the process of history are gathered up in the End. 
The key to unlocking Mackintosh's view of the richness of history is to see it 
as a "moral operation", or in other words, to note how temporality is connected to the 
will of a holy God. God's acts within time and thereby ensures that "history is a 
moral operation. The kingdom of God is coming on earth. A redemptive purpose is 
being executed on the grand scale and will throw its results far on into coming 
ages.,,22 As temporal creatures who are encountered by God, 
we find ourselves in contact with a universe not really interpretable as 
a closed circle of forces, all the changes of which can be computed in 
advance by a mind sufficiently powerful. It is a universe rather whose 
apparent iron uniformity is but a fragment of the whole. God is a free 
21 Mackintosh, The Christian Apprehension of God, 200-20l. 
22 Mackintosh, Some Aspects of Christian Belief, 6. 
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spirit, able to bring events to pass which transcend all finite forces 
acting with mechanical rigor, able to release into the phenomenal order 
the pent-up fullness of His own Divine activity. Reality is rich, plastic, 
full of unimaginable potentialities. It is susceptible of new departures, 
and the preferential action of God affects its movements by way of real 
initiation.23 
With this view in mind, we may say that Mackintosh clearly subscribes to a dynamic 
interpretation of time which allows for God's action to change and mold people and 
events according to his holy and loving will. Reality is "plastic" in God's hands 
because temporal potentialities are subject to God's will and not an "iron uniformity" 
that is devoid of divine possibility. 24 
Hegel's theory of history fails to distinguish between the Creator of time and 
the creatures that experience it. There is a blurring of the stark distinction between 
God and humanity when temporality and specific events in history are not viewed as 
necessary for the Divine-human relationship. This is an untenable confusion over the 
understanding of the main difference between God and humanity. If philosophers and 
theologians alike center their thoughts on the concept of God's "infinite" being, 
meaning that God is infinitely ubiquitous and in all things, then "God" means the 
"Whole of Being" or the "Entirety of the Universe." According to this logic, creation 
is just one part of a reality in which all finite beings are absorbed into one larger 
Whole that is the infinite God. The historical process is then merely the Spirit of 
God's outworking as God "realizes" himself in all that is. Temporality does not stand 
on its own as a distinct, created element and something other than God. This view 
will not suffice because the distinction between God and creation, between the eternal 
God and time is one that must be maintained if creatures are to understand , 
themselves rightly in relation to the God who made them. They themselves are not 
23 Mackintosh, The Doctrine of the Person of Jesus Christ, 458-359. 
24 Mackintosh, Some Aspects of Christian Belief, 14. 
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part of God and hence divine. Only God is divine, and humans who fail to realize this 
succumb to the temptation to set themselves in the place of primary importance. 
Mackintosh finds that theology too often surrenders to the Hegelian impulse to 
"spiritualize" history in order to cleanse it from the mess of mundane, corporeal 
reality. For Mackintosh, however, since reality is primarily temporality, theology is 
wrong to attempt to "ascend" to the world of un-embodied Ideas. Faith means trusting 
in the God who reveals himself in historical events, and faith is not the cleavage of 
one's rational mind to an eternal Mind/God, above and beyond the dull and difficult 
modes of earth-bound existence. The perennial temptation of theology is to succumb 
to the idea that the specifics of history and time matter less for redemption than one's 
own attempts at a spiritual "escape" from life in the present. Latent in this spiritual-
philosophical approach is the assumption that because Truth is timeless and eternal, 
faith in the eternal God therefore exists independently of events in history. In contrast 
to the Hegelian approach to history, which is static in its conception of realit/5, 
Mackintosh favors a dynamic view of history as a moral realm of God's progressive 
revelations that culminate in the historical person of Jesus Christ. He argues that 
history and finality, or Absolute Truth, are not mutually exclusive: "If it be said that 
the Gospel as involved in history must consent to be equally relative with other facts 
in the time-series - that it has to choose, in short, between historicity and finality - the 
answer is that this is pure assumption, and assumption must be changed if it conflicts 
with real phenomena.,,26 Mackintosh insists that history is not negatively or neutrally 
related to God but rather that history is the positive realm of God's revelations of his " , 
loving will toward humanity. Time is at the disposal of God's saving activity, and 
25 Mackintosh describes this view in temporal terms: "For much contemporary thought it is axiomatic 
that nothing real ever moves." Mackintosh, Some Aspects of Christian Belief, 5. 
26 Mackintosh, The Doctrine of the Person of Jesus Christ, 309-310. 
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"history then is such that salvation may come by way of it. .. Salvation must be 
mediated through history. Humanity can be saved only from within.,,27 Mackintosh's 
conclusion is that history is dynamic and that God exercises redemption by bringing 
about real changes in the relationship between God and humanity temporal events. 
Brunner echoes much of Mackintosh's thought in regard to his theory of 
history as he similarly describes temporal reality at the disposal of God's power and 
action. History is such that it is capable of containing God's revelations as God 
guides creation toward its Goal in God's kingdom. History is not cyclical, and events 
in time are essential to God's ultimate purpose for creation: "History is the field in 
which what is new and of unique occurrence happens. History as a movement 
towards an end has assumed a direction and a meaning, an absolute divine meaning 
which makes its total claim upon man.,,28 Based on his kenotic interpretation of the 
creation of time, Brunner contends that defining a goal for creation is possible only 
when its origin can be identified. Just as time had its origin in God's act of creation, 
so also will time have its end in God's act of consummation, and along the way of 
history God is guiding creation toward its End. 
The fact that God decides in favor of temporal events means that God is Lord 
over time as its creator and that time is at the disposal of God's will. God's power 
created time, and God's power shall bring time to its fulfillment. The flow of time is 
not random or haphazard, but, rather, history is moving toward a purpose which shall 
be achieved in consummation. God's Lordship over time means that time's beginning 
and end are held within the scope God's eternal plan. History becomes the theater in 
which God is realizing the divine goal for humanity along with all creation: 
27 Mackintosh, Some Aspects o/Christian Belief, 16. 
28 Brunner, Eternal Hope, 32. 
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Just as time has a beginning so also will it have an end. It will be 
dissolved, in the fullness of time, in eternity .... But the beginning and 
the end are held together by God's eternal plan, and God manifests His 
Lordship over time by the fact that from the beginning He aims at the 
end. For this reason there is history not only of humanity but of the 
cosmos. All is moving towards an ultimate goal. Everything has its 
place within this world-history. The goal and the meaning of this 
world-history towards which all is oriented is eternal life in the 
communion of God and creature.29 
Thus we see in Brunner's thought the conception of time as subsumed under the 
purpose of the redeeming will of God.30 In Brunner's thought, all aspects of creation 
and all peoples of history have an eschatological goal toward which they are moving, 
and just as each person has an eschatological future, so also does all creation. God 
retains ultimate power as creator over all things, and God rules over time as its origin 
and end. 
To describe the movement of history toward an eschatological goal, Brunner 
divides history into two simultaneous and intertwined tracks of temporal occurrences. 
He identifies two channels of historical reality, and they run parallel to one another, 
although one channel remains invisible without faith. These two tracks of general 
history and saving history run concurrently and are inseparable, although saving 
history, or the history of God's redemption, is discernible only when one is guided by 
God's revelation.31 
General history is a vast realm that is open to broad fields of human inquiry, 
and the events of general history can be observed and discussed from innumerable 
29 Brunner, Eternal Hope, 52. On the relation of the beginning to the end, Brunner writes: "The fact 
that Time has a beginning is just as important as the other fact, that it has an end. Its end coincides 
with the end of created existence. This end, however, is not 'nothing-ness', but it is the Goal which is 
both the end and the completion of the created universe. God Himself is the End of Creation, but this 
does not mean that He will be once more without a creation, as at the beginning; but it means that He 
will glorify Himself in Creation, and give Himself to it, in such a way, that it will shatter the 
framework of the created universe as we know it." Brunner: Dogmatics, v. 2. 16. 
30 Brunner, The Christian Doctrine of the Church, Faith, and the Consummation: Dogmatics, v. 3, 
trans. David Cairns (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1960),340. 
31 Brunner, Dogmatics, v. 2, 194. 
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angles and approaches. The general history of the world is the story of human events 
and cultures, and general history is inclusive also of occurrences in the natural non-, 
human world. 32 Inquiries into the general history of the world investigate the 
achievements of peoples and societies from Ancient Greece to Medieval England to 
modem China. Plato, Shakespeare, and Mao Tse-tung and all their works form the 
subject matter of general history. In addition, because general history includes 
aspects of the natural world, such as the earth's geologic ages, the natural sciences 
shed great light into the understanding of the world's general history. Paleontology 
and zoology, among many other fields of knowledge, comprise the barometers that 
measure the effects of the development of general history. General history does not 
require the intense personal commitment of its observers that saving history does, and 
study of the general past does not generate transformation in the present. 
Independent of theology, one may historically approximate Jesus' life and 
ministry to the time of Pontius Pilate's reign in Judea and the period of Roman 
authority in Galilee. As a person, Jesus belongs to general history in the same way 
that Kublai Kahn and Joan of Arc do. The death of Jesus on a Roman cross belongs 
to the realm of general human history, and in this sense, the Bible records generally 
historical material. Even if one insists that the biblical history of Jesus is biased by 
the early church's mission and the writers' beliefs, one can neutrally accept that the 
accounts are based upon a real historical figure whose life occurred in the chronology 
of the world's history. The historically unique person Jesus lived in a certain period of 
time, and his life, like every person's, was bound by spatial and temporal limits. As 
an historical person who lived at a specific time, Jesus had a history which coincides 
with the overall history of the world.33 
32 Brunner, Dogmatics, v. 2, 196. 
33 Brunner, Dogmatics, v. 2, 199. 
137 
While the events of general history are open for universal observation, the 
general historian cannot grasp the significance of the theological events that comprise 
salvation history. Salvation history, in striking contrast to general history, makes 
personal demands on the individual considering it, and it cannot be discerned from a 
neutral, objective point of view. Salvation history is hidden within the events of 
general history, and one must observe it through the eyes of faith. 
One can categorize many of the events in Israelite history and those of the life 
of the man Jesus within the general history of the world, yet the theological weight of 
these events is clear only when they are understood as moments of God's activity in 
salvation history. The events of God's interaction with the world are moments of 
revelation, and they are times when God is revealing his holy and loving will for 
creation. Salvation history is real, but hidden, within general history, and the only 
way to perceive salvation history is through the trust that comes with faith. Only 
through the eyes of faith one can recognize the Son of God in the man who appears as 
a person like everyone else. The Son of God's saving identity is hidden within the 
visible identity of Jesus of Nazareth. Likewise, God's guiding and saving activity for 
Israel lies within the events in the life of the nation and its leaders and people. It lies 
in the domain of the historian of salvation history, the theologian, to elucidate the 
significance of God's activity in saving history. 
How convincing is Brunner in his description of history's two tracks - general 
history and salvation history? Brunner struggles to characterize the relationship 
between general and salvation history because he seeks to explain how salvation 
history is included within general history, while acknowledging that the former is not 
recognizable to all people. That which can be apprehended through investigation of 
general history is the visible "shell" of the invisible "kernel" of salvation history, and 
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yet this kernel, which drives all history on toward its consummation, remains largely 
unseen and unknown. 34 
I believe that Brunner's two-track approach to history has merit because it 
relies on an argument that distinguishes between the phenomenology of events in the 
two realms of history as he defines them. Events in general history are relatively 
unique, meaning that while each occurrence is a new event, it remains dependent 
upon other events for its meaning and place within the larger scope of history. An 
event is unique relative to other unique events which frame its occurrence. Events in 
salvation history, however, are absolutely unique because they draw their meaning 
from outside the realm of general history. An event in salvation history is absolutely 
unique because its significance derives only from its place in that history. For 
example, the execution of a man named Jesus on a Roman cross is relatively unique 
and can be apprehended by secular history. That this event wrought atonement for 
human sin is an absolutely unique fact, and its meaning is determined by the events of 
salvation history. Brunner writes: 
Whereas the uniqueness which the historian can appreciate in the 
person and story of Jesus is a relative uniqueness, what faith 
apprehends as God's act and word in atonement and redemption is 
something absolutely unique .... The historical event on Calvary, 
fundamentally appreciable by everyone as such, is the visible shell of 
the invisible kernel - the absolutely unique - which can only be 
apprehended by faith. 35 
An action of God, and only God, is always absolutely unique, while any world event 
is always relatively unique in relation to other world events. 
The factor that makes Brunner's approach to salvation history important is 
precisely his reliance on faith as the necessary hermeneutic for interpreting certain 
historical events as God's revelation. Faith is necessary in order to understand 
34 Brunner, Eternal Hope, 35. 
35 Brunner, Eternal Hope, 35. 
139 
temporality and historical events as constituent parts of salvation history. In order for 
theology to maintain a dialogue with other fields, it must acknowledge that general 
history is open to investigation by various methods. Insisting on a faithful approach 
to salvation history does not shut down conversations between theology and science. 
Rather, it opens up another dimension to history that sciences must reckon with and 
grapple to understand. Brunner's scheme of history is one that allows theology to 
embrace the discoveries of science regarding creation, and it challenges science to 
acknowledge that events in time have a purpose that only theology can illumine. This 
purpose is the redemption of the world by God. 
Added to the distinction between general history and saving history is the 
concept of personalism, and Brunner integrates this concept into his interpretation of 
history from creation to consummation. Brunner accentuates the idea that the domain 
of time is necessary for personal encounter between God and human beings?6 God 
created all that is, but not everything possesses the personal nature of being. The 
sedimentation or rocks and the formation of stars are important for understanding the 
development of the natural world, but these natural phenomenon are trivial compared 
to the engagement within history between God and humanity. Human history, as 
distinct from natural history, is the dimension of personal encounter and decision-
making, and the process of humanity's development, unlike that of nature, involves 
the free decisions of human beings over and against their environment. Unlike the 
history of the natural world and its evolution, human history is the sphere of national 
destinies and cultures, and it is the arena of conflict, encounter, and, most importantly, 
decision.37 Time, therefore, becomes the necessary condition which enables personal 
encounter between God and human beings, and human living within temporality 
36 Jewett, Brunner's Concept of Revelation, 27-28. 
37 Brunner, Man in Revolt, 440. 
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necessarily entails decisions in hannony or dishannony with God's purposes. To 
understand truly what it means to live as human, one must recognize one's obligation 
for a decision in favor of faith in God.38 Throughout life, one is encountered by the 
personal God who loves, creates, and redeems, and each human exists under the 
responsibility to decide for or against God. This is the ultimate definition of what it 
means to be a personal creature who exists in time: one who is encountered by God. 
Throughout his career Moltmann has been occupied by the effort to redefine 
time and history along radically different lines from that of Mackintosh and Brunner. 
Theology of Hope seeks to examine how eschatology undergirds all of history as the 
principle which gives history its meaning, yet the traditional account of salvation 
history is one that Moltmann rejects. History is the realm of God's promises, and as 
such it is not cyclical but is moving toward the fulfillment of the promises that God 
has spoken into and over history. But history itself does not contribute to the 
eschatological end God has in store for it. Whereas Mackintosh and Brunner affirm 
that the historical process itself reveals and is leading to the kingdom of God, 
Moltmann absolutely rejects the notion that historical progress is the means by which 
the eschatological future is secured. History is not synonymous with the coming 
eschatological kingdom of God, and a progressivist approach to history will not yield 
the eschatological future. 
Moltmann dismisses theories of salvation history as nothing better that 
Enlightenment theology. To equate temporal history with salvation history "is 
nothing other than historical Deism. God becomes the watchmaker of world history 
and author of a master blueprint of foreknowledge. Once it has been drawn up, he has 
no further need to intervene. The calendar will one day bring 'the day of Jesus 
38 Jewett, Brunner's Concept of Revelation, 74-79. 
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Christ'. Where is God's freedom in all this?,,39 Here we see just how much 
Moltmann differs from Mackintosh and Brunner in his understanding of time in that 
he greatly distances himself from their notion of the temporal process as progressively 
leading toward a teleological End. Whereas Mackintosh and Brunner propose a view 
of salvation history as continually building upon itself toward a goal under the 
guidance of God, Moltmann offers a radically different interpretation which denies 
history of such an internal progress. 
In his disdain for salvation history, Moltmann sees great injustice and violence 
m the "progress" of humankind over the centuries. History is the struggle of 
humanity against itself, with the powerful wmmng out over the poor and the 
marginalized: "Isn't history, pictured as progress, always at the same time an 
instrument of domination - the domination of one society, one class and the one, 
present generation, an instrument used to suppress all the others and take possession 
of them? And isn't history, pictured as progress, also an instrument for subjecting 
nature to the will and intentions of human beings?,,40 Human history is written from 
the perspective of the "winners" while the losers remain victims of injustice and 
shame. 
For Moltmann, history should not be viewed progressively as a homogeneous 
line, where the future can develop only out of what is past and where all of time is 
leading up to the eschatological event of the consummation. Rather, Moltmann 
capitalizes on the concept of promise to give the future an ontological priority over 
the past and present: "Promise announces the coming of a not yet existing reality from 
the future of the truth ... The 'possible', and wherewith the 'future', arises entirely 
from God's word of promise and therefore goes beyond what is possible and 
39 Moltmann, The Coming of God, 13. See also Moltmann, Theology of Hope, 71-75. 
40 Moltmann, God in Creation, 125. 
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impossible in a realistic sense. It does not illuminate a future which is always 
somehow already inherent in reality.,,41 Time and history, therefore, are qualified, not 
by what has happened before or presently but by the potentiality of the future.42 The 
future is the source from which time springs, and this future is transcendent over the 
past and present, thereby opening up the possibility of something radically new within 
time. Because of these constructive potentialities, history is the time of promise in 
which the future is transcendent over the past and present. The time of earthly 
creation is dynamic in that it is constantly open to change in regard to events which 
come from the future. 
Here we see Bloch's influence on Moltmann's theory of history as Moltmann 
describes the future as the "sphere of the possible," the past as the "sphere of the 
realized," and the present as the "sphere in which the possible is either realized or not 
realized." What is possible is future, what is real is present, and what is past in 
unchangeable. All temporal events are irreversible and unrepeatable because 
potentiality and reality are vastly different modes of existence. Moltmann gives the 
future "preference" over the past and the present because the future is comprised of 
realized potentiality: "If reality is realized potentiality, then potentiality must be 
higher ontologically than reality. If out of the future there is past, but out of past 
never again future, then the future must have pre-eminence among the modes of 
time. ,,43 Since time is irreversible, the source from which history springs lies in the 
future and this allows one to look forward to the future with hope. The scars of the , 
past remain, yet the future is the realm of a possibly different reality that will come 
41 Moltmann, Theology a/Hope, 85. . 
42 For Moltmann's analysis of and indebtedness to the four Jewish philosophers Bloch, RosenzweIg, 
Scholem, and Benjamin in this regard see CG, 29-41. See also, Bauckham, "Time and Eternity", 161-
166. 
43 Moltmann, The Coming 0/ God, 287. 
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into being. One gives pre-eminence to the future because it is the source of new 
reality and therefore hope. 
History is, then, the history of Jesus Christ, because he is the promise of the 
future that has been spoken into time. Earthly time is always oriented toward the 
future, but the entirety of history and time awaits the full salvation of God from 
outside of history. The dynamic history of Christ is fundamentally temporal, 
therefore, and the continuing passage of time is part his history because Christ's 
mission was not fully completed at his resurrection. Like Brunner, Moltmann 
believes that Christ's full glory remains veiled until its full disclosure at the parousia 
and consummation of creation. Time is for Moltmann, consequently, 
"eschatologically charged" as Christ continues to rule and to reconcile until he can 
hand his kingdom over to God. There remains an the outstanding advent of God yet 
to come when the kingdom shall come with him. In the Christian world-view, all 
history and all people await the coming of Christ to make all things right and to 
initiate the new creation. 
Incarnation, Time, and Eschatology 
The incarnation of the Son of God is a thing of the past: it was a once-and-for-
all event that took place within a human life at a specific time in a certain location. It 
belongs to history, and Christians look back and remember the incarnation in the 
annual celebration of Christmas. It was a unique historical event, as Mackintosh 
states: "For all religion controlled by the New Testament our Lord is not merely an 
incarnation of God, as others may be in their place; He is the unique and essential 
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appearance of God in history. No duplication is conceivable.',44 The incarnation was 
also an event in the life of God: when the eternal God entered time and became 
subject to its limitations and transience. Describing this remarkable event however , , 
is problematic, to say the least. How can the eternal God become subject to 
temporality and still remain eternal? Is there not something so paradoxical in this 
notion as to render it an unsustainable claim within Christian doctrine? Is it possible 
to say that one Person of the Trinity assumes the qualities of temporal being without 
all Persons doing likewise? If one Person of the Trinity is eternal, then all are eternal, 
and we cannot make the counter-claim that one Person is temporal without all being 
temporal. 
When we examine the doctrine of the incarnation in relation to eternity and 
time, we are plowing through ground that has been turned over many times in the 
history of Christian thought. Part of God's divinity is his eternity, and the earliest 
Christian councils sought to provide some method of understanding the unity of 
divinity and humanity in the person of Jesus. Since the Council of Chalcedon in 451, 
orthodox Western Christians have defended the view that Jesus is consubstantial with 
the Father in his divinity while at the same time consubstantial with all humanity, yet 
his divine and human natures are neither changed, confused, divided, nor separated.45 
The dual natures of humanity and divinity are united in Jesus without either 
compromising the properties of the other, as J. N. D. Kelly writes: "Side by side with 
the unity, the Definition states that, as incarnate, the Word exists 'in two natures', 
each complete and each retaining its distinctive properties and operation unimpaired 
44 Mackintosh, The Doctrine of the Person of Jesus Christ, 431. 
45 For more in the history of the debate regarding the two-natures theory within early Christianity, 1. N. 
D. Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines (New York: Harper and Row, 1960),280-343; G. W. H. L~pe, 
"Christian Theology in the Patristic Period," in A History of Christian Doctrine, ed. Hubert Cunliffe-
Jones (philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1978), 121-148. 
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in the union. ,,46 How shall we understand this apparent paradox that the eternal Son 
of God exists in the temporal person of Jesus? 
Many ancient and modem theologians alike throw up their hands in surrender 
III the face of the mystery of the incarnation. Tertullian acknowledged the 
incoherence of the logic describing the combination of divinity and humanity in Jesus, 
but he believed in it despite its absurdity.47 Kierkegaard described the notion of 
humanity and divinity dwelling together in Christ as "a breach with all thinking. ,,48 
More recently H. M. ReIton has commented regarding the incarnation that "it 
postulates a logical impossibility ... But the Person of Christ is the bankruptcy of 
human logic.,,49 Based on his comparative analysis of world religions, John Hick 
states that it is false to claim that Jesus was the Son of God incarnate.5o Christian 
faith has maintained the belief that in Jesus of Nazareth divinity and humanity became 
united, despite its logical incoherence and offensiveness to some. 
Is there a rationale that allows us to assess this claim and understand what it 
means for the relation of God to time? If the Son of God became temporal, then it 
logically follows that God is temporal as well. This claim will further add credence to 
the assertion that God's eternity is not timelessness but has the qualities of 
temporality. Thomas Senor offers a convincing argument for this claim through the 
following formula of propositions and conclusions: 
PI) Jesus Christ read in the synagogue (at the start of His ministry) before He 
carried His cross. 
CI) So, temporal predicates apply to Jesus Christ. 
P2) Jesus Christ = God the Son 
C2) So, temporal predicates apply to God the Son. 
P3) Temporal predicates don't apply to timeless beings. 
461. N. D. Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines, 34l. 
47 FN Tertullian . 
48 S0ren Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscripts, trans. David F. Swenson and Walter Lowne 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1941),513. 
49 H. M. Relton, A Study in Christo logy (London: SPCK, 1917),265. 
50 John Hick, The Myth a/God Incarnate (London: SCM Press, 1977), 178ff. 
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C3) So, God the Son isn't timeless.51 
Senor's logic breaks down if one denies P2, but since this is one of the fundamental 
beliefs of Christian orthodoxy it must remain for those who wish to debate God's 
timelessness within the framework of Christian doctrine. P3 is, as Senor 
acknowledges, a "conceptual truth", meaning that "a part of what it is to call a being 
timeless is to say that temporal predicates don't apply to that being.,,52 In other 
words, temporal descriptions or measurements cannot be used to describe a timeless 
being. Therefore, the only way to deny Senor's formula is to disprove PI and the 
temporal progression of Jesus' human life. 
This is the route which is taken by Stump and Kretzman in their essay entitled 
"Eternity" in which they defend the classical position of God's timelessness.53 Their 
approach is based on the duality of the divine and human natures in Christ and the 
preference of one over the other in speaking of events in his life. Thus, temporal 
descriptions apply only to Jesus in respect to his humanity and not to his divinity. 
Temporality does not apply to the timeless Son of God. For Stump and Kretzmann, 
temporal statements regarding the humanity of Jesus are meaningless when applied to 
the divinity of the Son.54 Their argument, however, fails to take into account the 
seriousness with which the Christian tradition has defended the unity of the dual 
natures in the one person of Christ. Orthodoxy has maintained that the dual natures 
are distinct, but they are still joined in the singularity of the person Jesus of Nazareth. 
It is the unity of the dual natures that requires us to say that if temporal predicates 
51 Thomas Senor, "Incarnation and Timelessness," in Faith and Philosophy, v. 7, no. 2, April 1990, 
149-162. 
52 Senor, "Incarnation and Timelessness," 151. 
53 Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann, "Eternity," in The Journal of Philosophy, v. LXXVII, no. 
8, August 1981,429-58. 
54 Stump and Kretzmann, "Eternity," 452. 
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apply to one nature of Christ then they apply to both. 55 Thus it is logical to claim that 
the Son of God is temporal through the incarnation. We shall see if it follows to 
conclude from this that if the Son of God is temporal then the Trinity, i.e. God, is 
temporal as well and not timeless. 
When we look toward the work of our three theologians, we shall examine the 
nature of the incarnation as an "eschatological event." Saying this implies that the 
incarnation involves ramifications for the relation between time and eternity, but there 
is more involved than that. Our three theologians view Jesus as an eschatological 
person because his whole life is viewed through the lens of God's eternal purposes for 
humankind. God has an eternal desire to exist in communion with human beings, and 
Jesus Christ is the means through which this desire is realized. There are 
implications, therefore, for a variety of doctrines, especially the atonement, when one 
claims that the eternal God lived a temporal life and became subject as he was to 
death. The manner in which each theologian addresses the incarnation in the 
eternity/time dialectic reveals how they recast Jesus' life as an eschatological event. 
Each is quick to affirm that the manner of incarnation (how God became 
human) pales in comparison to its meaning (why God became human), and each is 
similarly quick to debate the merits and demerits of the traditional Chalcedonian 
approach to incarnation. F or his part, Mackintosh concentrates mostly on the 
connection between the incarnation and atonement from human sin. This connection 
is consistent in each of our three theologians, as they commonly desire to link the 
whole of Christ's life with God's atoning sacrifice. Brunner and Moltmann, 
especially, add the dimension of Christ's role as messenger and bringer of the 
kingdom of God to the world. Not only does the incarnation signal God's desire to 
55 For an in-depth analysis of this claim, see Thomas Morris, The Logic of God Incarnate (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1986),46-55. 
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redeem the world from evil, the incarnation also enables the life of the one who ushers 
in God's eschatological kingdom on earth. The Christ event possesses eschatological 
meaning not only in its implications for time and eternity but also because the whole 
of Christ's life must be viewed in relation to his overall mission of redemption and 
new life for humanity. 56 
It is humanity's need for redemption that God is responding to in the 
incarnation of the Logos, and without its eschatological backdrop, any doctrine of the 
incarnation is woefully incomplete. In addition to this, the ministry of Jesus is vital to 
appreciating how his life ended the way that it did. The whole of Christ's life has 
atoning significance, and Christ's death brings atonement only because he lived a 
perfect, sinless, and obedient human life. The development that we see over the 
course of the twentieth century is that the incarnation of the Son of God assumes 
growing eschatological significance, and from the rather one-dimensional linkage of 
incarnation and atonement in Mackintosh emerges a grand schema which, by the time 
we reach Moltmann, binds together the whole of creation under the sovereign rule of 
the Son of God. 
The field of Christology was in great flux by the end of the nineteenth century, 
and orthodox Christology had been undermined by the liberal approach to historical 
research, which claimed to scrape off layer after layer of the church's doctrinal 
machinations. One such figment of the church's imagination was to ascribe eternal 
significance and an "infinite" nature to the historical figure of Jesus of Nazareth.
57 
The crucial eschatological concept for Mackintosh regarding the incarnation is the 
fact that all of history gains its meaning from the Christ event, and for God to have 
56 For an argument that qualifies and limits this claim, see Hans Conzelmann, An Outline of the 
Theology of the New Testament, trans. J. Bowden (New York: Harper & Row, 1969), 99ff. 
57 Redman, Reformulating Reformed Theology, 27-38. 
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entered so decisively into world history means that the Christ of faith and the Jesus of 
history are inseparably linked together. Indeed, Mackintosh's rationale on the 
incarnation concludes that this doctrine cannot be dismissed as a creation of the 
church in an attempt to build up a christology around the historical figure of Jesus. 
The fundamental Christian conviction regarding history is that the eternal God has 
been decisively revealed through the experience of an historical person. The world is 
therefore a new place on account of the Son of God's arrival and activity in it. The 
core meaning of history is the event of reconciliation that was the whole Christ event -
- his incarnation, ministry, death, and resurrection. 
Mackintosh fmds himself arguing against the assault on Christology from a 
dogmatic position, most notably that of Adolf Harnack.58 Harnack proposed that the 
early church had wrongly focused its attention toward the two natures theory of 
Christ's being. For Harnack there is no biblical emphasis on the eternal nature of 
Christ: it developed out of the doctrinal struggles within the early church. He wanted 
to see such dogmatic thinking, which he viewed as authoritarian, replaced by a truer, 
more historically accurate approach to Jesus' identity.59 In Harnack's opinion, the 
church's doctrinal views of Jesus' divinity could not stand the scrutiny of historical 
criticism, and he therefore challenges much of the creedal assumptions regarding the 
two-natures person of Christ.60 For Harnack, the "kernel" of Christology was 
comprised of the teachings of the historical Christ and not the church's doctrinal 
affirmations built up over centuries concerning his divine person.61 
58 Much of Mackintosh's thought on incarnation is a response to the work of Adolf Harnack, especially 
his What is Christianity?, trans. Thomas Saunders (New York: Harper, 1957). . . 
59 Wilhelm Pauck, Harnack and Troeltsch: Two Historical Theologians (New York: Oxford Umverslty 
Press, 1968), 34. 
60 Harnack What is Christianity?, 152 ff. 
61 G. Wa..;ue Click, The Reality of Christianity: A Study of Adolf von Harnack as Historian and 
Theologian (New York: Harper and Row, 1967), 181ff. 
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Mackintosh takes exception to Harnack's conclusion that most Christo logy is 
historically erroneous and merely a creation of the early church. In fact, in twenty-six 
references to Harnack in The Doctrine of the Person of Jesus Christ, Mackintosh is 
almost always in disagreement with him. Mackintosh faults Harnack for dismissing 
christological doctrine too superficially and without truly appreciating the experiences 
of faith among Christians in the early church.62 Mackintosh disagrees with Harnack's 
conclusion that understanding the development of doctrine is the same as disproving 
the truth that lies behind that doctrine. Exposing the development of doctrine does 
not invalidate the faith from which the doctrine grew, and Mackintosh believes that 
the church's affirmation of Jesus' divinity emerged out of the church's genuine and 
heartfelt belief in it. 
Mackintosh worked also in an era when scholarship was heavily influenced by 
the "History of Religions" school of thought, which assumed that Christianity is a 
religion of numerous ideas incorporated from various surrounding religions in the 
ancient world, especially in regard to incarnation. In biblical scholarship this idea 
was advanced mostly by the work of Wellhausen and Pfleiderer.63 In systematic 
theology, this view is voiced mainly by Troeltsch, whose book The Absoluteness of 
Christianity abandons the idea of Jesus' divinity on the grounds that nothing historical 
could ever be "absolute.,,64 Troeltsch argues that all religious ideas are part of a 
continuum, and therefore all ideas are historically conditioned and dependent upon 
their context and place in history. Over time Christianity assumed aspects that are 
inherent in all religions, and therefore nothing absolutely unique can be claimed 
62 Mackintosh, Person of Jesus Christ, 29; 126. . 
63 Julius We1lhausen, Die Christliche Religion (Berlin: B. G. Teubner, 1906). Otto PfleIderer, The 
Early Christian Conception of Christ (New York: Putnam, 1905); The Development of Christianity, 
trans. David Huebsch (New York: B. W. Huebsh, 1910). . . 
64 Ernst Troeltsch, The Absoluteness of Christianity and the History of Religions, trans. DaVId ReId 
(Richmond: John Knox Press, 1971). 
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regarding the identity of Jesus -- he is relative to the development of human religious 
belief. 
The problem with the History of Religions school is that it starts from the 
presumption that orthodox christo logy was erroneous for regarding Christ with eternal 
significance.65 Troeltsch denies the concept of unique revelation that traditional 
christology grants to Christ, and he faults Christian doctrine for attaching divine 
attributes to the person of Jesus through the two natures formula, thus making Jesus 
into someone he was not. Mackintosh, in contrast, approaches the incarnation from 
the very different view that Jesus was absolutely unique in person and work. Jesus 
cannot be explained in the same manner that other people and events can be 
historically analyzed. Like previous attempts to dismiss the uniqueness Christ, one 
would have to ignore the faith and christo logy of the early church. 
Much of Mackintosh's work is aimed at closing the perceived gap that existed 
in both the History of Dogma and History of Religions schools between the Jesus of 
history and the Christ of faith, especially in regard to the time/eternity conundrum 
surrounding the incarnation. These schools used historical inquiry as a rationale for 
discarding many aspects of christology on the grounds that the doctrine of the Son's 
divinity is a human creation and should be divorced from the real, historical person of 
Jesus. It is at this juncture between the Jesus of history and the Christ of faith that 
Mackintosh saw nineteenth century theology take a wrong tum. Many of the scholars 
who investigated the historical Jesus failed to make the connection between history 
and faith, and from a disinterested point of view, they discounted the faith of the New 
Testament writers and the revelation to them of Christ's identity. For many modem 
65 Mackintosh, "The Liberal Conception of Jesus in Its Strengths and Weaknesses," American Journal 
o/Theology 16 (1912): 410-425. 
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scholars, Jesus was simply another figure from an ancient religion surrounded by 
zealous followers who concocted his miraculous existence to augment his reputation. 
Mackintosh formulates his christology in response to the Chalcedonian 
formula of the person of Christ, and although he expresses dissatisfaction with the 
terminology of the traditional doctrine, he acknowledges that theology cannot easily 
displace it in favor of other concepts. Mackintosh displays an amazing breadth of 
thought on the historical grasp of the two natures theory from early church history 
through the Reformation. In fact, much of the bulk of the early chapters of The 
Doctrine of the Person of Jesus Christ is consumed by his deliberations on the people 
and events through which the church's position on the person of Christ came to be. 
Mackintosh is well aware of all the debates that raged in the midst of the councils 
from Nicaea to Chalcedon, and he documents the nuances at stake for the church and 
doctrine as the formula of Christ's two natures emerged from history. 
Mackintosh's method of confronting the divorce between the Jesus of history 
and the Christ of faith is to argue that the incarnation is consistent with God's 
continuing relationship with humanity even from before the life of Jesus. Prior to the 
incarnation, it was God's prerogative to commune with human beings within the 
parameters of history. God has been immanently involved in creation, and the 
incarnation signifies God's absolute immanence within the world. The life of Christ is 
the last and highest form of God's continual indwelling with that which he has made: 
"We see God as it were ever on His way to incarnation, moving on by new accesses of 
self-communication, approaching always nearer to complete personal union, in 
creation and prophecy and redemption ... The Logos, now manifest in Jesus, is but a 
name for the one God as He ever goes forth to the world in self-revealing act.,,66 
66 Mackintosh, The Doctrine of the Person of Jesus Christ, 434-435. 
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Jesus is the ideal realization of the confluence of God's movement toward humanity 
and humanity's receptivity of God. God's immanence reaches its climax in Jesus and , 
by doing so it reveals the will of God for human love, holiness, and redemption. For 
Mackintosh, there can be no doubt that the fullness of God dwelt in the humanity of 
Christ, and this fullness is revealed in Jesus' life of love and holiness toward both God 
and humanity. 
Given the assertion that Jesus is truly God incarnate, the main problem for the 
doctrine of incarnation is how to state the union of divinity and humanity in Jesus.67 
In addressing this problem, Mackintosh offers insight into the recovery of kenotic 
christology, by which he states that God's assumption of human flesh is a sign of 
God's power and not weakness.68 The limitations to which Jesus' life was subject 
define the power of God and not which attributes Jesus gave up to become human. 
The kenosis of the Son of God implies a powerful decision on God's part to love 
humanity perfectly from within creation: "The Son must empty Himself in order that 
from within mankind He may declare the Father's name, offer the great sacrifice, 
triumph over death; and the reality with which, to reach this end, He laid aside the 
form and privilege of deity is the measure of that love which had throbbed in the 
Divine heart from all eternity. ,,69 With a thoroughly kenotic approach to the 
incarnation, Mackintosh is able to cast the traditional understandings of divine 
impassability and unchangeableness in a new light. God's love for humanity is 
immutable, but the power of this love allows God to undergo change on humanity's 
behalf through the incarnation. 
67 "Traditional christology, on the whole, has found [this] too much to believe. Its persistent 
obscuration of Jesus' real manhood proves that after all it shrank from the thought of a true "kinsman 
Redeemer" -- one of ourselves in flesh and spirit." Mackintosh, Person of Jesus Christ, 467. 
68 Mackintosh, The Doctrine of the Person of Jesus Christ, 446. 
69 Mackintosh, The Doctrine of the Person of Jesus Christ, 470. 
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Since the arguments in church history regarding incarnation centered around 
the two "natures" of Christ, his divinity and his humanity, Mackintosh proposes that 
the nature of God in Christ must be understood primarily as moral. It is the moral 
nature of Christ in which divinity and humanity find unity and not through such 
concepts as omniscience and omnipotence.7o In Christ, God embodies divine love, 
and in Christ humanity finds the fullest expression of obedience to God and love of 
others. The categories of omniscience and omnipotence are less important than the 
categories of holiness and love, which are the sign of Jesus' true divinity and 
humanity. God's nature is to love, and humanity's nature is meant also for love. In 
Jesus these two natures are perfectly manifested. He lived intimately with the Father, 
and he displayed the Father's love for human beings. He lived a perfect human life 
toward God, "perfect Love and Holiness and Freedom in terms of perfect 
humanity. ,,71 It is in this way that the doctrine of the two natures should be 
understood. 
The outworking of these beliefs is seen in the continual battle Mackintosh 
fights to affirm the historical being of Christ, as opposed to more philosophical views 
in modem theology that denied the true historicity of the incarnate God. For example 
Fichte claims that it is impossible to demand faith in the historic Christ if Christ truly 
was God.72 According to Fichte, if Christ is "absolute," i.e. divine, then he cannot be 
conditioned by events in time; he must rather be above and beyond all the transient 
elements of temporality. To be subject to events in time means that one is captive to 
the progressive sweep of history and unable to rise above it in any meaningful way. 
70 For a similar appeal to the moral nature of keno sis, see P. T. Forsyth, The Person and Place of Jesus 
Christ (London: Wyman & Sons, Ltd., 1909), 300. 
71 Mackintosh Person of Jesus Christ, 486. 
72 Johann G~ttleib Fichte, Foundations of Natural Right: According to the Principles of the 
Wissenschaftslehre, ed. Frederick Neuhouser, trans. Michael Baur (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2000). 
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Faith must be based on something larger than and transcendent above the historical 
process.
73 
If Christ is absolute and eternal then he cannot be changed by any events 
within time. How can the absolute God appear in a time and in a place and remain 
transcendent? Fichte believes that nothing absolute, including the eternal Son of 
God, can be mediated through events in time because all historical events are 
transitory and fleeting. 
Mackintosh counters this line of thought by argUIng that the incarnation 
changes what we perceive as the Absoluteness of God. The incarnation demonstrates 
how notions of transcendence and infinitude are compatible with immanence and 
limitation, contrary to philosophy's understanding of the same principles. For 
Mackintosh absolute being includes "the human life of God" in the incarnation. Since 
history is the domain in which God realizes the divine goal for creation, then history 
must be fully capable of containing the creative will and the actions of an absolute 
God. "It is in history, and only there, that the infinite love of the Eternal is put within 
our reach and we are made certain of it as a person and inalienable possession.,,74 
Therefore, historical events are not fleeting and must figure decisively in the 
relationship between God and humanity. The incarnation makes possible a 
relationship for humanity in the love of God: "What has been realized in Him is not 
simply more than the past, measured backward from His advent; it is likewise more 
than all the future: for through him is mediated now and for ever that union with God 
which is salvation and blessedness. ,,75 Thus, the life of Jesus serves as the core of 
history, and all historical events revolve around his appearance in history. 
The change in the relationship between God and humanity through Christ 
displays the eschatological framework around his life, which signifies the link 
73 Fichte, Foundations of Natural Right, 47. 
74 Mackintosh, Person of Jesus Christ, 307. 
75 Mackintosh, Person of Jesus Christ, 436. 
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between incarnation and atonement. Mackintosh follows within the history of 
Scottish Calvinism in viewing the incarnation as a prelude to atonement, and the 
whole life of Christ must be treated with as much significance as his death.76 Jesus' 
entire life has atoning significance, and atonement is wrought through Christ's filial 
relationship to the will of God as well as his obedient sacrifice on the cross. The 
incarnation has eschatological meaning because it is part of God's overarching 
purpose to redeem humanity from its sin: "The history of theology proves to the hilt 
that the great ideas of Atonement and Incarnation lose the lifeblood of meaning when 
they drift apart from each other.,,77 By affirming the atoning significance of Christ's 
incarnation and life, Mackintosh's thought resonates with previous lines of Scottish 
theology, mainly that of John McLeod Campbell, who preceded Mackintosh by about 
fifty years. One of McLeod Campbell's primary concerns is to maintain the link 
between Christ's life and death - between his human nature, his ministry, and his 
death on the cross.78 While not sharing all of McLeod Campbell's view on the 
universality of atonement through Christ, Mackintosh frequently argues for the 
understanding that Christ's death was consonant with his whole life, and that his death 
must be interpreted in light of his life. 
This emphasis on the incarnation of the Son and his life as Jesus Christ 
emphasizes the linkage between incarnation and atonement. Rather than drawing a 
divider between his incarnation and death, the two events must be understood as 
operating as two events within the one redemptive cause of God: his death is the 
76 Robert Redman offers an analysis of the link between incarnation and atonement in Scottish theology 
from the Reformation through the 19th century. See Redman, Reformulating Reformed Theology, 69-
77. 
77 Mackintosh, The Christian Experience of Forgiveness (London: Nisbet & Co., 1927),208. 
78 See John McLeod Campbell, The Nature of the Atonement (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1996); see also 
J. B. Torrance, "The Contribution of McCleod Campbell to Scottish Theology," in Scottish Journal of 
Theology 26 (1973): 295-311; G. M. Tuttle, So Rich A Soil: John McCleod Campbell on Christian 
Atonement (Edinburgh: Handsel Pres, 1986). 
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result of his obedient life. Mackintosh explains that there can be no separation 
between incarnation and atonement because 
there is no rivalry between a tree-stem and its fruit, for each is only as 
related to and determined by the other; so the Incarnation and the 
Atonement, the person and the work of Christ, have concrete and 
intelligible reality only as they constitute and define each other in the 
unity of a single experience. Life exhibits no break or cleft dis serving 
the two; in Jesus Christ supremely being and doing are one?9 
The mission of Christ is directly associated with the conquest of sin, which puts the 
incarnation of God on an eschatological plane. 80 
The element in Mackintosh' assessment of the incarnation that will be 
magnified later in the twentieth century is the understanding of the divine pathos that 
God has toward human beings. It is God's solidarity with humanity through the 
incarnation that gives this doctrine a connection to the eternal love that God has for 
men and women. Mackintosh eloquently states that the result of incarnation is 
Christ's complete oneness with humanity to the degree that Christ suffers for all 
human sin. The incarnation displays God's willingness to take upon himself human 
life and death so that this suffering life becomes part of the experience of God's own 
being.81 What Mackintosh begins with this understanding of divine pathos will be 
enhanced by both Brunner and Moltmann in the ensuing years. 
Writing as he did in the middle years of the twentieth century, Brunner 
addresses several of the same challenges to modem theology that Mackintosh does, 
and yet his own context brought a host of new views regarding the relationship 
between eschatology and christology. The Mediator is one of Brunner's earlier works, 
and this made him an intellect to be reckoned with in theology. It is his primary effort 
79 Mackintosh, Person of Jesus Christ, 343. 
80 Mackintosh, Person of Jesus Christ, 441. 
81 Mackintosh, Christian Experience of Forgiveness, 205-206. 
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in regard to christology, although he would continue to develop his thought on the 
person of Christ throughout his career. Even though The Mediator is part of his early 
work as a theologian, it is nevertheless profound in its prolific study of Christ. In it he 
strives, above all else, to illustrate how God's revelation in Jesus is uniquely absolute _ 
- in an objective sense to the whole world and in a subjective way to the individual 
through faith. The centrality of Christ for all doctrine is seen in his insistence that 
doctrinal discussions, including that of eschatology, start with Jesus Christ, who is the 
climactic and perfect revelation of God's self and God's will for creation. Brunner's 
concept of God's revelation is based on the person of Jesus because his ministry, 
death, and resurrection are bound to specific places and times, and the events of his 
life form the heart of history. Brunner continually places great emphasis on the 
uniqueness of Jesus Christ as God's revelation to humanity because, like Mackintosh, 
Brunner found himself arguing against those who denied historical uniqueness of the 
revelation of Jesus Christ. 82 
Brunner casts the incarnation of the Son of God in an eschatological light by 
emphasizing that the incarnation is part of the larger event of redemption that can be 
understood only within its eschatological parameters. The incarnation is a revelation 
of the personality of God, a God who is known to be a personal God who acts within 
time and history in a continual movement toward humanity.83 Jesus is absolutely 
unique because he is the decisive and highest revelation of God's personal being. 
This particularity of Jesus is crucial for Brunner's eschatology because it is through 
Christ's life death and resurrection that humanity is able to believe in its own , , 
movement toward an eschatological goal. That human history has a goal given by 
82 Tetsutaro Ariga, "Jesus of History and Christ of Faith," in The Theology of Emil Brunner, 157-175 .. 
83 The title of chapter 10 in Brunner's The Mediator, "The Self-Movement of God," is indicative of hls 
view of God's continual involvement toward creation on a personal leveL 
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God is one of Brunner's primary points, and human beings are able to apprehend this 
goal only as it is revealed by God through the life of Christ. For this reason, the 
historical events of Jesus' life must be understood eschatologically, or, in other words, 
as they reveal the goal that God wills for humanity and creation. 
Like Mackintosh before him, Brunner struggles with the church's classical 
doctrine of the two natures. Much of the perplexity regarding Jesus' identity harkens 
back to the early church's difficulties in affirming the mysterious truth that Jesus was 
"true God and true man." The early church's battles over the doctrine of the two 
natures of Christ were an outpouring of effort to define precisely who Jesus was in his 
historical and extra-historical person, and the church realized that it had to affirm his 
divinity at the same time as his humanity. The Chalcedonian formula is one that tries 
to hold together several contradictions regarding the person of Jesus. The Son is 
eternal, and yet he has entered temporality. Jesus is morally perfect, yet he is a 
human being like everyone else, a fact which necessarily means sinfulness. Jesus is 
divine but also human. When theology speaks of Jesus, in the same breath it 
describes the Eternal Son and the Divine Logos as well as a human being in history 
like everyone else. Such statements naturally lead to confusion. 
Unfortunately, Brunner does little to ease this confusion in that he repeatedly 
and adamantly refuses to enunciate how the eternal God could assume temporality, 
and this is quite a deficiency in his theology. He regularly chalks it up to the 
"mystery" of incarnation without trying to solve it in a logical way. He states the 
problem thusly: "Must not every attempt to defme the 'togetherness' of divinity and 
humanity in the Person of Jesus break down? Is it not a fact, that all such attempts, of 
whatever kind, are disastrous, because they inevitably lead man to go further than is 
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allowable in trying to transcend the limitations of human thought?,,84 The classical 
formula is an attempt to place the two irreconcilable concepts of eternity and 
temporality within the identity of the person Jesus, and how this is possible Brunner 
will do little more than speculate. 85 
To describe the mystery without explaining it, Brunner returns to the apostolic 
witness in scripture to say that in the man Jesus, people had encountered God. Yet he 
also excoriates the Chalcedonian attempt to distinguish what in Jesus is divine and 
what is specifically human. Brunner seeks to breathe new life into the traditional 
understanding of the two natures of Christ as determined by the early church in the 
councils of Nicaea and Chalcedon. Brunner seems particularly concerned to address 
the shortcomings of the classical "true God, true man" formula of the doctrine of the 
two natures because he does not believe that the Chalcedonian formula fully resonates 
with the modem doctrine of either God or humanity. He cannot, however, dismiss 
certain aspects of Chalcedon which are fundamental to christo logy: 
Once we begin to think in abstract terms of the schema of the Two 
Natures, then we cannot hold the unity of the divine-human Person 
save through the denial of the duality, thus through the assertion of the 
unity of the divine nature. But why need we think in such 
abstractions? How do they help us to understand the true, insoluble 
mystery, that at this one point in the world and in history it is true that 
the borderline between the Creator and the creature has been crossed, 
that from the standpoint of natural knowledge, there is a human 
creature who is God, and that it pleased God to identify Himself with a 
definite, localized finite given entity, with the historical Person Jesus 
of Nazareth? . .! do not feel myself in a position to do this, and at the 
present time I have no cause to complain of this incapacity, since I 
must suppose that every so-called "solution" would only raise further 
difficulties. 86 
84 Brunner, Dogmatics, v. 2, 358. 
85 "It will be sufficient for us to say that the order of knowledge - that in the historical Revealer, we 
know the Eternal Son of God - corresponds to an order of being, which goes in the opposite direction: 
that the Eternal Son became man, that He who is from everlasting entered into human history, that it is 
precisely this entrance into history which constitutes the basis of His threefold work. All that goes 
further than this is useless speculation." Brunner, Dogmatics, v. 2, 351-352. 
86 Brunner, Dogmatics, v. 2, 362. 
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Raising the complex question of the two natures doctrine is simply asking questions 
about something that cannot be logically fathomed by our human minds. For Brunner 
it is enough to see that the New Testament writers believed that in Jesus God had 
chosen to live a human life. He is dissatisfied with the early church's desire to move 
beyond this biblical assertion into the "natures" or essence of Jesus' personhood.87 
Brunner's disdain for the doctrine of the two natures manifests itself 
particularly in his view of the virgin birth of Jesus, which he denies. In the least, 
Brunner claims that the virgin birth is inconsequential to the New Testament witness 
of Jesus as the Son of God. It is not part of the main confession of Jesus' personhood, 
and Brunner sees a contradiction between John's prologue and the Matthew and Luke 
accounts of Jesus' virgin birth. The virgin birth does not belong to the kerygma of the 
New Testament church, and "thus we must assume, either, that the Apostles were 
unaware of this view, or, that they considered it unimportant, or even mistaken ... The 
view which is often suggested, that the doctrine of the Virgin Birth is a special 
protection for the central doctrine of the New Testament, the doctrine of the 
Incarnation, is obviously wrong.,,88 Brunner further doubts that Jesus could be 
considered truly human if he did not have a human father and that theology asserts 
that Jesus is the Eternal Son of God in spite of and not on account of the Matthew and 
Luke narratives of Jesus' birth. 
Rather than bind the eschatological Jesus to the two nature theory of the 
incarnation through the virgin birth, Brunner links incarnation and eschatology by 
showing what the incarnation reveals about God's eschatological purposes for 
87 Like Brunner, G. C. Berkouwer recognizes the modem crisis for Christology surrounding the ~o 
natures theory of the person of Christ. For more, see his The Person of Jesus Christ (Grand RapIds: 
Eerdmans, 1954),21-55. 
88 Brunner, Dogmatics, v. 2, 354. 
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humanity. Through the incarnation the relatively unique field of human history and 
the absolutely unique field of salvation history coincided when the Word of God 
became flesh, and the fusion of temporality and eternity in Christ has altered forever 
humanity's relation to God. History and time gained an eternal dimension, which was 
previously unknown until the Word of God became an historical event. 89 The 
temporal and the eternal coalesce inseparably and completely in Christ because the 
relative and the absolute aspects of history are united in the person of Jesus, who 
himselfhas both a relative and an absolute history. 
The eschatological significance of the incarnation mainly involves Brunner's 
overall concept of revelation, and it is at this point that he is similar to Mackintosh. 
For both, the incarnation is the pinnacle of God's revelation toward humanity. It is 
the fullest expression of the divine will for human life, and the incarnation issues the 
ultimate personal correspondence from God to humanity. Brunner goes so far as the 
say that the concept of personal encounter is the crux of the biblical message, and 
Jesus Christ is God's way of personally encountering human beings.90 
Personal encounter can occur only between two subjects in a face to face 
encounter, and the encounter between God and humanity reached its most personal 
stake in Jesus. He is "the communication, the self-communication of God; it is He 
Himself in whom God proclaims and realizes His will to Lordship and His will to 
fellowship. . .. The incarnation of the Word, the entrance of God into the sphere of our 
89 Brunner, The Mediator, 308. This compares to Barth's contention that "the fact that the Word 
became flesh undoubtedly means that, without ceasing to be eternity, in its very power as eternity, 
eternity became time. Yes, it became time ... If this is so, from this standpoint too we cannot 
understand God's eternity as pure timelessness." Barth, Church Dogmatics, WI, 616. 
90 "The relation of personal correspondence, which we found to be the basic category of Biblical 
thinking and placed in contradistinction to the general understanding of truth, has conclusively prov.ed 
itself to be at the center of Biblical faith in a primary and decisive examination of justification by faIth 
alone." Brunner, The Divine-Human Encounter, trans. Amandus Loos, (philadelphia: Westminster 
Press, 1943), 76. The personal nature of God's revelation is the subject of Brunner's wo:k entitled 
Revelation and Reason: the Christian Doctrine of Faith and Knowledge, trans. OlIve Wyon 
(philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1946),50 ff. 
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life, the self-manifestation of God in His Son - this is the real revelation, the basis for 
Lordship, and the means of establishing fellowship.,,91 Brunner's overall theological 
project depends greatly on this concept of personal encounter between God and 
humanity through the incarnation. Therefore it follows that the incarnation as 
personal encounter would take on great importance in the expanding scope of 
eschatological thought. The incarnation of the eternal Word of God in the historical 
event of the life of Jesus Christ served the primary purpose of showing the 
eschatological, eternal intent that God holds for human beings.92 God intended an 
eternal relationship between humanity and God, and in the incarnation of the Son this 
intent of God is recognized. 
Like Mackintosh before him, Brunner emphasizes the vital importance of the 
incarnation by linking it with the concept of atonement. Atonement for sin does not 
begin with Jesus' death on the cross. Rather, it is the whole of Christ's life, including 
his ministry of teaching and healing, that God uses to atone for a lost creation: 
Thus when we speak of the "Person" and "the Work" of the Mediator 
we mean exactly the same thing. He Himself, because He is what He 
is, is the Revelation and Atonement. We do not need to posit Christ as 
the subject of a transaction in order to speak of His work. If we speak 
rightly of His Person, in accordance with His Nature, we also bear 
witness to His work of revelation and atonement. He is what He does 
and does what He is, and both these statements mean that He reunites 
man, who is separated, indeed practically severed from his divine 
origin, with God. He is a Person, because and in so far as His being a 
Person is, as such, already God's reconciling act.93 
All of Jesus' actions reveal the love of God reaching out to offer reconciliation and 
forgiveness to sinful humanity. Jesus is God's act of effecting forgiveness of sin, and 
God's forgiveness for humanity begins with Jesus' forgiveness for sinners during his 
91 Brunner, The Divine-Human Encounter, 77. 
92 Brunner, The Mediator, 291ff. 
93 Brunner, The Mediator, 490. 
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ministry. The person of Jesus Christ is known through his work, i.e. that who he is as 
God must be known first through his saving work as humanity's redeemer.94 
Brunner adds an eschatological dimension that Mackintosh lacks through his 
reliance on Adamic christology, which provides another avenue for Brunner to argue 
in favor of humanity's lost and restored eschatological existence through the 
incarnation. Here we see how Brunner relies on Kierkegaard for his understanding of 
the solidarity of humanity in relation to God. Kierkegaard writes that "the essential 
characteristic of human existence, that man is an individual and as such is at once 
himself and the whole race, in such wise that the whole race has part in the individual, 
and the individual has part in the whole race. ,,95 Brunner's intent in his use of this 
Kierkegaardian concept is to build an argument for Christ's role as the Mediator who 
reconciles humanity to God and God to humanity. 
The incarnation reveals the solidarity of humanity in that a person does not 
exist in isolation apart from the rest of humanity, and humanity receives its identity 
from its relationship with God.96 By emphasizing the solidarity of humanity before 
God, Brunner is denying the Enlightenment's elevation of the individual at the 
expense of humanity. The result of Enlightenment thinking was to sever the 
connection between individuals and to isolate them apart from an all-inclusive human 
nature.97 Contrary to Enlightenment isolation, Adam and Christ serve as typological 
94 Brunner, Dogmatics, v. 2, 27lff. 
95 S~Jfen Kierkegaard, The Concept of Dread, trans. Walter Lowrie (princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1957), 26. 
96 "The isolated individual is an abstraction, conceived by the reason which has been severed from the 
Word of God. 'The other' is not added to my nature after my nature, after I myself, as this particular 
individual, have been fmished. But the other, the others, are interwoven with my nature. I am not man 
at all apart from others. I am not'!, apart from the 'Thou'. As I cannot be a human being without a 
relation to God, without the Divine 'Thou', so also I cannot be man without the human 'Thou'. Brunner, 
Man in Revolt, 141. 
97 For a critique of Brunner's use ofK.ierkegaard, see M. Colin Grant, "The Power of the Umecognized 
'Blik': Adam and Humanity according to Seren Kierkegaard and Emil Brunner," in Sciences 
Religieuses/Studies in Religion, 7/1 (1978): 47-52. 
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representations of humanity in Brunner's soteriology, and all humanity is included 
under the rubric of the two Adams.98 The life of the second Adam, Christ, reveals 
that the life of the first Adam is an existence unto death. In addition, all human 
beings (all Adams) stand together, united in solidarity through their sin. 
Christ's life discloses each person's responsibility for guilt and sin, and the Son 
of God opens humanity's eyes so that each person may recognize his own history in 
Adam. 99 Each individual's sin is part of the past sin of all humanity, and in the 
present one is corrupted by the sin and guilt which is collectively shared by humanity. 
The individual recognizes that his fate is bound up with the fate of all humanity, 
which is, in the end, death. Through the second Adam, the first Adam discerns the 
inevitable eschatological consequences of human sin. The result of humanity's guilt is 
that each Adam is weighed down with an unbearable burden because anxiety and 
sorrow accompany the expectation of death, which is the end in store for humanity. It 
is only in the light of Christ that people can know that "Adam" is a symbolic 
representation of all humanity and each person, and each individual's story is also that 
of Adam and vice-versa. The second Adam is also a representative of humanity, but 
in a different sense from the first. Jesus, as the second Adam, is a literal figure of 
history, unlike the frrst. The second Adam serves to recapitulate every Adam before 
the God who was wronged and offended by every Adam's sin. lOO Brunner relies on 
christological assumptions of Jesus as the second Adam who alters human 
eschatology and who issues in the kingdom of God's universal rule. Through the 
second Adam, God moves toward all humanity, and consequently to each individual, 
and in this movement each person is restored to his or her right relationship with God. 
98 Brunner, The Mediator, 497. 
99 See Romans 5:12-17. 
100 Brunner, Man in Revolt, 377. 
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Brunner moves beyond Mackintosh also by strengthening the connection 
between incarnation and atonement by elaborating on how the incarnation signals the 
rule and reign of God's kingdom in the world. Brunner chooses to describe the 
significance of incarnation by drawing on the Reformed understanding of Christ as 
prophet, priest, and king, although for Brunner it is primarily through the prophetic 
office that he sees the most eschatological significance for the incarnation. Brunner 
ties the priestly and kingship roles of Jesus to atonement and resurrection, and it is in 
the prophetic office that Brunner details the significance of the incarnation as an 
eschatological event. 
Jesus fulfilled the role of eschatological prophet by making known the will of 
God through proclamation and teaching, and primarily he preaches about the advent 
of the kingdom of God. When Jesus arrived on the scene it was clear that he taught 
with authority, and that he proclaimed a message of the kingdom that went beyond 
what other rabbis and prophets said. Jesus was an eschatological prophet because he 
proclaimed something radically new about the will of God, and the truth he taught 
was "derived from the super-human sphere."lOl Unlike previous prophets who 
announced the future of the kingdom, Jesus is the immediate revelation of God. In 
fact, with Jesus comes the dawn ofa new era, and he personally brings in the kingdom 
of God. 102 Previous prophets had the Word of God given to them, but Jesus himself is 
the Word of God. What he says points to himself and to the kingdom he ushers in. 
Other prophets can only point to the kingdom as servants of Word of God, whereas in 
101 Brunner, Dogmatics, v. 2, 275. . . .. . 
102 Jesus is the highest and fmal self-disclosure of God, and therefo.re the end of h~sto;,y. IS ant1clp~ted m 
him. See W olfhart Pannenberg, "Dogmatic Theses on the Doctrme of RevelatIOn, m RevelatIOn as 
History, ed. Wolfhart Pannenberg, trans. D. Granskou (New York: Macmillan, 1968), 134. 
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Jesus the Word and the servant are one. As an eschatological prophet, Jesus himself 
embodies the message that God's kingdom has arrived on earth.l03 
For Brunner, the incarnation holds such enormous eschatological significance 
because it is only through the human Christ that God brings about his kingdom and 
rule. As a prophet Jesus points to the new reality that has come through his presence, 
and there is no other means by which God inaugurates his rule: "In His action, in His 
life, in His sufferings and in His death He brings in the Kingdom, and is the 
representative of the Kingdom. In Him we see what it is, and through Him it becomes 
real to us. The Kingdom is not 'something' but it is God's Presence in person. The 
Kingdom is where Jesus is, and if He is not present, the Kingdom is not present.,,104 
Brunner regards Christ as both the revealer and the content of God's kingdom, and in 
this way he is the eschatological prophet of God - because he is the kingdom's 
personal representative. This type of christology clearly moves in a direction similar 
to Moltmann as Brunner argues for Jesus' role in inaugurating a new era of God's 
kingdom on earth. 105 
Moltmann offers the most complete view of how Jesus' entire life, beginning 
with his incarnation, is an eschatological event. There are similarities in his thought 
to the theologians of previous years, but Moltmann is more deliberate in carefully 
connecting Jesus' incarnation to the eschatological purposes of God. With an 
expansive understanding of the nature of Christ's being, Moltmann says that "to 
confess Jesus as the Christ of God means perceiving him in his eschatological person. 
103 Jesus message and conduct reveals also his own self-understanding. See Ernst Fuchs, "The Quest of 
the Historical Jesus," in Studies of the Historical Jesus, trans. A Scobie (Naperville, IL: Allenson, 
1964),21-22. 
104 Brunner, Dogmatics, v. 2, 280. . . . 
105 "The Christ is the One in whom and through whom God establishes His sovereIgnty. Christ IS 
characterized not so much by His being as by His function. Whatever else Christ may 'be', in ~ny case 
He is the One who leads out of the 'present age' into the 'coming age', who ends one penod, and 
ushers in another, who realizes God's rule upon earth." Brunner, Dogmatics, v 2, 291. 
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In him are present Israel's messiah, the Son of man of the nations, and the coming 
Wisdom of creation itself. He is the kingdom of God in person, and the beginning of 
the new creation of all things. In this way he is the bearer of hope for the world. In 
him believers recognize the messianic human being. "lO6 Like Mackintosh and 
Brunner before him, Moltmann insists that the being of Christ is concurrent with his 
mission and ministry and that his whole life has atoning significance. His being is 
primarily eschatological because he not only represents the kingdom of God, he is 
also in himself the beginning and the manifestation of the kingdom. 
In several significant ways, Moltmann expands the scope of twentieth century 
christology by applying eschatological interpretations to all of the aspects of the 
person and work of Jesus Christ. With great breadth of thought, Moltmann's 
christo logy examines the mission of Christ from a thoroughly eschatological point of 
view -- from the Son of God's birth to the eschatological resurrection of Jesus and the 
new age ushered in by it. Moltmann's main goal is to demonstrate how the Son of 
God's mission is one of eschatological transformation for all creation, and this mission 
begins through the incarnation. 
The title The Way of Jesus Christ is illustrative of Moltmann's primary view of 
Jesus as the Christ who is becoming and who must be understood in light of the 
eschatological purposes of his ministry in the coming kingdom of God. Moltmann is 
determined not to trap christology in a static formula like that ofNicaea or Chalcedon, 
and he yearns to demonstrate a christo logy "which points beyond itself and draws 
people toward the future of Christ, so that they remain on Christ's path, and move 
forward along that path." lO7 Christo logy must reflect the goal of Christ's way from his 
birth through his baptism and ministry to his crucifixion and resurrection. Any true 
106 Moltmann, Way of Jesus Christ, 149. 
107 Moltmann, Way of Jesus Christ, xiv. 
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messianic christo logy must reflect the ongoing work of Christ in the world as he 
liberates creation on the way toward the kingdom: "A Christology of the way of 
Christ will always interpret his way in light of his goal." 108 Moltmann repeats his 
claim in several places that as the Son of God incarnate, Christ is on the way to his 
Messianic rule, but he has not arrived at it yet. Moltmann writes: 
The earthly -- the crucified -- the raised -- the present -- the coming 
One: these are the stages of God's eschatological history with Jesus. It 
is these stages which the title "Christ" gathers together .... If we take 
this Christ-in-becoming, this Christ on the road, seriously, then we can 
take up an eschatological distinction that was made in the theology of 
an earlier time, and say that there can already be a christologia viae 
here and now, but there cannot yet be a christologia patriae .... The 
coming One is in the process of his coming and can be grasped only in 
that light: as on the road, and walking with us. But for that reason 
every confession of Christ in the history of this unredeemed world has 
to be understood as a reaching out, an anticipation of the new creation 
in which every tongue will confess him in the glory of the Father (Phil. 
2: 11). Every confession of Christ leads to the way, and along the way, 
and is not yet in itself the goal.109 
This is the means by which Moltmann seeks to move beyond Chalcedonian 
christo logy -- by maintaining the continuing development of Christ's being. Christ 
cannot be contained in a formula that freezes his being so long as he still has promises 
to fulfill regarding his identity. 
The main problem that Moltmann identifies in the doctrine of the two natures 
is that it diverges from early church affirmations of Christ toward a God of the 
philosophers with certain preconceived notions of the attributes of God that we have 
previously mentioned: omniscience, omnipotence, omnipresence, and impassability. 
We have already seen Moltmann's disdain for defming God in superlative categories 
according to what humanity is not. When this happens, discussions of God's 
attributes move away from describing the personal God who acts in history. Divine 
108 Moltmann, Way of Jesus Christ, xv. 
109 Moltmann, Way of Jesus Christ, 33. 
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pathos, which inspires God to intervene on behalf of his people, is neglected in favor 
of omnipotence and impassability. The two natures theory of the incarnation loses the 
sense that God is coming to the aid of suffering human beings by becoming a 
suffering human being himself. 
Moltmann frames his discussion of the identity of Jesus by moving in a 
direction away from the Chalcedonian formula, which deals with Christ's first coming 
into history. Moltmann believes that God's interaction with the world must be viewed 
from the eschatological perspective of the future coming of Christ. The two natures 
doctrine is an attempt to explain Christ's identity according to his first coming into the 
world, and Mackintosh and Brunner are bound to the Chalcedonian formula even as 
they criticize it. Moltmann sidesteps the issue of Christ's two natures, in a way, by 
focusing on the future coming of Christ. The past event of incarnation is only part of 
the larger, continuing movement of Christ, so that his incarnation is an event on the 
way to his Lordship. 
Moltmann believes that to appreciate the meaning of incarnation one ought 
first to appreciate how Jesus fulfilled Messianic expectations through his life and 
ministry and not simply from the manner in which he was born. For Moltmann this 
means understanding Jesus as the Son of God who grows into his messianic role over 
the course of his life. Moltmann progresses this line of reasoning by offering, in his 
words, "a richer, fuller portrait of the person of Jesus Christ" by claiming that Jesus 
grows into his role as Messiah. As Bauckham points out, this provisionality of Jesus' 
messianic identity is revealed in the structure of Moltmann's The Way of Jesus Christ. 
The book mostly parallels stages along the way of Christ's life instead of dealing with 




The structure of this book poses an interesting contrast to Mackintosh's 
Person of Jesus Christ, in which he re-visits much of the history of christological 
debate before offering his own interpretation of the two natures. 
Grounding his perspective in the Jewish concept of Messianic expectation, 
Moltmann illustrates how Jesus fulfills these eschatological expectations by his way 
of life. One gains a sense of how Jesus assumed his role as the eschatological 
Messiah only through examining his relationships and his interactions with God and 
others: "Jesus does not posses the Messiahship; he grows into it, as it were, since he is 
molded by the events of the messianic time which he experiences. These events find 
their completion in him through the sufferings of the new Servant of God and the 
birth pangs of the new creation." 111 Emphasizing messianic hope as the impetus for 
the incarnation moves Moltmann beyond our two previous theologians in linking 
Jesus' incarnation with Old Testament expressions of eschatological hope. While the 
previous two appreciate the Old Testament foundation for a coming messiah, 
Moltmann makes the category of Old Testament messianic expectation the primary 
means of defining the Son's incarnation. If the identity of Jesus as the Christ is to be 
truly understood, then it must be as he reveals himself as an eschatological Messiah 
who relates not only to humanity but also to the whole of creation. 112 
Moltmann labors to reclaim the Jewish parameters of messianic hope as they 
surround Jesus, and Jewish conceptions of messianic hope are the foundation of his 
understanding of Jesus' eschatological mission as the Christ of God. The Christ is 
Israel's Messiah, and "of course Christian messianology takes its impress from the 
unique figure of Jesus, his message and his special divine history. But we must 
110 Bauckham, Theology of Jiirgen Moltmann, 199-202. 
111 Moltmann, Way of Jesus Christ, 139. 
112 Bauckham, Theology of Jiirgen Moltmann, 205-206. 
172 
always have in mind the Old Testament and Israel's history, in which Jesus lived and 
which is the source of his theological significance as 'the ChriSt.",Il3 Moltmann links 
Christians and Jews in their common hope for a Messiah, and he claims that Christian 
hope for the Messiah springs from its Jewish roots. 
In The Way of Jesus Christ, Moltmann continues many trends which were 
begun in his earlier work, especially Theology of Hope and The Crucified God, yet 
there are significant additions and changes on Moltmann's behalf. In Theology of 
Hope, Moltmann relies heavily on the Old Testament theology of God's promise as it 
was manifested in the incarnation of Jesus.Il4 In The Way of Jesus Christ, Moltmann 
builds on this theme while also adding a dimension on the role of the Holy Spirit in 
linking Jesus with the divine LogoslWisdom of God. It is the Spirit of God who 
forms the bridge between the pre-incarnate Word of God and Jesus as the Christ of 
God whose life, death, and resurrection usher in the new creation. In this way 
Moltmann is able to strengthen the linkage between the Old Testament theology of 
promise and Jesus as the Christ. In The Way of Jesus Christ Moltmann proposes what 
he terms as a more holistic Christology by presenting the eschatological history of 
Christ from the divine Logos' purpose in the pre-incarnate state through the life of 
Jesus Christ through the expectation of his future parousia. This angle on Christology 
prevents a doctrinal split between the Messiah who fulfills the Old Testament promise 
and the coming Lord in parousia who fulfills the New Testament promise. 
The Son's pre-incarnate role in creation is a category by which Moltmann 
advances on the work of Brunner by leaps and bounds, and Moltmann's views on the 
christo logical implications of the Word as Mediator of creation are thoroughly 
eschatological. Even though Brunner dedicates the first portion of the second volume 
113 Moltmann, Way of Jesus Christ, 1. . . 
114 See Christopher Morse, The Logic of Promise in Moltmann's Theology (phIladelphIa: Fortress Press, 
1979),83. 
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of his dogmatics to the doctrine of creation, he does not delve into the understanding 
of creation through the Word of God. Mackintosh attempts to draw some conclusions 
regarding the perplexities of the "pre-existence of the Son of God," but he does not 
deal with Christ's role in creation as part of this discussion. lls Only Moltmann offers 
an extended appreciation for the eschatological connection between creation and 
. . 116 mcarnatlOn. 
Moltmann's understanding of the eschatological nature of Christology stands 
out prominently also in his doctrine of creation because he views creation and its 
eschatological renewal as events that are solidly grounded in the person of the Word 
of God. All creation is the act of the one God through his divine WisdomILogos, by 
which creation is held together in its unity. The unity of creation in God's being is 
symbolized in the Biblical witness of creation through the divine Word and the 
presence of the Spirit of GOd. 117 The Word and Spirit of God work together to give 
creation its unity through form and function: "We therefore have to say that God 
creates all things through his defming and differentiating Word in the primordial 
vibrances of the Spirit... In the unity of created things, Word and Spirit complement 
one another. The Word specifies and differentiates through its efficacy; the Spirit 
binds and creates symmetries, harmonies and concord through its presence.,,1l8 The 
Word as the mediator of creation must be coupled with the Spirit through which God 
indwells and sustains what the Word has spoken into existence. The eschatological 
Christ is the ground of existence for all of creation.119 
What this means for Moltmann's eschatological Jesus is that there is a link 
between creation, incarnation, redemption, and consummation, and so there is a 
115 Mackintosh, Person of Jesus Christ, 445ff. 
116 Bauckham, Theology of Jiirgen Moltmann, 187ff. 
117 Moltmann, Way of Jesus Christ, 288. 
118 Moltmann, Way of Jesus Christ, 289. 
119 Moltmann, God in Creation, 94. 
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continuity of Christ's work from start to finish. In the creation of all, of which the Son 
played an integral part, everything received God's approval and blessing. The 
incarnation of the Son reveals God's continuing approval of humanity despite its 
sinfulness. The creating act of the Word exists not only in the beginning, but also in 
an ongoing relationship with creation through its preservation. God patiently 
preserves creation while always looking forward to its consummation in the kingdom 
of his glory. Throughout creation's existence, God has maintained his original stance 
of favor and grace toward it, even with the reality of evil and creatures who contradict 
God's will. God's preservation of and participation in the world through the Word is 
oriented toward its recreation as a new world in the consummation of God's kingdom. 
The Word of God remains as the mediator by which God enacts creation's new 
liberation and redemption. Moltmann is able to maintain his stance on the ongoing 
role of the Word as Mediator by stating that creation was not a once and for all event. 
Rather, creation is a process which always remains open to God. Through the divine 




Redefining Time: The Future 
Christians hope for certain events to happen in the future, but are they really in 
the future, or are they beyond the future and time itself? Here our experience of a 
dynamic reality and our language of tense run into obstacles. 1 How do we speak of 
events that we anticipate in the future but that are not future events in time? If they 
are not temporal events, then what are they and how are they related to time? Are 
events in the eschatological future related to all of time and tense - past, present, and 
future alike? This chapter focuses on pronouncements of Christian theology 
regarding the eschatological future, which means that we will be relying on the 
vocabulary of tense in many ways, some of which may prove unsatisfactory. The 
eschatological future is future, because it has not yet been realized, yet it is also 
eschatological, because it is dealing with matters beyond time. 
Eschatological hope is problematic because it is dependent on symbolic 
apocalyptic language and visions in scripture that are not easily compatible with a 
scientific view of nature and reality. When speaking of the eschatological future --
Christ's parousia, final judgment, and the consummation of God's glorious kingdom -
- our tensed approach to dynamic reality breaks down. We cannot speak of these 
events as if they will occur in a series, one after the other, because their occurrence 
will be simultaneous. We are speaking of events that transcend time and are viewed 
by our theologians as such. In this chapter we will see what views of time and 
eternity are relied upon in the views of our three representative theologians in their 
presentations of the eschatological future. They each interpret the parousia of Christ 
1 Schwartz, Eschatology, 289. 
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as essential to the eschatological future. Christ's return, and the events that 
accompany it, interrupts time in order to end it and to transform temporal creation into 
an eternal existence. We shall examine our three theologians' views on the 
eschatological future and how time is involved or eliminated in their presentations of 
these events. Again, we shall interpret the future christologically and therefore 
examine it through the event of Jesus' resurrection, which straddles the boundary 
between time and eternity. 
The Problem of "The End" & The Parousia of Christ 
The return of Christ is, for Mackintosh, central to the faith of the New 
Testament, and the message of the New Testament cannot be understood without this 
cardinal object to which its writers looked forward? While acknowledging that the 
biblical descriptions of the parousia are symbolic, they nevertheless convey the truth 
that the transcendent Christ shall return to finish what was begun during his earthly 
ministry.3 What we see in Mackintosh's thought is the inkling of a futuristic 
eschatology in that what Christ began during his ministry, life, death, and resurrection 
remains incomplete without his coming in glory to establish God's eternal kingdom. 
This completion, however, will be marked by an abrupt disjunction between what was 
before and what comes at the end: "When He spoke about his triumph, as he did 
frequently, it was not as of something destined to occur within this present order ... For 
2 "In the literature of primitive Christianity the Parousia holds a commanding place. The writers of the 
New Testament are men who look forward intensely to the great event; life for them is ruled by a 
transcendent hope. Redemption as an experience, so far as making the Return of Christ otiose, renders 
it the chief object of anticipation. Only the fIrst chapter had been written." Mackintosh, Immortality 
and the Future, 132. 
3 Dodd has a similar approach to the truth of the parouisa contained in the symbolic language of the 
New Testament. See his The Coming of Christ - Four Broadcast Addresses for the Season of Advent 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1951), 16-17. 
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Jesus, the new order comes from God, by interposition, when and as He may think 
best; the redemptive crisis is such as to wholly outstrip the powers of nature." By 
powers of nature, Mackintosh implies the current structure of reality as we know it, 
including its temporality. The parouisa is a crisis moment, then for all reality because 
evil and good exist together in the present order. There must be an abrupt ending to 
the progress of time because in time evil progresses along with good, as Mackintosh 
is well aware: "Tares grow beside the wheat." So, the moment of Christ's return will 
be one outside the structure of space and time. 
Jesus himself was aware of his future transcendence over history, even if his 
statements about the timing of his parousia varied from time to time.4 There is a 
sense of immediacy to Jesus' statement in Matthew 16:28 that "1 tell you the truth, 
some who are standing here will not taste death before they see the Son of Man 
coming in his kingdom." Mackintosh interprets this statement to mean that Jesus is 
expressing his transcendence in temporal terms to assure his followers of his nearness 
in power and love, which they may draw upon readily: 
This, we may believe, was at least part of the truth underlying those 
elements in Jesus' teaching which ostensibly mean an early Parousia. 
He employed a conceptual form native to the Jewish mind to express 
His own absolute control of the future. What filled his mind was the 
assurance that after His departure the powers of an endless life would 
still reach men through Him; and it is necessary to recollect that the 
nearness of the unseen and divine, which Greek thought expressed in 
spatial terms, was more naturally set forth by Jewish thought in terms 
oftime.5 
The resurrected Jesus is near, perpetually near in power, love, and wisdom to those 
who live as disciples. Christ's union with his disciples transcends temporal 
boundaries, yet this nearness is expressed in temporal language in order to be 
4 See Matthew 10:23; Matthew 23:-51; Matthew 25:31-46; Luke 12:35-48; Luke 18:8. 
5 Mackintosh, Immortality and the Future, 138. 
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conceptually understood. 6 The effect of Mackintosh's perspective is a collapsing of 
spatial boundaries along temporal lines, which is problematic for a dynamic view of 
time. Time and space are separate entities that cannot be spoken of as synonymously 
as Mackintosh appears to be doing here.7 
The return of Christ will be a final manifestation of his transcendence and the 
completion of the work begun in his ministry, and for Mackintosh this event will be 
the real "close" of history. It is not clear at this point if Mackintosh means that the 
parousia will be an event in history that finishes it, or if it will be beyond history. On 
the one hand he describes the end of history to be a "worthy denouement of the story 
of a world in which God has redeemed His people.,,8 But the denouement is still part 
of the story that has not yet reached its end. I assume that when Mackintosh speaks of 
the "abrogation of spatial relations" in the End, that he means something similar about 
time. He writes: "The good purpose of the Father cannot attain to the full reality in 
space and time. The Kingdom is transcendent, and only under transcendent 
conditions - such as are in our minds when we speak of heaven and immortality -
does it come to final being.,,9 There is a sense of finality and closure to the 
development, change, and becoming of history, and the End will be the culmination of 
redemption worked through the passage of history. 
This means that Mackintosh believes that God has a final, post-temporal goal 
toward which God is directing creation throughout the temporal process of its history. 
6 Here Mackintosh seeks to solve the dilemma posed by Schweitzer regarding the failure of Jesus' 
expectation of his immanent return. Werner follows Schweitzer in declaring that the development of 
Christian doctrine emerged from the fact that the parousia did not occur. Martin Werner, The 
Formation of Christian Dogma: An Historical Study of its Problem, trans. S. G. F. Brandon (New 
York: Harper, 1957), 71-72; see also Fritz Buri, Christian Faith in Our Time, trans. E. A. Kent (New 
York: Macmillan, 1966), 124-126. 
7 Even for an advocate of Relativity Theory, time and space are not synonymous. See Robinson, 
Eternity and Freedom, 65-76. 
8 Mackintosh, Immortality and the Future, 140. 
9 Mackintosh, Immortality and the Future, 141. 
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Although history is leading up to this goal, the goal is not attainable through the 
world's progress, and the end is not something that will grow out of the world. The 
goal, a "perfect conclusion" according to Mackintosh, is not reached through any 
evolutionary process in which creation merges with God's kingdom. Rather, the 
conclusion comes from beyond history and is imposed upon the process through the 
parousia: "Hence the attainment of the final goal must be mediated through the 
interruption and supersession of the present order; and while it may be a question 
whether its arrival is rightly to be termed 'abrupt' or 'catastrophic,' it is at all events 
something to which no sort of justice is done by the idea of homogeneous continuity. 
And to this truth Jesus' conception of a Parousia recalls US."l0 In his view of history, 
Mackintosh asserts that God is leading history toward and end, yet when he describes 
the transition of the historical process into its conclusion, time cannot continue in its 
present progression. Time itself will be not only interrupted but superseded by the 
transcendence of God's perfect order: eternity. 
Mackintosh describes the perfection and finality of creation's goal in God's 
eternity, and it begs the question of whether this perfect state is dynamic or static. 
Mackintosh seems to imply that the parouisa stops the passage of time so that history 
ends in a "perfect conclusion." By this he means the removal of anything inconsistent 
with God's holy love, but perfection implies that nothing more may come of that 
which is now complete. God grants life to his followers in this state of perfection so 
that all hostilities, i.e. sin, are withdrawn. Mackintosh does not, however, mean to say 
that reality in the perfect kingdom of God is thereby static. The kingdom of God is 
not simply as a place of rest and changelessness. Just as life in this world has change 
10 Mackintosh, Immortality and the Future, 144. In regard to the questionable catastrophic end of 
history, Mackintosh appears to be alluding to the concept as found in Harnack, What is Christianity, 
52. 
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and growth, so also it is true eternal life will not be a monotonous state of simple rest. 
Life in God's kingdom will be a life of progress, change, and movement: 
The continuity of this life with the next would be severed at a stroke if 
the fluid and dynamic conditions of earthly moral experience were on a 
sudden to be replaced by static and unchanging modes. So, if heaven 
be a moral life, the gifts of God will still be made ours by desire and 
appropriation .... Life will move within the fact of perfect love 
answering to, and subsisting on, the blessed love of God; and in an 
experience so qualified, effort is one with eternal satisfaction. 11 
In this way life in God's kingdom is portrayed by Mackintosh as a constant and 
unending movement toward God. The Christian's eschatological joy is found in 
attaining increasing communion with God and others, and this communion only 
increases in a cycle of divinely-inspired love. The desire for communion is satisfied 
by even a greater desire for communion, yet there is no dissatisfaction in living 
eternally in the kingdom of God's love. There is, no doubt, some contradiction in 
Mackintosh's view that human beings will reach perfection in God's kingdom, yet 
they will have perpetually increasing desire for God's love. He envisions a dynamic 
cycle of movement within God's love, but a cycle by definition can hardly be thought 
of as dynamic. 
In contrast to those who follow him, Mackintosh does little to relate the 
parousia of Christ to the consummation of creation. In fact, it is a weakness of his 
eschatology that he hardly speaks anywhere of the consummation and the universal 
manifestation of God's glory. The closest he comes to speaking of the consummation 
in glory is found in his descriptions of eternal life in God's kingdom. In a way that 
foreshadows those who follow him, Mackintosh asserts that there is continuity 
between temporal life and eternal life in God's kingdom that comes from one's 
relationship with Christ. In faith every experience with Christ brings with it a closer 
11 Mackintosh, Immortality and the Future, 244. 
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relationship, and no future life would be of any value if it did not offer a closer 
intimacy with Christ. The hope for God's kingdom is a hope that there awaits a more 
glorious revelation of Christ. 
Christians would not hope for the kingdom of God if one's communion with 
Christ does not outgrow the limits of the present. Eternal life in God's kingdom is the 
ultimate object of hope because it promises a fulfillment to one's relationship with 
Christ: "To remove the hope of seeing Christ beyond the grave, in an unclouded 
fellowship, is to cut the root of Christian life and power. We cannot imagine a point 
at which our sense of indebtedness to him will terminate, or our desire to serve in 
payment of the obligation. Many things we shall outgrow and leave behind, but not 
the consciousness of owing everything to God's love in Jesus, the historic 
Mediator." 12 Christians live with a loving dependence upon Christ that will only 
increase in the God's kingdom, where one's vision of Christ is immediate in his 
presence. 
Mackintosh affmns the conviction that in eternal life, Christians will maintain 
their relationships with others from earthly life, and this highlights the communal 
nature of the kingdom of God, which is full of loving relationships. Mackintosh 
decries the limited vision modem people have toward the kingdom that is attributable 
to the incurable individualism that afflicts modem Christianity. A modem Christian's 
concern with "my salvation" often neglects the fact that life is communal and framed 
by relationships, and so also will this be true of life in God's kingdom. Each person 
will be in closer communion with God, which will, in turn, allow persons to enter 
more deeply and truly into each other's life and love. Part of the promise of eternal 
life is the end to all obstacles that prevent human beings from loving one another 
12 Mackintosh, Immortality and the Future, 233-234. 
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fully. True human communion in eternal life will be enabled by the permeating 
power of God's love. 
Mackintosh believes that New Testament portrays life in heaven as a divine 
society which, in contrast to the divisions and conflicts of history, is made perfect in 
the eternal love of God. No one experiences eternal life in isolation, and therefore 
"reunion with lost friends, accordingly, is not a sentimental detail in pictures traced by 
fancy; it is part of the hope guaranteed in Jesus .... In the unseen world, as in this, each 
new gift unites us not only to the Father, but to all the brothers of His household. ,,13 
What is lacking in Mackintosh's writings is how God's love will reconcile historical 
enemies in his kingdom. Brunner and Moltmann base this reconciliation on the 
outpouring of God's love in the consummation and glorification of creation. The 
closest Mackintosh comes to this universal reconciliation is a brief allusion to the idea 
that all people in heaven will be subject to God's universal love. 
In Brunner's theology, the coming of God in the parousia of Christ generates 
the completion of humanity in its divinely given purpose, and the consummation of 
creation is the all-embracing goal of human existence. Brunner seeks to connect the 
parousia to other events of the eschatological future, i.e. judgment, resurrection, and 
consummation, and in so doing it is often difficult to see how these terms differ from 
one another in Brunner's writing. In many places, Brunner uses the terms parousia, 
resurrection, and consummation in nearly synonymous ways. Therefore describing 
anyone of these necessitates contemplation of all. 
Brunner, when he speaks of the problem of the end of history, acknowledges 
that the event of the parouisa of Christ as described in scripture cannot be categorized 
as an historical event within the modern world-view. The most significant disparity 
13 Mackintosh, Immortality and the Future, 238. 
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between the world-view of the biblical writers and that of the twentieth century is the 
composition of time. The scientific revolution has so altered our concepts of time as 
it relates to the universe and history that we cannot agree with any fundamentalist 
interpretation of scripture regarding a geo-centric universe or a "short" history of 
creation. We now know that the universe of the ancient world and that of the modem 
world are worlds apart. This is so much so the case that "the net result of this change 
in our conception of the time-span, effected by exact observation and experiment, is a 
millionfold widening of the horizons of cosmic time.,,14 What this means in 
eschatology is that the parousia must be discussed in terms that are neither wildly out 
of sync with biblical metaphors of the end or the scientific outlook of the universe. 
This is the dilemma or Brunner as he seeks to describe the parousia as the event in 
which time ends in the presence of God's eternity.15 
Like Mackintosh, Brunner regards the parousia as an expectation that is 
central to Christian faith. It is the source of hope for humanity: the coming God who 
chooses to dwell with creation in a never-ending relationship. The advent of God to 
his people is the controlling theme of the Bible as God promises to come to his people 
to bring redemption through his reign. Interestingly, Brunner relies on the tenses of 
time to explain the controlling nature of this theme: "The coming of God to man 
which is the theme of the Old Testament is thus explicated in the New, in the three 
dimensions of time: He has come, He is present and He will come. In this unity of 
faith hope and love consists the existence of the church, of the Body of ChriSt.,,16 , , 
The one who lives according to the theme of God's coming thereby experiences each 
14 Brunner, Eternal Hope, 121. 
15 Brunner, Eternal Hope, 124-125. 
16 Brunner, Eternal Hope, 137. 
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of these aspects of tense as part of a faith.I? In faith one looks back at the life and 
ministry of Christ, lives with Christ presently, and anticipates his future advent. 
Christ is the subject who makes one's faith, hope, and love real, and "therefore hope 
can have no other object than that He who has come - in the form of a servant - will 
. . I ,,18 Th f' come agaIn In gory. e tenses 0 expenence are aligned with experiences of 
faith, with preeminence given to hope for the future on account of the promise of 
Christ's anticipated return. 
Taking this promise seriously requires us to define the parousia according to 
language that is symbolic, and it is in this interpretation of symbols where Brunner 
has trouble determining if the parousia is a temporal or atemporal event. It will be an 
event, and all events require temporality, yet it will be an event unlike any other 
space-time occurrence: 
When we speak of the imminent end of history we obviously mean a 
happening which takes place in space and time, for it belongs to 
everything historical that it takes place in space and time, even though 
its full meaning cannot be grasped in space-time categories. It is 
precisely this confinement to the limits of space and time which 
constitutes the nature of events. But if we say end of history we imply 
something which bursts the framework of space and time and destroys 
the structure of the historical. 19 
The "bursting" of time's framework means that the parousia must be transcendent to 
temporality. To illumine what he means here, Brunner imagines the transcendent 
nature of the parouisa through Jesus' own comparison of his return to a flash of 
lightning2o: "The lightning flash is probably of all the possibilities of expression open 
to us the one symbol which expresses most effectively this transcendence of space 
17 Barth offers a contrasting thought to the tenses of one's life as they reflect our fmitude and limitation 
- the fragmentation oftime in human experience. See Church Dogmatics, IUI2, 511; 553-564 
18 Brunner, Eternal Hope, 138. 
19 Brunner, Eternal Hope, 130-12l. 
20 Luke 17:24: "For the Son of Man in his day will be like the lightning, which flashes and lights up the 
sky from one end to the other." 
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and time. Lightning is, so to speak, a happening without temporal extension, its flash 
nowhere and everywhere at the same time.,,21 Christ will come again in glory in a 
way that is manifested everywhere, yet without temporal extension, and his coming in 
glory is paralleled by the consummation of creation. 
The parousia of Christ and the resulting consummation of history are events of 
cosmological proportion and significance, and Brunner arrives at his conclusions on 
the consummation by employing what he terms a theanthropocentric solution. To 
arrive at the Christian doctrine of the consummation, one must understand the 
theanthropocentric nature of creation. Brunner's defines the term theanthropocentric 
as "God-man centered," and he employs it in reference to the purpose of all creation 
in relation to Jesus ChriSt.22 The eschatological and cosmological positions offered 
by the New Testament are theanthropocentric in essence, and they are based solely on 
the revelation of God in the person of Jesus Christ. Christ is inseparably related to 
creation and consummation because the universe itself has its being in the Godlhuman 
being of Christ. 
He, the personal Logos of creation, has been incarnated and revealed in 
Jesus Christ the Redeemer, and He is also the personal Logos inhering 
in world-consummation. The world was created in Him, through Him 
and unto Him. The world must be envisaged neither from the 
standpoint of its ultimate objectivity-which would imply an 
idolization of the world-nor from that of its subjectivity-which 
would imply an idolization of the ego-but from the standpoint of the 
divine Logos, who became man in Jesus Christ. It is a 
theanthropocentric world.23 
The main implication of a theanthropocentric reading of the New Testament is that 
Jesus Christ is both the origin and the goal of human life, and therefore hope for the 
consummation contradicts both a materialistic nihilism and a subjective egocentrism. 
21 Brunner, Eternal Hope, 140. 
22 Brunner, Dogmatics, v. 3,431. 
23 Brunner, Eternal Hope, 194. 
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Theanthropocentric cosmology means that humanity is not merely a tiny fonn 
of life on a speck of dust suspended in orbit around one of many millions of suns in a 
seemingly unlimited universe. Likewise, with a faithful, theanthropocentric outlook, 
humans are humble enough to know that the self is not the most important and only 
true entity that exists, as if human beings alone were immortal. In a 
theanthropocentric cosmology, the ostensible impersonality of a vast universe and the 
vanity of human intelligence are negated by the God who becomes human in order to 
illumine humanity's place within the whole. History is given its meaning by the once-
and-for-all event of Jesus Christ, who shows that the cosmos exists for the purpose of 
salvation. Theanthropocentric theology is concerned with the consummation of all 
things just as it defines the creation of all things, and the consummation of the world 
should be apprehended in the same way as the world's creation: through the cosmic 
Christ. Creation and consummation are bound together by the strength of the 
theanthropocentric standard which engenders both. 
Because creation is theanthropocentric, the relationship between humanity and 
God as mediated by Christ is the most important element of creation, and the 
importance of this relationship defmes the meaning of consummation. God wills 
human fulfillment in the coming kingdom, and it is God's lordship over his kingdom 
that unites humanity in its shared consummation among all peoples. In contrast to 
the unity of humanity attempted within earthly, political states, human unity in God's 
kingdom will not be a unity imposed by compulsion. The unity of humanity in God's 
kingdom will be established and recognized by freedom: the true freedom of self-
sacrificing service toward others. Brunner believes that the citizens of God's kingdom 
engage in acts of love and service toward one another. The kingdom's inhabitants 
will exist in a fellowship based on creative freedom and a unity of love that embraces 
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others. The unity of humanity in the kingdom of God will produce acts of self-
sacrificial love which mirror the selfless actions of the Christ who brings in the 
kingdom in glory. 
The unity of humanity in the kingdom of God will be based on all humanity's 
shared created identity in the image of God. This unity has its source only in God, 
and it is God's Spirit which will overcome the divisions and hostilities caused by 
human sin. In the present world, blood kinship and national identities bring both 
unity and cause divisions. In the kingdom of God, everyone shall be unified by the 
Spirit into a community where unity arises from the common identity of each person 
as a creature made in the image of God. The kingdom of God will overcome all 
national, cultural, racial, and family histories because the kingdom is such where the 
image of God in people has overriding significance. The history of the world is 
marked by the strength of nations and of individuals who powerfully enforce their 
will on others, but the kingdom of God is that of the vulnerable, and the child-like. It 
is the place where there is no privilege or rank, but there is common service of all. 
The kingdom of God is a dramatic reversal of the earthly structures and means of 
power, and whole cultures will be transformed in God's kingdom. 
Brunner opens himself up to confusion, however, as he contradicts himself 
regarding the continuity and discontinuity between the created world and the 
consummated kingdom. As Shuurman notes, Brunner has not adequately worked out 
his relation between the creation and the redeemed creation.24 Brunner affirms the 
goodness of the created order, including humans, while also insisting that the 
consummation will completely change the present fallen world, and especially human 
24 Douglas J. Schuunnan, Creation, Eschaton, and Ethics: The Ethical Significance of the Creation-
Eschaton Relation in the Thought of E. Brunner and J. Moltmann (New York: Peter Lang, 1991), 77. 
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beings. While the reality of sin and evil necessitates the eschatological redemption of 
the world, Brunner does not clearly articulate the relation between pre-redeemed and 
post-redeemed creation. On the one hand he maintains that there is continuity 
between present creation and the eschatological future, while on the other hand he 
claims that all will be radically changed in God's new creation when Christ returns in 
glory. 
Like those before him, Moltmann asserts that Christ's mISSIOn, all his 
suffering, his dying, and his rising would be incomprehensible without the 
expectation of Christ's return in the glory of God. It is the parousia of Christ which 
binds all christology together, and the eschatological person of Christ is defined in 
terms of this anticipated event. Those who discount hope for parousia on account of 
its "delay", i.e. Schweitzer and others, do so because they wrongly temporalize 
expectations of the parousia, viewing it as another event within time rather than 
seeing it as the end of time and the abolition of history. The eschatological moment 
of parousia will be that event which both draws time to a close and signals the advent 
of the eternal kingdom of God. 
Moltmann shares Brunner's emphasis on the coming of God as the controlling 
theme of eschatological hope. The parousia of Christ will signal the consummation of 
the world, including time, and the perfecting of our limiting forms of space and 
time.25 It will provide the transformation of creation into the new creation where 
death and evil are removed so that God's creatures may live in perfect fellowship with 
each other and with God. With his preference for the future as the source of hope, 
Moltmann gives tremendous support to the idea that the parousia of Christ is the 
25 See also Walter KUnneth, The Theology o/the Resurrection, trans. James W. Leitch (London: SCM 
Press, 1965), 285-286. 
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moment of creation's completion and healing of the sin and abuse that has wreaked 
havoc in creation throughout its existence.26 
There is a trend in Jesus' life by which he promises the future coming of the 
kingdom, and all the events of Jesus' life point toward his future advent. The past 
events in the history of Christ thrust toward his future: "The community of the Christ's 
people expects that his parousia will bring the fulfillment of the history of salvation 
and the termination of the history of affliction and disaster, the fulfillment of 
liberation and the end of suffering. That is why the parousia of Christ and the end of 
this world-time belong together. ,,27 Everything in Christ's ministry, life, and death 
points toward the future, looking beyond themselves to an eschatological kingdom, 
and the parousia signals the transformation of this transitory world into the eternal 
kingdom of God.28 
Moltmann's main dilemma concerning the parousia, like those before him, is 
how to describe this eschatological moment which is both an event in time and an 
event which ends time and is therefore outside or beyond time. He struggles to 
explain how the parousia of Christ will be the "last day" while at the same time be the 
end of time and the enveloping of time by eternity. The confusion Moltmann tries to 
overcome, like those before him, is how to defme the parousia in relation to the end of 
history. The parousia cannot be another moment within history because it would then 
be part of the historical process which awaits redemption. Yet the parousia must also 
26 Miroslav Volf does not believe that Moltmann adequately distinguishes between creation's 
completion and redemption in the consummation. Whereas Moltmann speaks often of creation's 
completion in a new creation, Volf wishes Moltmann would emphasize creation's healing and 
redemption from evil. For his part, Moltmann responds that transformation and redemption are similar 
terms for the healing of creation of its evil. See Volf, "After Moltmann," in God Will Be All in All, 
245-252; and "Can Christian Eschatology Become Post-Modem?" in God Will Be All in All, 259-264. 
27 Moltmann, The Way of Jesus Christ, 321. 
28 In this way, Moltmann's theology is highly millennial, and Moltmann picks up a theme of 
eschatology, millennialism, that had been neglected for many years. While disagreeing with some 
aspects in Moltmann, Bauckham helpfully traces Moltmann's millenialist thinking in "The 
Millennium," God Will Be All in All, 123-154. 
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be related to time if it is to be the moment of time's end and the transition into 
eternity. 
To describe the parousia's transcendence over time, Moltmann returns to his 
doctrine of the creation of time in the "moments" of God's creative resolve: the 
primordial moment and the moment of inception for creation. To describe the 
eschatological moment of the parousia, Moltmann declares that how one understands 
the end of time relates directly to how one understands "the beginning." As we saw in 
the previous chapter, Moltmann believes that time is an element of creation itself, and 
just as time came into being with creation, so also will time end with the parousia and 
the ensuing new creation. The divine primordial moment is God's self-restriction of 
his eternity to allow for time. The eschatological moment is the reverse of the 
primordial moment, and the parousia God will signal God's de-restriction of his 
restricted omnipresence and eternity in order to manifest his glory in the transfigured 
creation. The temporality of creation will be ended in the unrestricted eternity of 
God. The original divine self-limitation which made the time possible will work in 
the opposite direction as time gives way to God's ubiquitous, eternal self. 
The eschatological moment has the dual result of God's de-restriction of his 
glory and the accompanying entering of creation into the kingdom of glory. The 
eschatological moment is more than the consummation of individuals and human 
history: it will be the consummation of all creation since its inception and beginning. 
The end of time is the symmetrical converse of the beginning of time, and God's de-
restriction will occur so that God may be all in all: "The temporal creation will then 
become an eternal creation, because all created beings will participate in God's 
eternity. The spatial creation will then become an omnipresent creation, because all 
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created beings will participate in God's omnipresence. ,,29 The eschatological moment 
has the double outcome of God's willful de-restriction of his restricted self as well as 
the appearance of God's splendor to all creation. At this eschatological moment, the 
temporal creation experiences its transformation into the eternal creation and as a , 
result, time is transformed into eternity. 
To discuss the nature of this transformation of time, Moltmann draws on a 
careful distinction between the concepts of advent and future. The future is 
descriptive of anticipated events within history. Things which are future are not yet, 
but are coming to be and moving towards the present. These events, however, like all 
others, shall also pass away into the category of past time, and all future events are 
bound to the passage of historical time. In contrast to the category of expected future 
is the concept of expected advent, which applies to the return of Christ. Christians 
anticipate that the advent of Christ will be the end of time and the beginning of God's 
eternal creation. The parousia must be seen as an event in God's eternity, and as 
such, the parousia is related, not merely to the future of creation, but equally to the 
present and the past of all things as well. "As the culminating and fulfilling end of 
history, the parousia of Christ will appear to all times simultaneously in a single 
instant. F or the future of Christ also brings the end of becoming and the end of 
passing away. ,,30 Moltmann's understanding of the nature of parousia is therefore 
diachronic, meaning the simultaneous appearing of Christ to all times, places, and 
peoples -- in order to finally redeem them. 
In this way, the parousia is an event that may be described as both tensed and 
tenseless. It exists as an event that stands not just at the end of history but over all 
history at the same time. Christ will be revealed at the same diachronic moment to all 
29 Moltmann, The Coming o/God, 294. 
30 Moltmann, The Way of Jesus Christ, 317. 
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peoples of history, and final redemption will occur simultaneously in his presence. 
This implies that the parousia should be seen as a tenseless event, in that it will occur 
in a rather static fashion to all times in one moment. The dynamic eschatological 
process in history that began with Christ's dying and rising continues to follow its 
course as time passes. But time does not move forward toward the parousia. The 
parousia comes to time and history and will confront all peoples of all times. Should 
we not conclude, then, that all times are statically "fixed" in relation to the parousia? 
Again we see how Moltmann distinguishes between the "absolute eternity" of 
God and the "relative eternity" of the new creation in order to examine how humanity 
and creation could share in, but not be overwhelmed by, God's eternity. The 
unrestricted presence of God's eternity will be relatively experienced by creation 
through its participation in God's de-limited self. Moltmann again employs the 
patristic concept of aeonic time to convey the meaning of eternity enjoyed by created 
beings who partake in God's absolute eternity. The time of the world will not end but 
will be changed from linear time to aeonic time, which is experienced cyclically. 
The passage of time will arrive at its destination in the eschaton, and rather 
than standing still, aeonic time reflects the Sabbath rest of God's creation in God's 
presence. Created time, which is aligned toward the future, will be transformed into 
the circular movements of the aeonic time of the new creation. The aeonic time of 
eternity is defined not according to length or passage of time but according to the 
experience of the presence of eternity. The new creation will exists in an unmediated 
relation to God, and eternity is a dimension of the quality of this new creation in 
relation to God. As we have seen, God's eternity is something far beyond the simple 
negation or superabundance of time. God's eternity is the fullness of creative life, and 
193 
eternity is to be understood as a descriptive term regarding the quality of life, as well 
as it never-ending duration. 
As with Brunner before him, Moltmann cannot describe the parousia without 
also discussing in close relation the consummation of creation in the glory of God: 
they are differing aspects of the same eschatological event of God's fmal revelation of 
his glory. The glorification of God is the purpose and goal of creation, and Moltmann 
expounds upon the notion that the hiddenness of God's glory on earth will be met by 
the full revelation of God's glory upon consummation. Moltmann draws upon the 
Jewish Shekinah theology of God's historical indwelling within limited spaces on 
earth, as well as upon Christian incarnational theology, to examine both the 
hiddenness and revelation of God's glory. 
Moltmann has built the case for God's self-restriction and allowance for the 
space of creation, yet Jewish and Christian theology also proclaims the indwelling of 
God within creation and history. How can the eternal and infinite God dwell within 
creation without destroying its time and space? Shekinah theology of Jewish doctrine 
links the infmite God with a finite, earthly space in which God dwells within the time 
and space of history. 31 God desires to reveal himself in a particular place, and this 
special presence of God is based on the kenotic concept of descent and God's self-
limitation within history. Shekinah theology describes the God who desires to be 
present in a specific place, such as the Temple, to reveal his will and glory. The 
Shekinah of God's glory is present in history at different times and places and before 
different people. God's Shekinah is sometimes present and sometimes absent, and it 
comes at the discretion of God and not human beings. The Shekinah of God goes into 
31 See G. von Rad, Old Testament Theology, I, trans. D. M. G. Stalker (San Francisco: Harper Collins, 
1965), 234ff. 
194 
exile with the Israelites, reminding them of God's presence with them despite the 
anxiety of exile and abandonment of the Temple. 
Moltmann relies on the concepts of Shekinah theology -- God's glorious 
presence with his people -- in order to state how hope for the consummation is a hope 
for the eschatological Shekinah of God. Hope in the Shekinah of God is hope for the 
fmal and never-ending presence of God, and it is thus an eschatological hope. The 
eschatological revelation of God's glory is coupled with the return of the Shekinah, 
which will no longer be hidden. The glory which will completely fill heaven and 
earth is identical with the Shekinah that dwelt in the sanctuary of the temple?2 With 
this understanding, the time and space of history is understood as the time of exile, as 
a remoteness from the immediate presence of the glory of God. God is historically 
available only through the presence of the Shekinah. 
God has veiled his glory to make room for creation, and by employing 
concepts of Shekinah theology, Moltmann describes how creation is destined to be 
the dwelling place of God. When God comes to dwell completely within creation, the 
space of creation itself will give way to God's glory. The limited indwelling of God 
through the Shekinah and the indwelling of God in Christ serve as precursors and 
pointers to God's final and full indwelling in creation -- when God shall be all in all. 
Moltmann describes this all-in-all presence this way: 
Through the historical process of indwelling and its eschatological 
completion, the distanced contraposition of the Creator towards his 
creation becomes the inner presence of God in his creation. To the 
external presence of God above it is added the inner presence of God 
within it. To the transcendence of the Creator towards his creation is 
added the immanence of his indwelling in his creation. With this the 
whole creation becomes the house of God, the temple in which God 
can dwell, the home country in which God can rest. All created beings 
participate directly and without mediation in his indwelling glory, and 
in it are themselves glorified. They participate in his divine life, and 
32 Moltmann, The Coming of God, 304. 
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live eternally. Once God finds his dwelling place in creation creation 
loses its space outside God and attains to its place in God. iust as at 
the beginning the Creator made himself the living space for his 
creation, so at the end his new creation will be his living space.33 
This is not equivalent to an eschatological pantheism because God will remain distinct 
while the world retains definite creaturely life, yet they will dwell in one another 
without either losing their respective identities. These mutual indwellings mean that 
there will be a mutual participation in the attributes of the other. Just as God has 
taken temporality and restriction into himself, so also will human beings share in 
God's eternity and omnipresence. 
This indwelling presence of God makes heaven and earth completely new, and 
the cosmic Shekinah is God's dwelling amongst his people. God's immediate 
presence interpenetrates everything, and the eschatological indwelling of God has the 
two characteristics of holiness and glory. Because God is holy, everything that 
belongs to God will be holy because it is the redeemed vessel of his indwelling. 
Everything unholy must be excluded from God's kingdom.34 The antithesis between 
holy and unholy is a comprehensive one, and must be understood politically, 
economically, and morally. The glory lies in the shared divine splendor and the 
beauty of God's appearance everywhere. The beautiful radiance that shines through 
everything will be a visible sign of the all-inclusive presence of God and of the divine 
presence which fulfills everything. "The holiness and the glory of the eternal 
33 Moltmann, The Coming of God, 307. 
34 Karl Peters has recently written that modem science invalidates the possibility of universal Christian 
eschatological future by saying that "a universe in which the overcoming of evil by good, in which 
justice is fmally served, is vastly different from the current scientific picture of an expanding universe 
with billions of galaxies each with billions of stars. It is so different that it is difficult to see how the 
details of biblical eschatology can be translated into the current scientific view of a future, universal 
eschatology. . .. If the expanding universe is indeed open, expanding forever, then how can one speak. 
of God recreating the universe? If the universe is closed, then it is likely to end in a 'big crunch' of 
mammoth black-hole proportions. Again, it is difficult to see how a new creation can take place." Karl 
Peters, "Eschatology in Light of Contemporary Science (paper presented to the Theology and Science 
Group of the American Academy of Religion, November 1988), 9-10. 
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indwelling of God is the eschatological goal of creation as a whole and of all the 
individual created beings. ,,35 Moltmann concentrates on the "fullness of God" a , 
phrase found in Ephesians 3: 19, to elaborate on the concept of the pervasive glory of 
God. The fullness of God is the joyful nature of divine life, and God's overflowing 
fullness is the source of joy and exaltation for everything that lives. Life in the 
fullness of God is like a feast of eternal joy, and from the fullness of God people 
receive limitless grace and love for life. This full life enjoyed by humanity, and by all 
creation, becomes a song of eternal praise to God. 
Eschatological Judgment 
The parousia of Christ brings with it the event of eschatological judgment that 
also involves certain views of time in the description of it and its outcome. Any 
description of the kingdom of God necessarily entails action on God's part to 
eliminate finally everything evil that is hostile to God's love and reign. Assessing the 
scriptural accounts of judgment and the writings of our three theologians reveals that 
judgment is a crucial component to the overall purposes of God regarding human 
beings and the final consummation of creation in the glory of God.36 Each of our 
three theologians dedicates considerable thought to the doctrine of final judgment, yet 
they arrive at differing viewpoints about the outcome of judgment for human beings. 
35 Moltmann, The Coming of God, 318. 
36 New Testament passages indicating a fmal judgment include, among others, Matthew 16:27: "When 
the Son of Man comes in his glory, and all the angels with him, then he will sit on the throne of his 
glory. All the nations will be gathered before him, and he will separate people one from another as a 
shepherd separates the sheep from the goats."; 2 Corinthians 5:10: "For all of us must appear before the 
judgment seat of Christ, so that each may receive recompense for what has been done in the body, 
whether good or eviL"; and Revelation 20: 12: "And I saw the dead, great and small, standing before the 
throne, and books were opened. Also another book was opened, the book of life. And the dead were 
judged according to their works, as recorded in the books." 
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As we shall see, the topic of universal salvation occupies much of their attention, and 
it is primarily here that we see the concept of time entering into their thought 
regarding either the eternal union or eternal separation from God. If one is forever 
separated from God as a result of judgment, then must this not include some form of 
temporality? There is a shift in thinking about the outcome of judgment from 
Mackintosh to Moltmann, with Brunner taking a middle position between twO?7 
Even with their varying opinions regarding the outcome of judgment, each one holds 
firm to the understanding that judgment is fundamental to God's redemptive purposes 
for human beings. 
Judgment implies moral accountability, condemnation, punishment for sin, 
and rewards for righteousness, and Scripture consistently refers to God as the divine 
Judge whose will defines righteousness. Traditionally, theology has held that the 
outcome of judgment is the separation of the righteous from the condemned and that 
each person is designated as one or the other according to his actions in this life.38 
Yet Scripture, not to mention several hundred years of Protestantism, also describes 
humanity's complete reliance upon God's merciful grace for salvation because no one 
can live up to the righteousness of God. If God's love is sovereign, how can God's 
loving purposes for all humanity's salvation be thwarted? 
The main issue at stake surrounding the debate about judgment is the 
relationship between God's love and God's holiness. Does God's love for humanity 
allow any room for God's righteous wrath to punish sinners according to their deeds, 
37 Regarding the doctrine of universal salvation in modem theology, Bauckham has observed: "Eternal 
punishment was fIrmly asserted in official creeds and confessions of churches. It must have seeme~ as 
indispensable a part of universal Christian belief as the doctrines of the Trinity and the Incam~tlOn. 
Since 1800 this situation has entirely changed, and no traditional doctrine has .been so wlde~y 
abandoned as that of eternal punishment." Bauckham, "Universalism: A Histoncal Survey," m 
Themolios 4, no. 2 (1979): 48-54. 
38 See James P. Martin, The Last Judgment in Protestant Theology from Orthodoxy to Ritschl 
(Edinburgh: Oliver & Boyd, 1963). 
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and if so, does that punishment also entail an eternal separation from God in hell? 
The traditional Reformed approach has been to allow for eternal separation in hell by 
limiting the scope of God's love to the redeemed, while the unredeemed receive the 
due punishment for their sins.39 The character of God as supremely loving is called 
into question also by the classical Reformed assertion that God has created some 
people for salvation and others for punishment.4o The idea that God has determined 
the eschatological fate of the individual appears to be a harsh caricature of the God 
who creates human beings with the freedom to decide for or against God. 
The ideas of hell and the related category of God's wrathful punishment have 
come under intense criticism from both theological and philosophical angles as being 
ultimately incompatible with the love of GOd.41 The underlying assumption is that if 
God is love, then God cannot condemn some of his beloved creatures to eternal 
punishment in separation from that love. The doctrine of universal salvation provides 
a way for theologians to address the reality of evil without having to surrender 
completely the essential nature of God as loving. The loving God promises that all 
will one day be restored, even if that restoration must occur through the harshness and 
pain of judgment. There are real victims and there is real injustice, but the doctrine of 
universal salvation promises that injustice will not last forever. 
It must be noted from the outset that final judgment is a concept fraught with 
difficulties because the Bible contains mixed messages about punishment and grace 
for human beings.42 For this reason both separationists and universalists appeal 
39 David Fergusson, "Will the Love of God Finally Triumph?", in Nothing Greater, Nothing Better: 
Theological Essays on the Love of God (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2001), 
189. 
40 See Concerning the Eternal Predestination of God, ed. J. K. S. Reid (Cambridge: Clark & Co., 
1961); John Calvin, Institutes 3.23.6. 
41 See Jonathan L. Kvanvig, The Problem of Hell (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 39ff. 
42 I. H. Marshall, "Does the New Testament Teach Universal Salvation?" in Christ in Our Place, ed. T. 
Hart (Exeter: Paternoster Press, 1989), 313-328. 
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passionately to scripture for justification of their positions. Separationists interpret 
passages about judgment, separation, and hell to mean that those who live their lives 
in willing opposition to God will be forever separated from the love and goodness of 
God after this life. Universalists interpret passages about the sovereign love of God to 
mean that all human beings will, eventually, live with God, even if it means being 
painfully judged in order to be purged of their sins.43 
Universal salvation has a long history within Christian doctrine, going back to 
its first main proponent in Origen of Alexandria.44 Origen held that the development 
of a soul does not end with this life, and that after death there remains a purification of 
fallen souls before all are led back to God. The consummation of all things, for 
Origen, includes the destruction of all evil in every person before everyone returns to 
their source in God.45 Even though Origen's system of universal salvation was 
condemned by the Synod of Constantinople in 543 A. D., traces of Origen's thought 
filter down through the centuries, and the basic argument remains the same.46 
In the modem era, Schleiermacher emerges as one of the most prominent 
advocates of universal salvation.47 He believes that if there is but one supreme will in 
the universe, and if that will is almighty grace, then at long last the love of God will 
triumph over the dying struggles of human rebellion.48 All people are predestined by 
God's will to salvation in Christ, contends Schleiermacher, and the sovereign divine 
43 Stephen Davis offers a survey of relevant passages in, "Universalism, Hell, and the Fate of the 
~orant," Modern Theology 6:2, January 1990, 173-174. . 
Origen, On First Principles, trans. G. W. Butterworth (Gloucester, Mass: Peter SIDlth, 1973); Contra 
Celsum, trans. Henry Chadwick (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), VI, 26 & vrn, 72. 
45 Origen writes from his Neoplatonist view: "Such is the end when 'all enemies shall have been 
subjected to Christ.' ... For the end is always like the beginning; as therefore there is one end of all 
things, and as there is one end of many things, so from one beginning arise many differences and 
varieties, which in their turn are restored, through God's goodness, through their subjection to Christ 
and their unity with the Holy Spirit, to one end, which is like the beginning." Origen, On First 
Principles, 53. 
46 Frederick Norris, Universal Salvation in Origen and Maximus (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 
1992). 
47 Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, 117-120. 
48 Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, 713-717. 
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purpose cannot fail in the end. The process by which the unbeliever shall turn toward 
God is a psychological one, and Schleiermacher states that if future punishment is 
spiritual by nature, then it pertains to the mind, specifically the conscience. While on 
earth the lost have no pain of conscience in relation to God, but in death, their pain of 
conscience is such that it will awaken their awareness of God. With a grieved 
conscious now aware of God, the lost are thus elevated above their rebellious attitudes 
and into a proper understanding of God.49 Since they are thus awakened to God and 
therefore properly relate to God, it is unjust that they should suffer any longer. The 
movement of remorse, which will be theirs after death, is a movement of repentance 
toward the good that God will acknowledge and reward. 50 
We now tum to our three representative theologians and their VIews of 
eschatological judgment and its outcome. Mackintosh asserts that eschatological 
judgment forms a vital element in the outworking of God's history of salvation, and 
logically this implies that judgment is part of a continuation of the time-series. Since 
history is a moral operation for Mackintosh, God judges people throughout the 
continuation of history. Drawing on a lengthy list of both Old and New Testament 
citations, Mackintosh points out how central the concept of judgment is to a biblical 
doctrine of God. Inherent to the biblical understanding of judgment is the consistent 
presentation of the unified understanding of both mercy and severity in God's in 
dealing with human beings. With increasing anticipation, however, from the prophets 
through Daniel, there is a growing sense of future judgment, and this judgment 
assumes significance not only for Israel, but also the entire world. 
49 Schleiennacher, The Christian Faith, 719. ..' . 
50 Schleiennacher is thus able to conclude that the divine decree of electIon whIch marks the mc1uslOn 
of some into the Church in this life will be applied to all eventually so that the church will be complete 
in God's Kingdom: All "are objects of the same divine activity that gathered the Church together.' ~d 
are embraced along with us all under the same divine fore-ordination." Schleiennacher, The Christian 
Faith, 548. 
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Whether it is Amos' threatening predictions of the dreadful "Day of the Lord" 
or Isaiah's more positive visions of God's plan of redemption for the whole world , 
there is a movement of eschatological expectation that grows toward the end of the 
Old Testament period. In particular, Messianic hope expands in the later years of 
Jewish writing to focus on a kingly figure who comes from God to forgive sin, 
execute judgment, conquer death, and establish God's reign. In addition to hope for 
the nation or community of the faithful, later developments in Old Testament 
eschatology begin to project hope for the individual in a life after death, and it is this 
development that feeds into the New Testament conviction of the resurrection from 
the dead.51 What emerges in Mackintosh's view is that judgment is another event in 
the continuation of salvation history. The dynamic movement of history continues 
with history, so that judgment is part of that history. It appears that judgment is not 
an event "after" time in eternity, but part of the temporal process itself. 
Judgment is a temporal process, and as such, Mackintosh places judgment 
within history because Christ executes both redemption and judgment on humanity's 
behalf. The redemption from sin that was begun by Christ during his ministry will not 
be complete until Christ's universal judgment over all sin. The issue at stake for 
Mackintosh is the fact that Christ functions as Mediator in his dual roles and 
Redeemer and Judge of humanity within time: 
Christ is central as Redeemer; if in history as proceeding now He has 
certified Himself to faith as One on whose person everything turns in 
the relation of God to man -- and the Church has no other message --
He will be central also at the end, and no human life can be conceived 
as finally placed out of relation to Him as the all-determining reality ... 
If any decisive close be in store for human life, then, unless it were 
indissolubly bound up with the personality of Christ, we should have to 
51 Mackintosh, Immortality and the Future, 33. 
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regard the climax of God's dealings with men as strangely out of line 
and out of keeping with all the rest. 52 
Jesus is God's Mediator who brings redemption from sin, and the redemption 
which Christ began in the past will not be complete until the final and decisive 
judgment within history.53 
Another factor which leads us to believe that judgment is a temporal event is 
the positive aspect of Judgment as an instrument of God's grace. Judgment is 
consistent with all of the other ways in which God deals graciously with humankind 
within temporality. Each person's history, existence in time, is a sinful one, and this 
history must be redeemed from within: 
There is no reason why we should suppose this condemnation of sin to 
be excluded from His attitude to believers at the last. No more then 
than now can He speak to us of what we are, and have done, except as 
good and evil in our life stand out for His reprobation or approval, in 
perfect openness. But the point is that judgment in this sense, real and 
searching as it is, is love's instrument, and serves love's purpose. It is 
by passing through it that believing men are fmally delivered from the 
effects of their sinful history. 54 
Mackintosh implies here that this "passing through" judgment is another event within 
the temporal life of human beings so that their "histories" may be once and for all 
purged of resistance to God. For Mackintosh, therefore, judgment is a temporal event 
of grace that serves as a precondition to etemallife with God: "To be tried at last, in 
Christ's presence, may be truly designated as the last means of grace for the redeemed. 
There will be pain in it, doubtless, beyond our imaging -- the purifying and 
emancipating shame of those who bend under the condemnation of perfect love, in 
52 Mackintosh, Immortality and the Future, 184. . . 
53 Mackintosh echoes Luther's analysis of judgment as an historical event, summed up ill his hopeful 
anticipation: "Come, dear, last day." As quoted in the discussion in Paul Althaus, The Theology of 
Martin Luther, trans. Robert C. Schultz (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1966),420-421. 
54 Mackintosh, Immortality and the Future, 193. 
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full assurance that for all their guilt they will not be cast OUt.,,55 To be reminded of 
one's sin is, in away, to relive it and to experience it anew, and this cannot happen if 
eternity is the domain of the redeemed. Each person will be shown all the awful 
reality his in order that the one judged and pardoned may understand the greatness of 
God's love toward human beings. 
Questions about universal salvation arise when one considers the final fate of 
those who do not or cannot, for whatever reasons, confess faith in Christ and live in a 
relationship with God. Mackintosh is acutely aware of the massive number of people 
around the globe who either adamantly refuse to believe the Christian message or who 
never hear the message and never have an opportunity for faith. What is the ultimate 
fate of those who persist in their hostility to God and those who remain in ignorance 
of Christ? Is their continuation in alienation from God to be viewed along temporal 
lines so that one's opposition to God continues forever? If so, is not the very concept 
of "forever" a temporal one? 
Mackintosh denies the prospect of universal salvation by saying that the New 
Testament only alludes to universalistic views in occasional verses, and he believes 
that the case for universalism can be made only after removing such verses from their 
context and standing them in isolation. 56 In the overall portrayal of God, Scripture 
does not subordinate God's holiness to God's love, which is the case in universalism. 
Mackintosh believes that the scriptural allusions to God's love for all and God's 
desire for all to be saved do not displace the reality of free human decisions to reject 
55 Mackintosh, Immortality and the Future, 194. .. 
56 Mackintosh cites several verses that are often referred to in the argwnent for uruversal salvatIon, 
verses such as: 1 Corinthians 15:22 ("that God may be all in all"); Romans 5:18 ("As in Adam all di.e, 
so also in Christ all shall be made alive"); Romans 6:32 ("Through one act of righteousness the free gIft 
came unto all men to justification oflife"); and Philippians 2: 10 ("That in the name of Jesus every knee 
shall bow"). 
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God. Universal salvation not only denies separation after judgment, it also denies 
human beings the freedom given to them at creation. 57 
The freedom given to human beings is the freedom to choose in favor of God 
or to reject God, and Mackintosh views universal salvation, not as an act of love on 
God's part, but an act of force which denies freedom. Jesus revealed the love of a 
God who does not enter people's lives by brute force, compelling them through the 
gates of the kingdom. 58 Advocates for universalism appeal to God's magnanimous 
love for all people and the divine, sovereign will to carry out God's loving purposes. 
Taking this logic to its end, this means that God will force God's opponents to love 
him over and against their own sinful choices. Mackintosh's rejection of universal 
salvation is based partly on the idea that love which forces its way is not the divine 
love revealed in Jesus. His assessment of universalism is that human freedom is lost 
in the overpowering activity of God, and in this way universalism sacrifices freedom 
in order to magnify God's grace. What we will see with Moltmann is that God's 
freedom to choose in favor of humanity through Christ is a gracious act with is 
stronger than people's ability to refuse. What remains paramount for Mackintosh is 
the moral freedom that humans have to choose whether or not to love God, and this 
freedom is not restricted to temporal history. 
The ethical significance of the present life is, for Mackintosh, continued in life 
after death, and this life may be eternally lived in opposition to God. Mackintosh 
states plainly: "If God be the God we meet in Jesus Christ, fixed opposition to God's 
57 Stephen T. Davis, "Universalism, Hell, and Ignorance," in Modern Theology 6:2 (1990): 179. 
58 "When schemes are drawn up whereby all men eventually must be swept into the divine Kingdom, 
they appear to have lost touch with the moral realities of New Testament religion. It is in this se~se 
that to proclaim Universalism as a certainty is rightly repelled as disloyal to the Gospel, for nothmg 
will permanently commend it.self to the believing mind which tends, as such dogma must, to lower the 
ethical significance of present life." Mackintosh, Immortality and the Future, 206-207. 
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will must entail suffering, and this is true if the next life has a moral framework. ,,59 
Mackintosh holds out little hope for those who have conclusively rejected Christ after 
contemplating his relevance for their life. Those who reject Christ in hostility or 
apathy have had their say regarding his will for their lives. For those who reject God 
and Christ, the outcome of judgment is certain: eternal separation from God. 
The sorest punishment of sin lies in the sinner's isolation alike from 
God and man. To sin and break up fellowship are one thing. Whether 
it be pride or lust, sin essentially involves the shutting up of our own 
life within the limits of our own ego. We banish ourselves from the 
presence of the Father and others. The loss of a living connection with 
God is par excellence the punishment of sin... Christian faith 
recognizes eternal life in God and His kingdom as the highest good and 
ultimately the only true good. Conversely, the greatest evil, ultimately 
the only real evil, is eternal death, i.e. definitive separation from the 
living God.6o 
Eternal separation cannot be divorced from some sort of continued temporal 
existence in eternity, as described by Mackintosh. 
Despite his antagonism toward universal salvation, Mackintosh does dedicate 
a portion of his thought to the prospect of a person's having saving, post-temporal 
contact with Christ after death, and Mackintosh contends that Christian theology does 
offer hope for certain people who have not had faith in this life. He believes that it is 
too rigid an interpretation of New Testament thought to fix the fate of the stranger to 
God strictly according to his relationship with God at the point of death. He therefore 
holds out the possibility of some kind of post-death reconciliation for those who have 
never been exposed to the Gospel message.61 While acknowledging that he can only 
speculate on such a matter, he proposes that a future reconciliation may happen at the 
time of God's judgment of humankind. Mackintosh relies on the notion that God's 
59 Mackintosh, Immortality and the Future, 195. 
60 Mackintosh, Christian Experience a/Forgiveness, 168. 
61 For another, more recent presentation of this belief, see George Lindbeck, "Fides ex auditu and ~e 
Salvation of Non-Christians," in The Gospel and the Ambiguity 0/ the Church, ed. Vilmos VatJa 
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1974),92-123. 
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love is truly infinite and beyond human understanding and control. Human beings 
cannot direct the will or the love of God when it comes to those who have not heard 
of saving grace through Christ: 
Weare interested in [the] argument that men who have not utterly 
rejected the divine love, and cannot be truthfully described as 
obstinately wicked, will after death hear the words of life and 
peace ... Heathen who have not heard Jesus' name, children who die 
young, imbecile minds, all those whom the beauty of holiness has 
never been presented - these, and others in like case, may look for 
something better than to be dismissed into the rayless night of 
perdition. 62 
Mackintosh believes that if a person of no faith were simply to come face to face with 
the holy love of Christ, as Christians have in this life, then these former unbelievers 
would also then trust in and have fellowship with Christ. 63 Mackintosh is rightly 
concerned to address the eschatological destiny of those who may never have heard 
the Christian message, and indeed even those who may not have had faith in their life. 
In some ways, this approach by Mackintosh is a prelude to the thought of Moltmann, 
who speaks of those lives that are cut short before faith or who do not have the 
capacity to know God. 
Brunner describes eschatological judgment as a prelude to the kingdom of 
God, and for each person there is no entrance into eternal life except through "the 
narrow pass" of judgment. Prior to the consummation of creation is the purification 
of human beings through judgment, and all humans shall stand before the judgment 
seat of Christ. 64 All must be judged according to their works, and God's judgment of 
62 Mackintosh, Immortality and the Future, 158. 
63 "Let them meet Jesus, somehow and somewhere, let them feel the unique and amazing power to 
evoke faith which, as all believers know, resides in Him, and who shall say they too may not answer 
Him with trust and love?" Mackintosh, Immortality and the Future, 159. 
64 Cullmann also points out the significance of the imagery of the Son of Man's judgme~t over t~e 
nations in The Christo logy of the New Testament, trans. S. C. Guthrie and A. M. Hall (philadelphIa: 
Westminster Press, 1963), 157-159. 
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a person's actions necessarily flows from the holiness of God.65 God is not indifferent 
toward evil, and God's holiness has a distinct aim which excludes opposition to God. 
God carries through his will "against all resistance by means of the process of 
discrimination and crisis-the process of judgment.,,66 Brunner's doctrine of 
judgment emerges from a synthesis God's holiness and sovereignty, and he concludes 
that the culmination of God's will shall be the unambiguous victory of God over evil. 
Within time, there is a confused state of affairs in which obedience to God and 
opposition to God commingle and struggle against one another. There is not within 
history a clear, visible victor between God's goodness and the evil that opposes it. 
Human life now is a complex admixture of the good and evil that exist in the world, 
and something must happen to reveal and relieve this unbearable contradiction within 
humanity. More than human deeds will be judged, however, because sin, as a power, 
is larger than anyone person. Because sin is the negation of God's creation, the 
power of evil must be destroyed by an act of divine judgment and annihilation. 
Judgment for Brunner is a post-historical event because a final discrimination 
between good and evil is not possible within the framework of history. Opposition to 
God within history will be ended by the full manifestation of God's righteousness 
beyond temporality. Judgment will end the confusion and anguish brought about by 
the co-mingling of good and evil. Through eschatological judgment it will be clear 
that resistance to God means ruin, while obedience to God gives life and peace. The 
process of judgment is the complete disclosure of that within human beings which 
resists God's grace, for this must be revealed before it can be eliminated. 
65 Brunner, Dogmatics, v. 3,418. 
66 Brunner, Eternal Hope, 173. 
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Following Mackintosh, Brunner emphasizes that judgment is not designed 
only to satisfy a sense of divine wrath but to be the instrument of redeeming love. 
The parallel concept of justice is grace, and judgment benefits the one being judged 
because it results in the separation of evil from the one who is an object of God's 
love. Judgment is not only the exposure of hidden sin because it is also the method of 
separation by which humans are healed of their sinfulness. Judgment is the outcome 
of God's wrath against sin, yet even wrath serves the purpose of redemption. 67 
Despite his occasional objections to universalism, it seems clear that Brunner 
advocates for the fmal inclusion of all within the mercy of God. He tries to sidestep 
the debate about universalism by stating that scripture teaches both separation and 
universalism and that a faithful adherence to the biblical witness will affrrm both. In 
this way Brunner hopes to occupy the middle ground between Mackintosh and 
Moltmann because he claims that biblical eschatology portrays the necessity of both 
mercy and wrath in God's future dealing with humanity.68 Throughout his work on 
judgment, Brunner believes that God's abundant love for all people is as universally 
inclusive as God's universal condemnation of humanity's sin, which is shared by all. 
God's response to human sin in Jesus Christ applies to the sin of all human brings, and 
the sinful person cannot be ultimately defiant and stronger in his "no" to God than 
God's "yes" to humanity in Jesus Christ. 
When it comes to interpreting passages regarding judgment versus universal 
salvation, Brunner states that the intent of Scripture is not to reveal a certain doctrine 
which must be heeded or debated, but rather, that through Scripture's words God is 
speaking the Word of challenge to human beings. Scripture's intent is to reveal a 
67 In a similar way Barth wishes not to dissect God's love and holiness into categories apart from each 
other. Barth, Church Dogmatics, II12. 
68 Brunner, Dogmatics, v. 3,424. 
209 
living God, one who loves and who judges those whom he loves. The Word of God 
regarding salvation, whether it emerges from judgment or universal love, is not a 
doctrine to be believed -- it is always a personal Word to be trusted by each person 
who hears it. God's promise of both loving acceptance and holy justice confronts 
humanity by placing it in the middle of a struggle, and the God who speaks refuses 
any neutral observers. The Word of God pleads with human beings to recognize that 
divine decision which has already made in their favor. 
Scriptural depictions of separation and universal salvation reflect God's twin 
attributes of holiness and love, and therefore both are accurate expressions of God's 
will concerning humanity's future. Brunner explains: "We must listen to the voice of 
world judgment as to the voice of God Himself, in order that we may fear Him; we 
must listen to the voice which speaks of universal redemption as to the voice of God 
Himself, in order that we may love Him. Only through this indissoluble duality do we 
grasp the duality of God's being which yet is one: His holiness and His love.,,69 To 
proclaim God's universal love at the expense of judgment would be to deny that God 
holds people accountable for their actions, and universalism often contravenes the 
moral responsibilities which frame human living and actions. Conversely, favoring 
separation at the expense universal atonement implies that salvation follows 
necessarily from one's actions alone and not from the mercy of the God who saves 
humans despite their actions and hostile wills.70 
What is vital is the view that God is sovereign over the eschatological future 
and that its outworking emerges according to the initiative and action of God's doing. 
69 Brunner, Eternal Hope, 184. 
70 Moltmann does not see this dual emphasis on both universalism and separation in Brunner's th~ught. 
Moltmann believes that Brunner advocates too strongly for the position of eschatological separatIOn as 
Brunner argues against the universalistic tones in Barth's theology. Moltmann, The Coming of God, 
239. 
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Here Brunner's argument is similar to one proposed by Barth, who insists on the 
freedom of God's grace as the starting point in any discussion about salvation. God 
offers universal grace to humanity in Jesus Christ, who is both God's elected and 
rejected Mediator.
71 
As such, Christ is the only rejected person, and all other persons 
are elected by grace through Christ. The question for Barth is how long a person will 
resist God's gracious election of him that has occurred in Christ: "The Church will 
then not preach an apokatastasis, nor will it preach a powerless grace of Jesus Christ 
or a wickedness of men which is too powerful for it. But without any weakening of 
the contrast, and also without any arbitrary dualism, it will preach the overwhelming 
power of grace and the weakness of human wickedness in the face of it."n With this 
view, Barth proclaims that evil cannot stand against the gracious love of God, and 
there all will be received into the salvation offered by God through Christ. Brunner 
likewise emphasizes the sovereign freedom of God in bestowing grace to sinful 
humanity through Christ. It is God who directs humanity toward its teleological end 
through the means of both love and divine judgment. Despite his denials that he is a 
universalist, Brunner does prefer to leave the possibility of universal salvation as an 
"open question. ,,73 
Final judgment does occupy an important place within Moltmann's larger 
eschatological project, and his descriptions of judgment he brings in discussions of 
time and eternity that are lacking in Brunner. For Moltmann, eschatological judgment 
is a description of the process by which God restores the whole of creation and 
reconciles all things to himself. Judgment is a necessary stage in the process of the 
purging of creation from evil, and judgment is a precondition for the establishing of 
71 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, II12, 340-354. 
72 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, II12, 477. 
73 Brunner, Eternal Hope, 33; Bauckham, "Universalism," 53. 
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God's eternal kingdom of glory. God's justice and righteousness leads to the 
transformation of creation, and particularly for human beings, judgment is a stage 
along the way to the universal redemption. 
The key for Moltmann is his desire to begin with the consummated, future 
kingdom of God and work "back" from the eschatological future. If God is to be "all 
in all," as Moltmann is fond of saying, then this has important consequences for the 
concepts of judgment. If God's all-pervasive kingdom will be the fullest 
manifestation of God's holiness, righteousness, and love, then what does this mean for 
evil and its future? Moltmann comes to no other conclusion than the universalistic 
one, meaning that all evil (but not persons who are evil) will be expunged from 
creation in the new creation. Working with the assumption that the kingdom of God 
is coming to all creation allows Moltmann to hold onto the Christian confession of 
God as both all-loving and all-powerful because the kingdom will be the realization of 
both these confessions. God's love will be stronger than any evil resistance, and 
God's loving omnipotence will be exercised in favor of all creatures and all creation in 
order to bring everything to full redemption. 
Moltmann's main objective is to reinstate judgment as a positive, hopeful 
element of eschatological thought, rather than the horrible, terrifying aspect which is 
portrayed in medieval art and much of the history of eschatological writing. A final 
judgment which causes fear and terror is untrue to genuine hope in God "because 
psychologically it has done so much to poison the idea of God, [and] it is high time to 
discover the gospel of God's judgment and to awaken joy in God's coming 
righteousness and justice. ,,74 Since the cross was the revelation of God's love for the 
world and God's desire and means for reconciliation, the last judgment is the 
74 Moltmann, The Coming o/God, 235. 
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conclusion of that process which was begun at the cross. Christ's death on the cross is 
the basis for universal forgiveness, and Jesus' death is the foundation for the 
eschatological reconciliation of all things through judgment. The day of judgment 
will not be a day of wrath to be feared, but it will be, rather, the day when God's peace 
will finally begin. By condemning evil, Christ will create the preconditions for the 
universal kingdom of peace through a justice that brings healing.75 
Theology must cling to the concept of judgment because the victims of 
injustice can appeal finally only to God, and the world must be assured that God's 
justice and righteousness will be established in the end. People wait for a tribunal 
which will make righteousness prevail because, in a phrase Moltmann often repeats, 
"murderers must not be allowed to triumph over their victims for ever, [and] the 
innocent victims must not be forgotten. ,,76 Hope for judgment is trust that those who 
have been wronged or killed by injustice will be renewed and restored. Therefore, the 
concept of restorative justice is crucial for Moltmann's approach to judgment because 
the goal of judgment is not punishment but graceful reconciliation. Any judgment 
which does not lead to reconciliation and the healing of relationships is not related to 
the justice of God. 
In this regard, Moltmann once again displays his special sensitivity toward the 
victims of history and those who have suffered wrongly from the hands of others. 
Temporal injustices must be answered by God's eternal justice. Judgment will be the 
ultimate act of grace for everyone, even for the perpetrators of injustice and violence. 
75 [The Judge] will fmally bring justice to those who have never received justice, and will make the 
unjust just; which expects that he will 'slay' enmity for ever -- enmity, but not his enemies, whom he 
will transform through the power of his love, so as fmally to set up the kingdom of peace without end. 
The purpose of Jesus' judgment is not retaliation in all directions. Its aim is to set up the kingdom of 
peace, founded on the righteousness and justice which overcomes all enmity. The law which this judge 
applies, we might say, is a law whose purpose is rehabilitation. The fmal judgment is at all events no 
more than the beginning of the new creation of all things, and must be viewed in this character 
Moltmann, The Way of Jesus Christ, 338. 
76 Moltmann, The Way of Jesus Christ, 334. 
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Judgment is good news for the victims of evil as well as those who cause evil, and 
every violent act, every murder, and every act of selfishness will be condemned. 
Perpetrators of evil are just as enslaved by evil as victims, and through judgment 
everyone will be liberated and saved from destruction. God exercises creative power 
in judgment because through liberation from sin people will be transformed by God 
into whom they were created to be. For this reason, judgment is understood as a 
stage, or precondition, for God's over-riding purpose of establishing the eschatological 
kingdom. 77 
As in Brunner's thought, behind all the implications of judgment for Moltmann 
lies the more important and larger implication of the doctrine of God. Moltmann's 
endorsement of universal salvation is based on a doctrine of God that views God, not 
as the judge over and against what he has created, but as in favor of his creation, 
despite the reality of evil. In judgment, God will reject the sin and evil that people 
have committed without rejecting them as the perpetrators of evil. Clearly, the goal of 
Moltmann's reflections on judgment is to argue in favor of universal salvation and the 
concept of divine judgment as grounds for establishing the universality of God's 
righteousness in all creation. The crux of the matter for Moltmann is that the outcome 
of judgment is not initially concerned with the status of individual people. Rather, 
what matters is the righteousness of God and the victory of God's justice over the sin 
and injustice of the world. Universal salvation emerges as the inevitable outcome of 
God's victory over all that opposes the Creator's will for humanity and all creation 
itself. If God will be "all-in-all," then whatever opposes God will not be annihilated, 
but, instead, will be purged and changed through the process of judgment. Moltmann 
declares that the issue of whether or not some are lost to God and eternally separated 
77 Moltmann, The Way of Jesus Christ, 315-316. For a similar view, see John Hick, Death and Eternal 
Life, 265ff. 
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must be answered in a christological context and no other.78 Moltmann fully 
embraces and advocates for universal salvation because the judgment that is prior to 
the new creation will purge the old creation, and all humanity, of its evil. 79 
In stark contrast to Mackintosh and partly to Brunner, Moltmann hones in on 
several concepts of reconciliation and atonement in Scripture as a way of arguing in 
favor of universalism. Universal salvation hinges on God's promise to reconcile all 
things through the cross of Christ, and the divine restoration of everything means even 
those persons and powers who are opposed to God. Philippians 2 states that every 
knee will bow before God and every tongue will confess Christ as Lord to the glory of 
God. All enemies of Christ will be put under his feet, and God's kingdom will be 
consummated so that God may be all in all. 80 Moltmann claims that Paul's thought in 
1 st Corinthians dealing with resurrection does not discuss the possibility of a double 
outcome of judgment, and he believes that Paul's Adam-Christ typology works on the 
premise that humanity's condemnation through Adam is overcome by humanity's 
acquittal through Christ. 
Moltmann agrees with Mackintosh that the reconciling God desires to save 
human beings through a relationship of faith. Both argue that the power of God's 
grace is not a compulsive force which compels people to choose God over and against 
their own will. Grace is the non-coercive power of love that calls people to faith and 
enables them to make a free decision in favor of God. Where Moltmann disagrees 
with Mackintosh is the way in which God's grace will work in judgment. God saves 
human beings, not by overpowering them, but by convincing them in love. Whereas 
Mackintosh believes that people will be able to resist God even in eternity, Moltmann 
78 Moltmann, "The Logic of Hell" in God Will be All in All, 43-47. 
79 So also argues J. A. T. Robinson, In the End, God (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), 108ff. 
80 Philippians 2:10-11 & 1st Corinthians 15:28. 
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believes that in eternity people will be gracefully led and inspired to choose in favor 
of God. 
Moltmann rejects the idea that human beings control their own eternal destiny, 
and, as we saw in Brunner, the relationship between divine and human decisions is at 
stake in the debate about universal salvation. The question of God's sovereignty is 
crucial to the finality of "the decision" for salvation. Who is ultimately sovereign in 
deciding for or against salvation: a human being who chooses alienation or the loving 
God who wills reconciliation? To posit final destiny in the hands of human choice is 
a salvation-by-works scheme in which human beings control their own redemption: 
If the decision, 'faith or disbelief has eternal significance, then eternal 
destiny, salvation or damnation, lies in the hands of human beings. 
What will happen to people in eternity really depends on their own 
behavior. . .. Christ becomes a person's Savior only when that person 
has 'accepted' him in faith. So it is the acceptance in faith which makes 
Christ the Savior of men and women. But if this is so, do people not 
really save or damn themselves?81 
The Son of God is a person's Savior long before he acknowledges it, just as God's 
grace works in a person's life before that person chooses a relationship with God in 
faith. God is control of each human's destiny; to say that a person chooses his own 
destiny makes that person his own God. 
Leaning heavily on certain aspects of Pauline theology, Moltmann echoes 
Brunner by stating that God has already decided in favor of humanity in the dying 
and raising of Christ. The whole creation is the recipient of God's love, and the entire 
cosmos, rather than just a few elect, receives God's favor. A person's turning to God 
is only a response to the love previously given to humanity along with everything that 
receives God's blessing. Moltmann claims that rather than one's faith creating 
salvation, one's salvation is what creates faith. God's decision for humanity and any 
81 Moltmann, The Coming of God, 244. 
216 
human decision for or against faith do not exist on the same plane of importance: 
God's gracious decision for humanity outweighs humanity's rejection of God through 
SIll. 
God's grace is more powerful than any human sin and any human decision, 
and God is angered by human sin precisely because he loves human creatures. God 
says a temporal "No" to human sin because God has already said an eternal "Yes" to 
human beings. Godjudges and condemns the sin of the world and of human beings in 
order to grant salvation, and God's judgment separates the sin from the person who 
sins. By condemning sin, God gives the person freedom from sin and new life. Some 
reject God while others have faith, but in the end all will be reconciled to God. The 
judgment and reconciliation of the world are not opposing concepts, and God's 
reconciliation with all things will be enacted through a judgment which reveals God's 
righteousness. God will put things right through judgment, so that God may gather all 
things to himself and exhibit the fullness of glory. 
Jesus' death on the cross is the grounds on which Moltmann decides against a 
double outcome of judgment and in favor of universal salvation. Final judgment 
speaks about the means of the restoration of all things in the new creation, which is 
the consummated, eternal kingdom of God. Most importantly, it is the crucified 
Christ who is also the Judge of humanity. Christ himself was accused, in the place of 
human beings and for their sake. Jesus experienced the injustice of the world, and it 
will be this same Jesus who will distribute justice at the end of the world. The nature 
of this justice will be redemptive, not retaliatory, because redemptive justice is not 
bent on punishment but reconciliation. Christ's final justice creates righteousness, and 
it is in universal righteousness that all people will live in the consummated new 
creation: 
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What we call the Last Judgment is nothing other than the universal 
revelation of J~sus Christ, and the .consummation of his redemptive 
work. No expIatory penal code WIll be applied in the court of the 
crucified Christ. No punishment of eternal death will be imposed. The 
final spread of the divine righteousness that creates justice serves the 
eternal kingdom of God, not the final restoration of a divine world 
order that has been infringed. Judgment at the end is not the end at all: 
it is the beginning. Its goal is the restoration of all things for the 
building up of God's eternal kingdom.82 
The divine righteousness which issues judgment has nothing to do with rewards and 
punishments like the courts of this world. God's justice is a righteousness that creates 
justice and puts people and circumstances right. God's judgment is, therefore, a 
process of a redemptive justice by which God establishes the triumph of his glorious 
kingdom. Eternity cannot contain what is evil within temporality. 83 
We see that despite their disagreement over universal salvation, both 
Mackintosh and Moltmann sound a similar theme in their eschatological hopes for 
those who, for whatever reason, were never able to choose in favor of God through 
faith. 84 Moltmann possesses a strong sense of anxiety and sadness over those who 
may be 'lost' on account of violent or premature or unjust death. The hope of 
salvation is a hope as well for those who are the lost and the victims of history. Citing 
the atrocities and tragedies of history, Moltmann insists that final judgment is 
necessary for those who died unjustly because they deserve justice from the 
discerning Judge who takes into account the circumstances of people's lives and 
82 Moltmann, The Coming of God, 251. 
83 Compare with Tillich, who agrees with Moltmann regarding the eventual redemption of all: 
"Everything as created is rooted in the eternal ground of being. In this respect, non-being cannot 
prevail against it." Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, 3 vols. (Chicago: University Press, 1951-63), 
3:418. 
84 Pannenberg does not espouse universalism, but he offers hope for those never exposed to the . 
message of Christ: "In their case what counts is whether their individual conduct actuall~ agrees WI~ 
the will of God that Jesus proclaimed. The message of Jesus is the norm by whi~h God Judges ~ven ill 
the case of those who never meet Jesus personally ... Again, all to whom the BeatItudes apply WIll have 
a share in the coming salvation whether or not they have ever heard of Jesus. For factually t~ey have a 
share in Jesus and his message, as the day of judgment will make manifest." One problem WIth 
Pannenberg's thought is the Jesus himself is central to the message he proclaimed. 
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history. Moltmann makes a movIng appeal on behalf of those who were never 
allowed to live fully and whose lives were tragically cut short: 
Think of the life of those who were not permitted to live, and were 
unable to live: the beloved child, dying at birth; the little boy run over 
by a car when he was four; the disabled brother who never lived 
consciously, and never knew his parents; the friend tom to pieces by a 
bomb at your side when he was sixteen; the throngs of children who 
die prematurely of hunger in Africa; the countless numbers of the 
raped and murdered and killed. Of course their lives can take on 
considerable meaning for others. But where will their own lives be 
completed, and how? Can they somewhere be healed, complemented, 
lived to the full and completed after they have died? The idea that for 
these people their death is 'the finish' would plunge the whole world 
into absurdity; for if their life has no meaning, has ourS?85 
The dead who died unjustly or prematurely have, through Christ, the prospect of a 
"time" in which they may develop beyond their point of death. Eschatological 
judgment ensures that justice will be given to the people who were denied it in this 
life. Part of justice is the fulfillment of the potential of the lives that were cut short. 
Like Mackintosh, Moltmann affirms that these people have a future within the 
purposes of God because God is just and promises justice through judgment. 
Resurrection, Time, and the New Age 
For twentieth century eschatology, the resurrection of Jesus Christ is the 
defming event that marks the beginning of the "new age" -- the dawning of a new era 
within history that nevertheless cannot be contained within history's parameters. The 
resurrection is the "first fruits" and guarantee of God's final victory over sin and 
death. If the death of Jesus is an eschatological event that changes humanity's 
85 Moltmann, The Coming o/God, 118. 
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standing before God, the resurrection is a revelation of the eschatological future that 
awaits humanity. Indeed, the resurrection is the event which assures Christians of 
their future in the love of God.86 While the cross is bound to the history of this world, 
the resurrection is an event that reveals the eschatological future because it ushers in a 
new era and new mode of being that is seen in Jesus but not yet experienced by 
humanity. The resurrected Jesus is no longer bound by time and space in the same 
way that the historical Jesus was. Each of our twentieth century theologians struggles 
with how to defme resurrection in ways that break away from Enlightenment notions 
of historiography because the resurrection is a unique event that does not fit neatly 
into categories of historical thought. In many ways, their task is another revolt from 
nineteenth century attempts to dismiss Jesus on historical grounds based on the 
methods of historical research of that era. In the twentieth century, explaining the 
resurrection becomes an attempt to show how the future of God's kingdom is a 
present reality through the resurrection, even though the creation continues to wait for 
its final redemption through Christ. It is important for each theologian to break the 
molds of nineteenth century historiography in order to portray how the resurrection is 
a thoroughly eschatological event. 
Mackintosh's presentation of the resurrection as an eschatological event is the 
designation of the resurrected Jesus as "the exalted Lord," and as he unpacks this 
phrase he describes how the risen Lord now exists in an exalted state above and 
beyond transience and death. Indeed, it is through and on account of the resurrection 
that Jesus is exalted to the position of Lord and Judge of the world. His Lordship over 
86 Macquarrie offers an unconvincing alternative when he states: "Suppose we omitte~ the 'j.o~ 
mysteries' that traditionally come after the cross? Would that destroy the whol~ fabnc of faIth ~ 
Christ Jesus? I do not think so, for the two great distinctive Christian affirmatIOns would remam 
untouched - God is love and God is revealed in Jesus Christ. These two affIrmations would stand even 
if there were no more mysteries beyond Calvary." John Macquarrie, Jesus Christ in Modern Thought 
(London: SCM Press, 1990),412. 
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humanity and creation is verified and concluded through the resurrection, and 
throughout The Doctrine of the Person of Jesus Christ, Mackintosh operates under the 
assumption that the exalted Jesus is the starting point for christology. Our task is to 
evaluate Mackintosh's view of to the resurrection as an historical event that transcends 
time. 
F or Mackintosh, the resurrection is the event from which Christian faith 
emerges, and it is the reality of Jesus as the exalted Lord which is the starting point 
from which all assertions about Jesus' incarnation, life, and death arise. Faith 
apprehends Jesus as the Risen One, and when one is encountered by Jesus, it is in the 
glory and exaltation that result from his resurrection. The Lord who lives and rules 
now is the object of Christian devotion and truSt.87 What makes the resurrection 
eschatological in nature is that it ushers in a new era, for Christ's own being, for the 
world, and his followers: "A new era opens with the resurrection. Certainly the risen 
Christ is the same person as formerly .... At the same time Christ is now regarded in a 
light so new and all-transmuting that the old terms of description become 
inadequate.,,88 It is the same-yet-new person who is viewed now in an eschatological 
light, and his resurrection signals the opening of a new era. But is it historical or 
atemporal? Is the resurrection an event in history like all others, or is it something 
beyond or outside the historical? Mackintosh believes that the resurrection grants to 
Christ a transcendence that was not his prior to the resurrection. 
The point that Mackintosh is trying to make is that the resurrection allows for 
a union that present believers have with Christ that is not bound to time. Union with 
Christ trumps all historical attempts to disprove the resurrection from a strictly 
87 Mackintosh, Person of Jesus Christ, 363. 
88 Mackintosh, Person of Jesus Christ, 364. 
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historical point of view. The Christian's union with the exalted Lord is Mackintosh's 
answer to all who would rely on historical criticism of biblical texts to doubt the 
authenticity of the resurrection accounts. Redemption in the life of believers occurs 
only because Jesus is alive and reveals himself to men and women throughout 
history.89 Mackintosh argues that union with Christ is proof enough for the historicity 
of the resurrection, but this question remains to ask of him: Is union with Christ alone 
verification enough that the resurrection is an eschatological event? Or, to ask the 
question another way of Mackintosh: Is the resurrection of Christ eschatological only 
in the lives of those who believe in him? One gains a sense from Mackintosh that 
"insiders" alone are the ones to whom the resurrection is real. This question must be 
asked of Mackintosh because he defines the eschatological nature of the resurrection 
along the lines of the benefits accrued to Jesus' followers on account of this event. 
The weakness in Mackintosh's thought in this area is that he does not develop 
his theology of the resurrection to suggest how the new era ushered in by resurrection 
is a new era of faith and power beyond the lives of believers. He makes claims for the 
new eschatological age of without paying much attention given to redemption for the 
creation through resurrection -- a theme that becomes prominent later. The closest 
he comes to addressing the consequences for creation through resurrection is to say 
"we first recognize Christ as Lord within the range of individual person life, and 
expand this initial assurance later to universal and absolute dimensions ..... In view of 
the indivisible unity of the cosmos, it is futile to represent the sway of Christ as 
89 "The power of His resurrection reveals itself as a present and universal activity, a reality on wh~ch 
men lean, and to whom they appeal in prayer. He gives a Divine life within the soul, and He sustams 
it. Union with him, not assent to a doctrine, is redemption. This is the distinctively Christian attitude 
to Christ, as it appears in the New Testament; and unless the records are of no val~e, it represents an 
estimate and a mode of behavior evoked in believers by the appearances of the nsen Lord and the 
subsequent manifestation of the Spirit." Mackintosh, Person of Jesus Christ, 364. 
222 
embracing the Church but not the total universe. ,,90 It is unfortunate, however, that 
Mackintosh never expounds upon this theme, and one is left to wonder about what the 
resurrection means beyond the life of the individual and the church. Despite his one 
assertion for the totality of the resurrected Jesus' dominion over "the cosmos" , 
Mackintosh focuses his thoughts on the resurrection only as it has significance in the 
lives of the faithful. 
To define the resurrection as a transcendent, eschatological event, Mackintosh 
knows that he must connect Jesus' new life with the new, eternal life that believers 
will have after death. But Mackintosh has difficulty in stating how Christ's 
resurrection is related to the human person's resurrection and eternal life. Mackintosh 
deliberately reserves the term resurrection for Jesus' new life as a result of Easter, 
while he chooses the term immortality to serve as the descriptive term for a person's 
never-ending life in the presence of GOd.91 Mackintosh is reluctant to let go of a 
strictly materialistic view of the human body in relation to the soul. In a positive 
sense, Christ' resurrection and human immortality are closely linked because they 
both point to the God who is ultimately stronger than death. Death could not hold 
Jesus because Jesus is who God is, and behind the triumph of Easter stands the 
character of God, which is known by divine love. The same reality holds true for 
Christians because God's love is stronger than death for those who are united with 
God through Christ. In a negative sense, however, Mackintosh cannot affirm the 
resurrection of the body of a believer in the same way that he affirms the resurrection 
of Jesus' body. 
90 Mackintosh, Immortality and the Future, 370. . ' . 
91 A similar approach is made by P. T. Forsyth, who focuses on the creation of an munorta1 relatIonship 
between God and humanity through Christ's resurrection. See his This Life and the Next: The Effect on 
this Life of Faith in Another (London: Macmillan and Co., 1918), 68-69. 
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He prefers to speak of the resurrection of Jesus as a "test case" or as "proof' of 
the possibility of life after death. It does not prove eternal life as such, but it does 
display God's promise of life for God's beloved. Mackintosh regards Jesus' 
resurrection as illumination on how human immortality is a gift from God, and it is 
the resurrection of Christ that Christians offer as the basis of their belief: "The 
experience of Jesus was a test case, and like every test case, it fixed a principle. It did 
not create that principle; yet it decided what it should mean for the world. ,,92 The 
resurrection is, in other words, an event that confirms the principle that God's love and 
power that are stronger than death. It is in this principle that Christians stake their 
hope for eternal life. If Jesus had not been resurrected, then any faith in eternal life 
through him would be difficult to maintain. 
Jesus' resurrection signaled the resumption of the relationship between Jesus 
and God, and this helps Mackintosh define the importance of etemallife in terms of a 
relationship with God. Eternal life is fundamentally not about merely surviving after 
death. Eternal life is the condition of living forever in close fellowship with God.93 
Mackintosh draws on Pauline themes of resurrection and immortality to state that the 
real thrust of Christian theology regarding immortality is that there is life after 
physical death for the redeemed personality in union with God. The body 
disintegrates, but the human personality, which constitutes life, both life in this world 
and life in the next, is continuously maintained between these two realms of life. 
Mackintosh writes: 
The whole man -- soul and body in living oneness -- connotes and 
embraces the effective human energies developed in and by his past 
life, controlled and unified by the self; and these energies, faith holds, 
92 Mackintosh, Immortality and the Future, 178. 
93 Mackintosh, Immortality and the Future, 172; See also John Baillie, And the Life Everlasting (New 
York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1933), 250ff. 
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will after death retrieve and reassert themselves in forms not now 
imaginable. To use St. Paul's figure, out of the seed will spring a new 
ear ?f com. T.he total e~ficacy of a life, considered as a force acting on 
envlforu:nent,. IS ~eanlng apart from organism; and this efficacy will 
not pensh; It WIll resume elsewhere its tribute to the life of the 
Kingdom. 94 
For Mackintosh, what matters most is the efficacy of a life, the personality which 
impacts its environment by acting and deciding, and this energetic efficacy of 
personality lives on with God after the body dies.95 
This line of reasoning points out a problematic area for Mackintosh because, 
as we have said, he believes in the unity of personality as a product of body and spirit. 
He cannot escape the conviction that "an outer mode of being," i.e. the body, is 
necessary for fellowship and the spiritual life, and he admits not being able to conjure 
up any notion of life without some form of body. Mackintosh refers to the part of 
human being that experiences eternal life as "the principle of individuality" and "the 
serviceable medium of spiritual commerce, in the absence of which souls 'unclothed 
upon' would share no life but their own." 96 Yet at the same time he denies the 
resurrection of the body. The fact that human bodies decompose is proof enough that 
the resurrection of the body cannot be believed in a literal sense. The tension in 
Mackintosh's thought arises from needing to maintain the possibility of fellowship 
between personalities, a prospect which requires spirit and body combined, and the 
stark experience that the physical body cannot be part of this union. 
Mackintosh falls back on an argument that the empirical sciences cannot prove 
that eternal life is impossible or that human beings will not have some kind of 
existence in bodily form. Human sciences and psychologies are only entitled to say 
94 Mackintosh, Immortality and the Future, 165. 
95 David Wiggins delineates the differences in identifying a person as "personality" and "body" in 
Identity and Spatio-Temporal Continuity (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967),35-36. 
96 Mackintosh, Immortality and the Future, 166. 
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that such a life is unimaginable to the limited human mind.97 Theology's claim is that 
in the future life, personalities exist in a manner that is beyond the present human 
powers of conception, and this existence will be in some kind of bodily form. 
"Personality needs organs or conditions through which it is expressed," writes 
Mackintosh, "but from this it is a long step, and one which no law of thought bids us 
take, to say that no conditions but those now existing will serve ... We commit no 
breach of logic, indeed, by holding that a higher type of organism may be in store for 
us, one more delicate and noble, better able to minister to or reveal the soul. ,,98 In this 
manner, Mackintosh can maintain the idea of personal contact and fellowship, 
because the individual, human personality will remain after death, yet he can also 
move beyond the notion of resurrection of the physical body.99 His emphasis remains 
on the importance of individual personality in God's presence, and what form the 
body/soul unity will take is an open question that will be answered only in etemallife. 
Brunner's thought regarding the resurrection goes farther than Mackintosh's to 
recast Jesus' resurrection as the dawning of a new era for humanity and the world. 
The resurrection of Jesus is the event that marks a decisive break between one age and 
another, and for Brunner the new era is the age of the glorified, exalted Lord. In a 
preliminary way, Brunner anticipates Moltmann by claiming that the resurrection is 
an eschatological event that emerges from beyond time and issues in a new eon, and 
for both theologians, the resurrection of Christ is closely connected to concept of the 
general resurrection of all the dead. 
97 This sweeping claim would not necessarily hold true today, as many discussions between science and 
theology demonstrate. See Nancey Murphy, The Resurrection Body and Personal Identity, in 
Resurrection: Theological and Scientific Assessments, 202-218. 
98 Mackintosh, Immortality and the Future, 170. . 
99 Forsyth echoes Mackintosh here in struggling to defme the essence or nature of the r~s~ect~on 
body: "We take with us the character we have made. All discussion of what body we come m IS besIde 
the point; and we have no data. What happens to this physical body is indiffere~t to. faith, and it is le~ 
to reverence .... The idea of Resurrection is the integrating factor between this life and the next. 
Forsyth, This Life and the Next, 78. 
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Brunner sees that the Christian significance of the resurrection finds its roots 
in the eschatological expectations of the Old Testament, and Brunner is careful to 
point out the linkage between Old Testament eschatology and resurrection hope. 
Brunner reaches behind the New Testament to show how the resurrection fulfills 
Israel's messianic hopes for the reign of God. The history of Israel is the history of 
God's coming to the people collectively in order to save and make righteous. The 
coming of God is not meant to bring salvation to individuals alone: God comes into 
history through a people in order to bring redemption to all. IOO The significance of 
this for a Christian appreciation of resurrection is the communal salvation it brings for 
all. Private redemption is unheard of in the eschatological hopes of the Old 
Testament, and Brunner applies this same perception to the meaning of Jesus' 
resurrection. Eschatological hope established by the resurrection is a collective hope 
shared by the community of the faithful, of which individual hope is only a part of the 
whole. 
For Brunner the resurrection is atemporal, and therefore it cannot be described 
in the normal terms that portray historical events. It does not fit neatly into the 
categories of human experience by which we empirically observe and analogically 
describe events. 1OI There is nothing to which we may compare the resurrection, and 
because it is something completely unique it breaks the categories of history and also 
the post-Enlightenment methods of historical inquiry and description. This is an 
important point because it serves as the foundation by which historical criticism is 
thwarted as a means of "disproving" the resurrection. If the resurrection of Christ is 
impossible to prove, it is because it is an event that comes to history from the 
100 Brunner, The Mediator, 565. 
101 Ladd offers a similar rationale in his statement that "although it was an event in history, Jesus' 
resurrection had no antecedent historical cause - a sequence which the historian assumes." George E. 
Ladd, I Believe in the Resurrection of Jesus (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1975),21. 
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eschatological future and defies the categorization of history. The resurrection 
narratives attempt to describe in limited language how Easter morning is the first day 
of the new age of Christ's transcendent Lordship: 
F or our part we would prefer to interpret the manifold discrepancy of 
the Easter reports as an indication that the fact to which they bear 
witness is in the strict sense of the word eschatological; that is, the 
beginning of the advent of the eternal consummation, of the life of the 
world to come, which cannot be grasped in the categories proper to this 
space-time world. The resurrection of Jesus is as an event the utterly 
incomprehensible and transcendent, the beginning of the Parousia, of 
which the -- one might say -- obvious characteristic is its 
incomprehensibility, its non-co-ordinability, the utter impossibility of 
expressing it in the terms of our thought and ideas. . .. In any event, the 
common feature of all these resurrection reports is that He who died on 
the Cross has revealed Himself to his believers as the Living Lord. 
Therefore with Easter day the new aeon has dawned. 102 
The resurrection remains so elusive to our framework of understanding because it 
represents the in-breaking of the eternity of God into our realm of space and time, and 
we have no categories of description beyond our usual experiences that can accurately 
described what has happened in the resurrection. This is the rationale by which 
Brunner, like Moltmann later, will sidestep historical criticism and its attempts to 
disprove the resurrection on historical grounds. To those who cast doubt on the 
historicity of resurrection, Brunner replies that they are correct: the resurrection 
cannot be "proven" or analyzed like other events in history because it is non-
historical. 
Brunner appeals to the same line of thought manifested by Mackintosh when 
he claims that belief in the resurrection is not to be gained from examining the 
narratives of scripture that describe the empty tomb or even the post-resurrection 
appearances to the eye witness apostles. It is the Living Lord who currently manifests 
102 Brunner, Eternal Hope, 144-145. 
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his presence through the Spirit to people today. The biblical texts alone can never 
convey knowledge or trust in the resurrection. It is only as Jesus reveals himself to 
people that they come to believe in the event written about in Scripture. 1 03 In this 
way, Brunner categorizes the resurrection along the lines of revelation, meaning that 
the revelation of the risen Lord to the apostles is the same as his revelation to people 
today. This is the way that the resurrection must be apprehended -- as a revelation 
that proves itself through the self-testimony of Christ through the Spirit. 104 
Otherwise, according to both Mackintosh and Brunner, there will always be 
skepticism about the truth of the event. For both of them, the truth of the event lies 
not in the past but in the present experience and relationship of the believer with 
Christ. 
In his appeal to present expenence as confirmation of the resurrection, 
Brunner notes that the life of believers in the church is an example of the 
eschatological power of Christ's resurrection. Christians have a share in Christ's 
resurrection because it is the empowering event which makes the Church's existence 
eschatological in itself: 
The existence of the Ekklesia, life in the Holy Spirit and His gifts --
these are signs and results of the world of Resurrection which is 
already invading the present. That which is future and eternal has 
become present. The existence of the Christ-community is 'messianic' 
or 'eschatological' existence, life in the presence of God in the midst of 
the stream of time, God's kingdom in the midst of the world of sin and 
death. 105 
103 "It is not the historical credibility of the Resurrection narratives which bears witness to Christ, but 
the self-testimony of Christ conveys to the believer all the historical credibility of these .narratives. 
Hence to all those who read these narratives only with the interest of students of secular hIstOry they 
will always remain incredible, whereas faith will be undisturbed by all historical criticism." Brunner, 
The Mediator, 575. 
104 Brunner, Dogmatics, v. 2,370-371. 
105 Brunner, Dogmatics, v. 3,411. 
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What this means for Brunner's theology is difficult to gauge because he implies that 
humanity lives not between the times as concurrent in two times: in the time death 
and in etemallife, in temporality and in eternity, in sin and in redemption. Brunner 
denies this however, claiming that Christians live wholly in a new era, although only 
in its beginning stages.
106 
Yet his statements regarding sin and evil dictate that this 
cannot be the case. He confusingly speaks both of the reality of the new eon as well 
as our expectation of it, both in the present tense. Resurrection life belongs to the 
Christian only in hidden form and not fully manifested, which signals an internal 
doubt in Brunner regarding the compete reality of the new age. 107 
Brunner approaches the concept of the resurrection of the dead in a way that 
Moltmann will develop further, yet for both there is a close link between Jesus' 
eschatological resurrection and the eschatological resurrection of all. The resurrection 
of Christ is the beginning of a new era which will reach consummation when the dead 
are raised to new life.108 Unlike Moltmann, who speaks in terms of all the dead, 
Brunner usually applies the concept of resurrection only to those who believe in and 
follow Christ. 109 Exactly how the dead in Christ are to be resurrected pales in 
comparison with the firm belief that it shall happen. When it happens, the 
resurrection of the dead will signal the final transformation of Christ's followers into 
106 This means Christians recognize that they live within both the old and the new age. See Martin 
Debelius, Paul, ed. W. G. Kiimmel, trans. F. Clarke (philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1953), 62. For 
Bultmann, the church fmds itself in the awkward position of belonging to the new age while 
manifesting itself in the present age. Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament, 1 :308. 
107 Brunner fails to develop the ways in which God's creative act in resurrection goes beyond this 
present creation and how the new creation replaces this present creation at the specific point of the 
resurrection. See Schwartz, Eschatology, 285. 
108 In this way Brunner sees that the resurrection of Christ cannot be separated from the apocalyptic 
view of history with its anticipation of the resurrection of the dead at the end. See also Wolfhart 
Pannenberg, Revelation as History, trans. D. Granskou (New York: Macmillan, 1968), 146. . 
109 Joseph E. Kokjohn, "A Hell of a Question," Commonweal 93 (January 1971), 370. .KokJohn 
proposes that the resurrection is not a valid hope for those not united to Christ. Their future IS slIDply 
"is simply one of non-existence, not only the isolation from other people and God, but the utter 
alienation from all other fonns of life." 
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his image and into the glory of God. The key concept guiding the resurrection of the 
dead is the love of God that transforms Christians from a "being unto death" into a 
"being unto life." The resurrection of the dead is the consummate sign of God's love 
for his creatures, and this love reaches a pinnacle in the sharing of God's glory in 
resurrection life. 
Following Mackintosh Brunner bases all hope for the individual in eternal life 
on the Christological foundation of Jesus' resurrection, and he believes that Jesus' 
resurrection is the absolutely unique, historical event which provides the foundation 
for all personal eschatology. The Christian's resurrection to eternal life is relative to 
Jesus' resurrection, from which all hope emerges.110 Brunner makes this connection 
by linking the Easter event with God's inauguration of a new and utterly 
immeasurable mode of being-human being unto eternal life. Jesus' resurrection was 
the event through which God initiated the operation of new life within creation, and 
this life is eternal life -- unending life in the presence of the eternal God. The 
introduction of this form of life within the world marked the beginning of creation's 
III b d' h . consummation and fulfillment. On Easter day the new age was om, an WIt It 
came the reality of resurrection life for believers in Christ. 
All that the Christian can hope for regarding resurrection is grounded firmly in 
the example given by God through Christ, and any other route to a doctrine of eternal 
life is not plausible. It is Jesus' resurrection to bodily existence which provides the 
model for human resurrection. Brunner writes: 
Jesus is not awakened again to physical life according to the 
Resurrection narratives, but to a spiritual corporeality which on the one 
hand manifests itself in spatial limits, on the other, overcomes the 
110 Brunner, Dogmatics, v. 2, 366. 
111 Brunner, The Mediator, 579. 
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limitations of space. This encounter with Jesus, who is both 
recognizable as the same and is free from the conditions of material 
corporeality, lies at the basis of [Paul's] idea of the soma pneumaticon. 
This idea also expresses the wholeness of the person as an 
individuality created by God and named by him. I, this particular 
individual, am called of God; I, this specific non interchangeable man 
am to rise again.II2 ' 
Jesus' existence is marked by a clear distinction between his pre-crucifixion life and 
his post-resurrection life, and this distinction is the key for understanding human 
resurrection. Brunner's relies on the Pauline concept of the pneumatic body described 
in 1
st 
Corinthians 15 to illumine his interpretation of the gospel accounts of Jesus' 
resurrection. Brunner concedes that a "pneumatic body" is paradoxical in a literal 
sense, as well as being highly mysterious, but this mode of being characterizes the 
gospel accounts of Jesus' post-resurrection life. 
Brunner relies so heavily on the notion of a spiritual body because it allows 
him to maintain the sense of personhood that he believes characterizes the human-
divine relationship. Following Mackintosh's thought, Brunner insists that corporeality 
is necessary for personality and communal relationships, yet Brunner moves beyond 
Mackintosh in explaining the importance of some bodily form for eternal life. 
Because a person is always a unity of body and soul, in resurrection life one holds on 
to the personal features which make him or her unique. A person remains a 
responsible, decision-making being even through death. By insisting on the 
resurrection of a person in a spiritual body, Brunner precludes any dichotomous 
division of the self regarding eternal life. Just as Brunner will not allow a division of 
the self regarding personality, sin, or death, neither does he allow the self to be 
112 Brunner, Eternal Hope, 149. 
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dissected in resurrection. The whole person sins and dies in relation to God, but so 
also will the whole person live before God in resurrection. 
Brunner appeals to pragmatic logic in regard to the physical properties of the 
human body, and although all people shall indeed rise in their own, interchangeable 
personality, the physical body shall not arise. We see Brunner struggling here as 
Mackintosh did with the difficulties of what type of bodily form human life will take 
after death. At this point, Brunner runs into difficulty regarding his doctrine of 
resurrection because he leaves several paradoxes unresolved. First, regarding the 
pneumatic body, anything bodily necessarily implies material existence, and anything 
spiritual implies non-material existence. Yet for Brunner the pneumatic body is the 
means by which our individual creatureliness shall be maintained in the eternal 
presence of God. What is the difference between Brunner's concept of a pneumatic 
body and a broad definition of the soul? If the pneumatic body is a spiritual 
existence, then it becomes only remotely connected to one's bodily, physical 
existence. Second, Brunner's logic presents great problems in regard to Jesus' 
resurrection. If human resurrection is patterned on his, and if the human body rises in 
spiritual form while the physical decomposes, what does this mean for Jesus' bodily 
resurrection? The gospel narratives are clear that the physical body of Jesus was 
raised to new life albeit a different kind of life from before his crucifixion. The , 
resurrection narratives imply that Jesus' resurrection life is a combination of both 
physical and spiritual existence. According to Brunner's thought, one of two things 
must be true. Either Jesus' was raised in a spiritual body, and his physical body 
remained in the tomb to decompose, thereby annulling the gospel accounts, or human 
resurrection is not the same as Jesus' bodily resurrection. 
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One of Moltmann's greatest contribution to twentieth century eschatology is 
clearly his emphasis on the resurrection as the single, transforming event in world 
history. Indeed, from Theology of Hope forward, the resurrection of Christ signifies 
the hermeneutical lens through which Moltmann would initiate the paradigm shift in 
theology toward a future-oriented eschatology. All of the century's redoubled efforts 
in the field of eschatology find their culmination in Moltmann's interpretation of the 
resurrection as the beginning of God's triumph over evil, injustice, death, and sin. The 
resurrection of Christ is closely tied to the concept of the promise of God, and it is 
through the resurrection that Moltmann ascertains the fulfillment of God's promises to 
Israel, the church, and to all creation. 
In addition to drawing on Old Testament eschatological hopes as a precursor 
to resurrection, Moltmann approaches the concept of resurrection by plunging into the 
depths of the modem experience, as propounded by Hegel and Nietzsche, that "God is 
dead." The problems of the historicity of the resurrection manifest themselves in the 
despair of modem life. All questions and doubts related to the modem philosophic 
and scientific denials of the resurrection have at their heart the profound experience 
that the resurrection cannot be ascertained as a reality based on history. The history to 
which humanity is subjected is one of suffering, death, and nihilism, and out of this 
history no proof of the resurrection can be garnered by human experience.
Il3 
F or Hegel, the god-forsakenness of history is represented in the expansion of 
Good Friday from merely the death of Jesus to the speculative Good Friday that 
represents all of humanity's forsakenness. Good Friday is representative of all 
113 Moltmann, Theology of Hope, 170. The inability to prove the resurre~tion through previ?us 
experience is one factor that led to Schweitzer's proposal of the resurrectIOn. as ~ psychologIcal 
phenomenon that occurred within the disciples. Schweitzer, The Quest for the Hlstorzcal Jesus, 284-
285. 
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humanity's existence in death and nothingness, and Christ's god-forsaken death is 
symbolic of humanity's atheism in the absence of God. Coupled with this Hegelian 
approach, Nietzsche revels in the antagonistic claims of God's death through which 
humanity finally exalts itself above the superstition of theism that holds humanity 
back from realizing its true potential. Humanity comes to itself in the realization that 
God is dead, and God's death is humanity's ultimate triumph. The result of both 
nihilistic approaches, for Moltmann, is humanity's descent into nothingness, and for 
this reason he seeks to redress modem nihilism through a new interpretation of the 
resurrection of Jesus. 
The main question for modem history is whether or not the resurrection is 
possible according to the norms of history and human experience as understood in 
post-Enlightenment categories. The resurrection is a problem for modem conceptions 
of history that are based on experience, probability, and laws of nature.114 
Moltmann's main point is that the resurrection of Jesus is the beginning of a new 
history, a history that is not based on previous experiences of history as known 
through human inquiry and past experiences.115 Jesus' resurrection opens up a new 
horizon and a new age that contradicts the former age of death. 116 
The resurrection makes its own new form of history because it breaks 
decisively and forever with the old history of the world and its sin and death. To 
make this point clear, Moltmann relies on the dialectical connection between the cross 
and the resurrection as two parts of the one Christ event that both link and separate the 
114 Moltmann, Way of Jesus Christ, 229. 
115 Moltmann, Theology of Hope, 175. . . 
116 "The resurrection of Christ does not mean a possibility within the world and Its history, but a new 
possibility altogether for the world, for existence and for history .. " In view of what is meant and what 
is promised when we speak of the raising of Christ, it is therefore necessary to expos~ .the profo~d 
irrationality of the rational cosmos of the modem, technico-scientific wor~d. By the ralsmg ~f Christ, 
we do not mean a possible process in world history, but the eschatologIcal process to which world 
history is subjected." Moltmann, Theology of Hope, 179-180. 
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old history of the world from the new.
II7 
The resurrection is a radical antithesis to the 
cross, even though they are united in the person of Christ. The crucifIxion is defined 
by the categories of death and sin that mark existence in the world, but the 
resurrection is an apocalyptic event that does not belong to history. It belongs to the 
new history of God's redemption: 
The cross and the resurrection stand in the same relation to one another 
as death and eternal life. Since death makes every life historical, death 
has to be seen as the power of history. Since resurrection brings the 
dead into eternal life and means the annihilation of death, it breaks the 
power of history and is itself the end of history. If we keep the two 
together, then the cross of Christ comes to stand at the apocalyptic end 
of world history, and the raising of the dead at the beginning of a new 
creation of the world. 1 18 
What Moltmann begins in Theology of Hope is expanded and strengthened in The 
Way of Jesus Christ as he describes the resurrection as the eschatological event 
through which God brings the fulfIllment of his promises, thus creating an 
eschatological history that breaks the pattern of world history.119 
The key concept guiding God's creation of this new, eschatological history is 
the righteousness of God that signals the fulfillment of his promises. Christ's sinless 
life and humiliating death are vindicated by the righteousness of God that seeks to 
bring the same righteousness to creation. The resurrection verifies God's promises of 
justice and righteousness for all people in that Christ's resurrection is the fIrst fruits of 
the resurrection of all the dead to meet God's righteousness. The righteousness of 
God creates a new world which, although not yet fully visible, is yet in the process of 
renewing creation. Here we see that Moltmann again relies on the concept of promise 
117 Moltmann connects the two events without going as far as Bultmann who claims that "the cross and 
resurrection form a single, indivisible cosmic event." Bultmann, ''New Testament and Mythology," in 
Kerygma and Myth, 39. 
118 Moltmann, Way of Jesus Christ, 214. . 
119 The same insight into the proleptic nature of the resurrection provided by Pannenburg m Jesus --
God and Man, trans. L. L. Wilkins and D. A. Priebe (philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1968),66-67. 
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as the key to interpreting what resurrection means for history. The resurrection is 
significant for the future that it opens up for creation. l2O The resurrection creates a 
new history that is subject to the eschatological promise of GOd. 121 Christ was raised 
ahead of all the dead as a sign of God's righteous victory on behalf of creation over 
d hI h· . I· 122 J' . eat y, Istonca eXIstence. esus resurrectIon becomes the lens through which 
we look to see the redemption of God. The resurrection, however, forces us to look 
forward into the end of history to see the fullness of this redemption because the 
future receives its direction from the event of resurrection. 123 
A crucial point for Moltmann, however -- and this brings us back to the 
category of promise -- is that belief in Christ's resurrection is contingent upon the 
resurrection of all the dead. Jesus' resurrection is not an historical fact but an 
eschatological promise because it is tied to the hope of the resurrection of all human 
beings:24 The resurrection of Jesus finds its most descriptive language in the 
category of hope while the world is still marked by violence and death. The 
resurrection of Christ is a hoped-for fact that is dependent upon the eschatological 
resurrection of all the dead and the creation of a new world. 
For Moltmann, the resurrection of the dead is the object of Christian hope for 
the individual's future. It asserts that all hope is possible, not on account of inherent 
human possibilities, but only on account of the God who can call into being things 
that are not and who can raise the dead, like the crucified Christ, to new life. 
120 This point is made clearly by Kfumeth as well. Walter Kfumeth, The Theology of the Resurrection, 
trans. James W. Leitch (London: SCM Press, 1965), 164-166. 
121 Richard Bauckham, Moltmann: Messianic Theology, 33. 
122 Moltmann, Theology o/Hope, 163. . . 
123 See Hans Conzelmann, The Theology 0/ Saint Luke, trans. G. Buswell (phIladelphIa: Fortress, 
1982),16-17. . . . . 
124 Like Pannenberg, Moltmann cannot envision the resurrection of Christ outSIde of ItS. p~oleptIc 
anticipation for the resurrection of all. See Pannenberg, Jesus - God and Man, trans. L. L. WIlkms and 
D. A. Priebe (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1968),81-82. 
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Christians look forward with longing to resurrection life because they await God's 
fmal victory over the powers of death and sin. The object of eschatological hope for 
an individual life is the resurrection of the whole person -- body and soul, physical 
and immaterial -- from death. The resurrection of the dead, however, has far-
reaching consequences beyond a life after death, and the signs of eternal life manifest 
themselves in the temporal here and now. What we fmd in Moltmann is a more 
decisive contribution to understanding of the resurrection of the body 
Moltmann sees that the foundation of hope for resurrection m the Old 
Testament lies in Israel's understanding of the attributes of God, while the New 
Testament relies on the resurrection of Jesus as the defining event that gives 
resurrection its meaning. Moltmann reaches far back into scripture in order to 
understand how the New Testament expectations of resurrection are founded on the 
Old Testament's understanding of the nature of God. Israel's faith is grounded in the 
God who calls things into being out of nothing. Israel trusted God as the deliverer 
from death, and there are examples in Hebrew scriptures of those, like the Psalmist, 
who cry out to God to rescue them from death. While the Old Testament does not 
possess a doctrine of resurrection, of life after death, it does express hope for new life 
and for deliverance from deathly powers in the present. God alone is the one who has 
the power to bring people and the Israelite nation to new life. Later Israelite 
eschatology serves as a bridge to the New Testament because it presents a hope for 
new life that reaches beyond death, as well as the conquest and end of death itself. 
Built on the foundation of the Old Testament, Christian faith is shaped by the 
experience of the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ and by the resurrected 
Christ's appearances. All Christian statements concerning the resurrection of 
individuals must emerge from christological reflections on the resurrection of Jesus. 
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Although it occurred within the scope of history, Christ's resurrection was not an 
historical event. It was, rather, an eschatological occurrence that happened to the 
crucified Christ. 
From this, Moltmann ascertains that resurrection is not a return to this or any 
mortal life, but it is an entry into a life that is eternal. The eschatological event of 
Christ's resurrection has vicarious significance for all of humanity: "If Christ has been 
raised from the dead, then he takes on a proleptic and representative significance for 
all the dead.,,125 The New Testament views the resurrected Christ as the first-born of 
the dead, and the process of the resurrection of the dead has begun with Jesus' 
resurrection, a process that will be completed with in the raising of those who are his 
and, indeed, of all the dead. Since questions of the resurrection of the dead are 
answered christologically, Moltmann states that resurrection must be anticipated as an 
event which involves the whole person, giving life to mortal bodies as well as spirit. 
Moltmann affirms the biblical promise of the resurrection of the dead as a 
contrary notion to the concept of an immortal soul, mainly because the resurrection of 
the body is based not on human capabilities, as an immortal soul would suggest, but 
on the power and promise of God alone. Belief in the resurrection of the dead 
signifies a trust in God who creates out of nothing and who can make the dead live 
again as part of the overall defeat of death in the Kingdom of God. Eternal life is 
nothing less than life lived in the love and glory of God, and affIrmation of the 
resurrection is a parallel affirmation of the love of God toward his creatures. Jesus' 
resurrection is the beginning of the resurrection of all, and Christ's resurrection is the 
beginning of process which will be completed when all are raised. 
125 Moltmann, The Coming a/God, 69. 
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The raising of the dead presupposes the death of the human person, but death 
does not automatically mean the end of the dead person's identity. God is able to 
identify each of the dead in order to raise them, and because there is a direct 
continuity in the identity of the dead, resurrection must be viewed as a transformation 
and not an entirely new creation. The events which comprise one's life remain 
eternally in the memory and perception of God. Although it sounds contradictory, it 
is a new creation of the same personality for the eternal life that is shared with God. 
God maintains one's personal identity through resurrection in order to transform that 
person with perfection. 
If death signifies the total destruction and disintegration of a person, including 
relationships, then resurrection means the power to unify all aspects of a personality 
in a redeemed life. Moltmann displays a special sensitivity not seen in Mackintosh 
and Brunner when he states that the resurrection of the body means the rectification of 
the mistakes one has made over the course of a lifetime. Through resurrection a 
person is redeemed in all aspects of life, spiritually and materially, and one's 
relationships are redeemed in the inclusion of the person into a community of eternal 
love. 
Whereas Mackintosh and Brunner concentrate mainly on the Christo logical 
aspects of resurrection and eternal life, Moltmann adds a pneumatological dimension 
that strengthens the connection between temporal life and eternal life, and the Holy 
Spirit is the vital link between God and human beings in life and beyond death. 
Moltmann describes the Holy Spirit's role in resurrection and transformation because 
it is the Spirit of God who brings the whole person into relationship with God and 
who brings God into the entire fabric of that person's life. The Spirit becomes the link 
between the already-raised Jesus and the yet-to-be-raised dead. The Spirit of God is 
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related to the whole of human existence, body and soul together, and so it is that the 
whole person is to be raised in the Spirit through resurrection. 
In humans, the Spirit of life shapes the mutual interdependence between body 
and soul, and through the Holy Spirit, God is in relation with a person's whole life. 
The whole is an integrated organism constituted of the unquantifiable sum of the 
parts. The Holy Spirit is related to the totality of a person's whole being. As a united 
entity, a human being is more than the sum of his organs; organs are more than the 
sum of their cells; cells more than the sum of their molecules, etc. Moltmann 
describes a person's totality of existence as his or her Gestalt. The sum of a person, 
the Gestalt, disintegrates at the moment of death, but the whole outcome of a person's 
life nevertheless remains always in God's view, and the individual Gestalt is 
remembered by God. One's Gestalt remains in God's vision, and the whole remains 
within God's memory even if the constituent parts dissolve: "Through the 
disintegration of the parts -- which we call dying, death and corruption -- the person's 
lived Gestalt -- will be transformed into the other form of living which we call 'eternal 
life'... Relationship before God is always whole relationship. ,,126 God deals with 
human beings in their total personal identity, and just as there can be no bodiless soul, 
neither can there be a soul-less body. It is with the whole human personality that God 
forms the immortal relationship, and it is the whole person who will be raised to 
newly-created life through resurrection. Like the risen Christ who was recognizable 
by the marks of the nails in his hands, human beings, after resurrection, will still be 
recognizable from the configuration of all events and circumstances of their life. 
Jesus' crucified body was transfigured in the glory of God through his resurrection 
126 Moltmann, The Coming of God, 76. 
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from the dead, and so also will the Gestalt of people's lives be returned, transfigured, 
and redeemed through resurrection into God's kingdom 
Developing the thought of Brunner further, Moltmann describes how the 
raising of the dead is the personal side of the cosmic event which is the annihilation of 
death. The two sides belong together because there is no resurrection of the dead to 
new life without the new earth in which death will be no more. 127 Moltmann's theory 
of resurrection is the most advanced because he paints on a broad canvass when he 
portrays the resurrection of the flesh as all flesh beyond human bodies, including 
animals and all living things within creation.128 A theology of resurrection which 
limits itself only to individuals misses the wider New Testament emphasis on the 
more universal impact of Christ's resurrection. Moltmann writes: 
Eternal life consequently embraces this person, and this person wholly, 
body and soul; and, beyond this person, it applies to all the living, so 
that in that future world the creation that 'groans' under transience 
(Rom. 8:19-21) will also be delivered, because there will be no more 
death. Hope for the resurrection of the dead is therefore only the 
beginning of a hope for a cosmic new creation of all things and all 
conditions. It is not exhausted by personal eschatology. On the 
contrary, every personal eschatology that begins with this hope is 
constrained to press forward in ever-widening circles to cosmic 
eschatology. 129 
The resurrection of the individual is only one aspect of the wider significance of 
creation's resurrection. One person's resurrection is indicative of a larger process of 
cosmic redemption which is initiated by the resurrection of Jesus. 
In the perfection and consummation of creation, however, death will be no 
more through the transformation of creation, and it is with this concept in mind, rather 
than annihilation that Moltmann discusses the end of death. The annihilation of , 
127 Moltmann, The Coming of God, 69. 
128 A similar argument for the resurrection of creation is presented ~ W. P~enberg, The Apostles 
Creed in Light of To day's Questions, Margaret Kohl, trans. (philadelphia: Westmmster Press, 1972). 
129 Moltmann, The Coming of God, 70. 
242 . 
death relies completely on a negation of the negative, yet unlike creation's final 
redemption from death, nothing positive can emerge from simply the negation of the 
negative. In contrast to Brunner, who describes the ways in which death will die and 
"not-being" will no longer be, Moltmann makes the critical distinction between the 
annihilation of death and the transformation of death. 
Transformation comes out of resurrection, and it is with the resurrection of the 
dead that eternal life, which is not subject to transience, is bestowed upon created 
beings. In resurrection life, people will live within the eternal presence of God, and in 
the presence of such eternal life, death loses all its power. Through resurrection one 
form of life gives way to another, eternal form: "The raising of the dead is conceived 
as a great metamorphosis of life: God who makes all things new is going to make out 
of life in its humble, frail, and mortal form a transfigured, glorious Gestalt which will 
completely and utterly match his intention. The negation of life, and the negative 
which thrusts from death into life, will be transformed into something wholly 
positive." 130 Moltmann's focus on transformation of even the negative aspects of life 
allows him to affirm the eschatological belief that in the end all things will have 
worked together for good (Romans 8.28), even things which have been tragic and 
incomprehensible. 
It is at this juncture of the "already-not yet" that I fmd confusion in 
Moltmann's presentation of the resurrection as the beginning of a new age of history. 
Moltmann states that the resurrection of Jesus is an apocalyptic event that initiates the 
new history of redemption in which God is glorified in righteousness. Yet in the same 
breath he acknowledges that the world continues to exist in the old manifestation of 
sin and death. By latching on to the biblical language of the resurrection of Jesus as 
130 Moltmann, The Coming a/God, 84. 
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the "pledge" of the resurrection of all, Moltmann hopes to describe the resurrection of 
Jesus a process by which all creation is renewed. For him, the resurrection of Jesus is 
a promise of a history life in the midst of the current history of death. The problem 
within his logic is that he seems to be advocating for two simultaneous histories 
running concurrent with each other: the old history of death and the new history of 
resurrection life. On the one hand, he believes that the resurrection put an end to the 
old history, yet on the other hand he acknowledges that the old history still exists and 
awaits redemption. 
This contradiction exists in Moltmann's thinking because he is trying to refute 
positivist approaches to history that judge the veracity of events on sensory judgments 
and previous experience. For him, since the resurrection is something new in history, 
it must signal a new type of history -- the eschatological history of the fulfillment of 
God's promises. What is more convincing and more logical is to affirm the newness 
of the resurrection while not shying away from the reliability of historical inquiry. In 
this sense, the resurrection need not be dissected from Christ's life and even his death. 
The division drawn by Moltmann between the crucifixion and the resurrection, 
between the history of death and the history of life, is helpful in describing the 
difference between the two events, but as a whole, they are linked together in the 
overall, eschatological mission of Jesus. If Jesus' incarnation and whole life (and 
death and resurrection) are viewed as one event with different parts, then his 
resurrection is seen to be a continuation of the eschatological mission of the Son to 
reconcile humanity to God and God to humanity. The resurrection of Jesus is as 
eschatological his incarnation and death because together they form the manner in 
which God is fulfilling his promises to redeem humanity. One gains a sense that 
Moltmann is acquiescing to the complaints of historical criticism that deny the 
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reliability of the biblical accounts in describing the resurrection as an event that 
occurred in history because it cannot be "proven." 
The most unique contribution that Moltmann makes that distinguishes him 
from Mackintosh and Brunner is his development of the connection between the 
resurrection of Jesus and its corresponding meaning for the resurrection of creation. 
This is a crucial step in the progression of eschatology in the twentieth century 
because he highlights the heretofore neglect of theology in addressing ecological 
concerns and creation's place in the history of salvation. Moltmann insists that 
theology must move beyond mere human history to demonstrate the consequences of 
the resurrection "in the perspective of nature." Moltmann moves in the direction of a 
historical-ecological theology of rebirth for creation by drawing heavily on the 
biblical images of rebirth and the Spirit's role in effecting a renewal for creation. 
The two metaphors from scripture that Moltmann relies on are that of the 
planted seed and the birthing mother, and he uses these images to describe creation's 
transformation, or resurrection, into the new creation. Moltmann relies on the Pauline 
image of resurrection found in the concept of the grain of wheat from 1 Corinthians 
15, and what is planted does not in fact die but grows into a new entity. Likewise a 
woman in labor travails through pains in order to bring new life out of current life. 
These metaphors from nature speak not so much about a rupture between death and 
life but about a transition from one form of life to another. These images from the 
natural world are applied to the resurrection of Christ, and in doing so they speak not 
of the end of life in death, but rather of Christ's transformation from one form of life 
to another: "These images present death and life, not as a breaking off and a new 
beginning, but as a transition. Mortal bodies come alive, lowly bodies are 
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transfigured, violated bodies are glorified. Dying and coming to life are two elements 
in the transformation process of the new creation of all thingS."BI From this 
conclusion, Moltmann opens up an analogy by which he states that nature itself 
participates in the resurrection of Christ through a transition by which creation will be 
transformed and reborn into a new creation. 
The transition of Christ through resurrection has cosmic consequences for all 
of creation in that the raised body of Jesus is a pledge for the resurrection of all matter 
and its transformation through resurrection into a new form of existence. Neither 
Mackintosh nor Brunner approach this line of thinking regarding the connection 
between Christ's resurrection and the transformation of creation. The bodily 
resurrection of Jesus signifies the goodness of all physical life, human and non-
human, and just as Christ's body was healed through resurrection, so also will creation 
be healed. The resurrection of Christ is a promise that all created life will be 
resurrected, i.e. transformed in the kingdom of God. 




Throughout this thesis, I have attempted to analyze a redefInition of time in its 
relationship to eternity in twentieth century eschatology. First, I sought to show why I 
believe a dynamic/tensed view of reality is preferable over a static/tenseless view. 
Philosophers, theologians, and scientists have engaged in much dialogue over the last 
one hundred years about which interpretation is a more apt description of reality, and 
I have claimed that the dynamic view is better. This preference is based on our 
inability to eliminate tense from our experiences of temporal life and our descriptions 
of it. By choosing in favor of a dynamic view of time and reality, I have stated my 
belief that all experiences are best understood through the categories of tense: past, 
present, and future. We cannot avoid using tense to describe the world because the 
world, i.e. reality, is itself tensed. 
N either can we avoid using tense when speaking of God because God's own 
eternal life is dynamic. We have examined the classical argument for a timeless God 
and found it to be wanting because it negates change and becoming in the relationship 
between God and temporal creation and creatures. To say that God is timeless, as we 
have seen is the claim of classical theology, is to rob God of the ability and desire to 
engage people and to act graciously toward them. A static, timeless God is immutable 
and impassable, among other things, because he is incapable of changing even toward 
that which he loves. Indeed, the nature of God's love itself is called into question if 
one stridently maintains that God is timeless. I have attempted to show, through the 
work of Mackintosh, Brunner, and Moltmann, that a redefInition of God's eternity has 
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taken place within contemporary theology that allows for the claim that in his eternity, 
God's life includes change, becoming, and passion in his relationship with creation 
and with human creatures in particular. 
God's dynamic, changing eternal life has been especially visible when we look 
closely at the events of incarnation, crucifixion, and resurrection and see them as 
eschatological events that incorporate aspects of both time and eternity. The life, 
death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ must be examined as eschatological events 
because they are dependent upon a dynamic view of temporality, yet they are equally 
dependent upon the larger eschatological backdrop of God's purposes for humanity 
along with all of creation. The incarnation was an historical event which our three 
theologians, despite sometimes speaking in contradictory terms, describe as the 
uniting of time and eternity. They share a mutual dissatisfaction with the early 
church's two-natures theory of incarnation, yet they recognize that the early church 
was struggling to fmd adequate ways to unite two radically different entities: 
humanity and divinity. We would now add that part of this difficulty centers on the 
time-eternity relationship and the early church's assumption of the incompatibility of 
the two. What we see, with a dynamic view of both time and eternity, is that the two 
are not nearly so incompatible as early church history would have us believe. In fact, 
part of the redefinition of time within the twentieth century has relied on the fact that 
the incarnation reveals eternity as the ground of time and inclusive of it. In his 
eternity, God is capable of experiencing the temporality of creation, and he does so 
through the Son's incarnation. To see God's interaction with creatures within 
temporality through the incarnation is to connect God to history in important ways. 
We see God as the Lord of history who redeems it from within creation. Weare then 
permitted to see how time itself is part of creation and God's resolve and power to call 
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into being things that are not. Time is an element of creation, disposable in the hands 
of God who can use the events of time to bring reconciliation about between God and 
humanity. 
The crucifixion, likewise, must be seen through eschatological lenses if it is to 
be understood correctly. It is this event, more than any other, which allows our three 
theologians to disregard the classical definition of God's impassability. Contrary to 
being dispassionately unaffected by human sin, suffering, and death, God experiences 
all of these through the cross of Christ. The cross is God's way of taking up and 
experiencing the suffering that is part of human life. This suffering is due partly to 
the transience of life that all human's experience, but more than transience, suffering 
is caused by sin and injustice. The human experience of time is one that inevitably 
ends in death. Along the way toward death, while there are good things and occasions 
to be joyful about, our experience of time is such that it causes regret and fear in 
relation to the past and future. More than regret and fear, our experience of time is 
one of alienation from God, which for some is the godforsakenness of injustice and 
tragedy. The cross is God's way of experiencing these temporal events in order to 
redeem us from our temporal alienation from God through sin and suffering. 
The resurrection of Jesus is the event which straddles the "boundary" between 
time and eternity. It is an event that our theologians categorize as both temporal and 
atemporal. It is historical in the sense that it happened just as other events do, and 
therefore it belongs to time and space like everything else in history. It is non-
historical in the sense that Jesus is a different person after his resurrection. The 
resurrection is the first event - the dawn -- of the new, eschatological age of God's 
kingdom. God promised that his kingdom would come, and the resurrection is the 
fITst event of the fulfillment of that promise. That there is an outstanding future due 
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to the final fulfillment of that promise is common to each of our theologians. There is 
an event in the future that we wait upon - the coming of Christ - and it will be the 
completion of the process of redemption that was begun at the resurrection. 
As a result of our analysis, we have seen that the eternal God's relationship to 
time is not that of negation or opposition. Rather, God's eternity is the ground of 
time, and God includes time within his eternity. God's eternity incorporates time in 
order to give time its dynamic nature as creation relates to its creator. God is 
personal, and God is personally involved in creating and sustaining all reality. There 
is a teleological goal for all reality. While Mackintosh and Brunner grant a more 
positive interpretation to history as it moves toward its goal, Moltmann maintains that 
history's goal is completely outside of time and is incapable of being produced by it. 
For Moltmann, the coming of God is what will transform all that is historical in what 
shall be eternal. 
The result of this redefinition of time has allowed us to alter our doctrine of 
God from that of classical theology. In the traditional approach, God's eternity was 
synonymous with immutability and impassability, and this approach is discounted by 
our three theologians. They maintain that the God revealed in Jesus Christ is not only 
capable of change, but that he is also passionately and intimately involved in the lives 
of his people and with all creation. God, therefore, because he is personal, 
incorporates change and time within his eternal being. 
The concepts of time and eternity that we have been examining are ultimately 
related to the prospect of hope that Christians have for the eschatological future. By 
asking so many questions about time's relationship to eternity, Mackintosh, Brunner, 
and Moltmann establish themselves as theologians of hope. They have hope for the 
future of humanity and all creation on account of God and not because humanity will 
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save itself through an evolutionary process leading to perfection. Hope comes from 
the eternal God who has intervened in time in a most powerful way: by making 
himself subject to time and its finitude. In this way, time has been redefmed in 
Reformed eschatology through the hope-filled eschatologies of Mackintosh, Brunner, 
and Moltmann. 
To conclude my analysis of time and eternity, I would like to propose one line 
of exploration that I believe has great potential for adding to our understanding of the 
time-eternity relationship. This line is important because it speaks to many of the 
issues and doctrines that I have been examining in this dissertation. I believe also that 
it provides a way of continuing the hopefulness espoused by Mackintosh, Brunner, 
and Moltmann in their respective presentations of eschatology, time, and eternity. 
Every era possesses its Zeitgeist which threatens to undermine faith and hope 
in God's future. Challenges to Christian eschatological hope emerge on an academic 
level from all quarters of the human sciences and philosophy. In dangerous ways, 
nihilistic, selfish, and exploitative approaches to life challenge eschatological hope in 
our increasingly global economy and society. Theology must deliberately 
demonstrate how Christian hope offers an alternative to all pessimistic approaches 
toward the future of humanity and all creation. As the "century of eschatology" has 
given way to a new century, what can we anticipate as strong challenges to Christian 
hope, and in what ways may we maintain hope as the time-eternity relationship is 
pushed into new frontiers of thought and inquiry? 
All three of our representative theologians believe that Christian hope is the 
only answer to the vexing problems of their respective generations, and they are each 
well-versed in the challenges to hope in their contemporary generations. Mackintosh 
wrote in an era when faith in human spiritual, intellectual, and technological progress 
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was mowed down by machine guns in battle. Challenges to God's omnipotence and 
eschatological purposes manifested themselves in doubts about God's ability to 
influence history toward God's kingdom. The Zeitgeist of Brunner's day was the rise 
of totalitarianism and oppression that swept across the political landscape in which he 
lived, and further doubts were cast upon God's loving intent for creation and 
humanity. Moltmann's generation inherited from Brunner's a world of potential 
nuclear catastrophe and a world where there is an alarming concentration of wealth in 
the northern hemisphere as opposed to the poverty of the southern. Our three 
theologians proved successful in rising to the need of speaking theologically about 
hope for the future of the world when there are great causes for despair in the present. 
What remains to be seen is the legacy of these three theologians as their shared 
eschatological emphases, as well as their disagreements, lead us as we take account of 
the spirit of the new century. What is the spirit of the age of the current generation, 
and how should contemporary eschatological doctrine resonate, critique, and 
challenge it in a faithful way? First of all, some things have not changed from the last 
century to this one, and the work of our three representative theologians is just as 
important in this day as in theirs. Their refusal to separate eschatology from ethics is 
just as important today as it has always been. There are still raging political and 
economic injustices that each so carefully addresses, and genuine eschatological hope 
should never shun the harsh realities of this life in favor of a better life in the future. 
We have seen in all three theologians an emphasis on ethics that will not allow 
eschatology to focus on "other-worldly" matters while ignoring the plight of those 
people who suffer in this world. The need for Christian hope to deal squarely with 
human sin will never change, and likewise Christian hope is truly eschatological when 
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it displays a faithful trust in Christ's fmal redemption of creation, especially for those 
who are the victims of history. 
There is, however, another spirit of our age in this new millennium that holds 
great potential and danger for Christian interpretations of time and eternity. It is a 
prevailing attitude that is actually centuries old, yet it has reached an unprecedented 
magnitude in recent years. I am speaking of the belief that the world, human beings, 
and all reality can be explained and should be understood only from the observations 
of the empirical sciences. For hundreds of years there has been a perceptible breach 
between the cosmic world-view of faith and that of science, a break which is traceable 
to Enlightenment-era thinking in the seventeenth century. The ensuing scientific 
revolution initiated by them caused the gap to grow between the scientific and 
religious views of reality. 1 The divergent views of nature, human origins, life, and 
cosmology have continued from the seventeenth century until now, and the prevailing 
sense in our day and age is that science has won.2 
By saying that science has "won," what I mean is that in our modem world 
people believe that the pre-modem view of reality contained the Bible is no longer 
acceptable A modem picture of reality is too "advanced" to believe that scripture 
contains anything more than mythology and moral lessons. An allegedly scientific 
view of reality cannot trust biblical history as the locus of revelation of the living God 
and God's purposes for creation. People now tum to scientific explanations of reality 
rather than theological ones, and people are more eager than ever to believe in the 
1 Ian G. Barbour traces the development of this split in Religion and Science: Historical and 
Contemporary Issues (London: SCM Press, 1998),4-72. . .. 
2 This opinion is based not only on the claims of those who are hostIle to .~~liglOn but also on the 
admission of theologians themselves. See Barbour, Religion and Science, xm; Peackocke, Theology 
for a Scientific Age: Being and Becoming -- Natural, Divine, and Human (London: SCM Press, 1990), 
1-23. 
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progress of technology to offer salvation as opposed to the message of the Christian 
Gospel. Barbour states the case that 
since . the Enlightenment, the Christian story has had a diminishing 
effectIveness for many people, partly because it has seemed 
inconsistent with the understanding of the world of modem 
science ... Much of humanity has turned to science-based technology as 
a source of fulfillment and hope. Technology has offered power, 
control, and the prospect of overcoming our helplessness and 
dependency. 3 
The credibility of religious beliefs has been called into question as more and more 
scientific discoveries offer explanations for phenomena once thought to be mysterious 
or miraculous. The positive benefits accrued by scientific and technological advances 
are coupled with a view that science provides fmal explanations of reality over against 
the explanations of pre-modem cosmologies. 
The popular perception is that science has discredited religion and has 
replaced faith and theology as the means through which people make sense of their 
lives and all reality. While this process of science's perceived triumph over theology 
has been taking place and increasing for many years, it reached a peak in the latter 
years of the twentieth century to the point where it is the dominant world-view today.4 
Faith in God has given way to faith in science to explain life's mysteries, and trust in 
God's providence has been replaced by a trust in technology'S ability to solve 
humanity's problems. No one should lament technological advances that promote 
health and make life better, and positive scientific advances as such should not be 
disparaged. Yet the Truth of faith has been lost with our modem world's sacrifice of 
3 Barbour, Religion and Science, xiv. . 
4 Russell Stannard says: "It is commonly held that religion is something you grow out of; that when It 
comes to the big questions of life -- those to do with meaning and purpose, and where we hum~s fit 
into the overall picture -- we should be looking not to religion, as was done in the p~t, but to s~Ience. 
Though people still retain a sense of awe and wonder when con~onted by the mystenes .of the"umverse, 
the sense of worship to which this sometimes leads has been displaced from God to SCIence. Russell 
Stannard, Science and Wond~rs: Conversations about Science and Belief (London: Faber and Faber, 
1996), xiii-xiv. 
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theology on the altar of science. This is the Zeitgeist of our modem world in which 
Christians now live and which theology must address. 
Is there a way for eschatology to state its case for trust and faith in God's 
eternal kingdom, while being fully cognizant at the same time of the dominating 
position of science in the contemporary world? How should Christian doctrine build 
upon the gains of the century of eschatology and proclaim the hope of Christianity in 
a way that does not compromise the essentials of eschatology and appears plausible to 
the contemporary scientific world-view? I believe there is a way for eschatology to 
proceed, and this way grows out of the fruitful dialogue that has occurred between 
science and theology in the last two decades.5 This dialogue has been especially 
productive in closing the perceived gap between theology and science, showing that 
the two fields are not as disparate as popular opinion would suggest. 
While a scientific world-view may dominate, there is too much interplay 
between Christian doctrine and scientific principles to say that one automatically 
excludes the other. In fact, the opposite is true, as these recent conversations between 
the two fields have proven. Science and theology can be integrated in such a way that 
demonstrates that the fields are not mutually exclusive but complementary. And, 
more important and relevant for this particular project, there is a way that eschatology 
and science can be integrated in regard to the topics of time and eternity. These may 
be addressed in such a way as to make genuine Christian hope available to those who 
wrongly perceive that science has made hope in God's kingdom either unconvincing 
or impossible. The way in which eschatological hope speaks to the spirit of our 
5 The last two decades have seen a flurry of activity in the area of dialogue between science and 
theology. In addition to the ones previously mentioned, other texts include: Nancey Murphy, Anglo-
American Postmodernity: Philosophical Perspectives on Science, Religion, and Et~ics (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1997).; Philip Clayton, God and Contemporary Science (Grand RapIds: Eerdmans, 
1997).; John Polkinghome, Science and Christian Belief Theological Reflections of a Bottom-Up 
Thinker, The Gifford Lectures 1993-1994 (London: SPCK Press, 1994). 
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scientific age is through the category of supervenience. God's eternal kingdom is 
supervenient to all dynamic reality, and through this relationship we may describe 
how God offers hope for modem men and women. 
Supervenience is a concept that has come to the fore in both philosophy and 
science in the last decade.
6 
Adapted from the field of philosophy of the mind, 
supervenience has proven to be an immensely helpful category in the theology-
science dialogue because it provides a conceptual model to explain God's means of 
interaction with the world. Supervenience, when applied to the human person and the 
mind, expresses the principle of how non-physical, mental events and the physical 
brain function in tandem. Mental events are caused by the brain's functioning, yet 
mental events cannot be reduced strictly to phenomena of the brain: a mental event is 
larger than the physical phenomena which constitute it. There is a hierarchy of 
complex systems within the human person because the physical functions contribute 
to mental events, yet the mind is more than the mere functioning of the brain. Ellis 
and Murphy explain that 
a mental event is supervenient on a state of the brain .... To ascribe 
mental properties to an individual is to describe, at a higher level of 
complexity, properties that could also be partially described (in theory, 
at least, if not in practice) at the level of neurophysiology. Second, 
however, the mental properties cannot be simply identical with the 
brain states. The mental property's greater complexity consists in its 
relation to environmental variables that cannot themselves be reduced 
b 
. 7 
to raIn events. 
Living beings are, therefore, hierarchical systems in which more complex phenomena 
supervene on lower, subvenient causes. This concept of supervenience has been 
6 See especially Jaegwon Kim, Supervenience and Mind: Selected Philosophical Essays (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1993); E. Savellos and U. Yalcin, eds., Supen:enience: New Essays 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Dennis Bielfeldt, "Supervemence as a Strategy of 
Relating Physical and Theological Properties," in Studies in Science and Theology 5 (1999): 163-176.; 
Beilfeldt, "The Peril and Promise of Supervenience," in The Human Person in Science and Theology 
(Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 2000), 117-152. 
7 Ellis and Murphy, On the Moral Nature o/the Universe, 32-33. 
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expanded from the philosophy of the mind to demonstrate how different properties 
within a physical system act upon each other. Higher level entities act upon 
subvenient, lower level properties because they are constituted by them but may not 
be reduced solely to them alone. 
Supervenience thus gives rise to the principle of "top-down" causation, which 
explains how more complex entities in a hierarchical system act upon the less 
complex events which constitute them. The actions of lower level properties cannot 
be predicted by looking at them alone. One must observe their place within the larger 
system, and the whole system partially determines how the lower level entities will 
act. 8 Based on this understanding of increasingly complex levels which interact in a 
hierarchical system, theologians see a model of how God interacts with creation. In a 
holistic way, God acts in a "top-down" manner toward the creation God has made. 
Mackintosh states this principle theologically when he states that Christians trust that 
the "meshwork of cosmic energies is the instrument of a loving Will not confined by 
their limits or exhausted by their efforts, but capable of using them for sovereign and 
gracious ends.,,9 Reality, as Mackintosh sees it, is this complex "meshwork" at the 
disposal of God, which today's scientific theology describes through supervenience. 
Brunner and Moltmann propose a kenotic concept regarding creation in which 
God willingly limits himself in order to make creation possible. As Moltmann 
suggests, God, in the primordial moment, restricted his omnipresence in order to grant 
space to creation. Without some form of self-limitation on God's part, creation could 
not exist. Therefore, all reality exists in the space that God has allowed that is 
different from God's own being. This kenoticism is what inspires scientifically-
minded theologians like Arthur Peacocke to propose that creation exists in the space 
8 Ellis and Murphy, On the Moral Nature of the Universe, 24. 
9 Mackintosh, Person of Jesus Christ, 435. 
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that God has created for its independent existence. Therefore all reality, including its 
temporality, is composed of complex hierarchical systems that God supervenes upon 
with top-down causality. 
Yet we must remember here a point that is crucial to all three theologians: the 
distinction between the Creator and creation. Mackintosh very deliberately 
contradicts the Hegelian idea that creation and God are basically synonymous, and he 
sees a terrible philosophical mistake in his day that confuses creation with God in a 
pantheistic manner. A supervenient view of God and creation does not assert that 
creation comprises God, although creation is dependent upon God and God 
determines creation. IO Therefore the world should not be understood as God's body, 
as has been suggested by some. 1 1 Supervenience allows for distinction and 
difference, even if one level in a system is dependent upon a higher level for its 
direction. 12 
Following Moltmann's lead we see that creation exists panentheistically within 
in the space God allows for creation's existence.13 Everything exists in the separate 
space God allows for creation, but God is not pantheistically within all created matter. 
Current theological cosmology proposes that God interacts with creation in a top-
down manner that does not compromise the integrity of nature's operating laws 
observed by science. Yet God supervenes on reality to bring about goals and results 
that are consonant with the divine will. Peacocke describes supervenience and God's 
top-down causation in the following manner: 
10 Thomas Torrance speaks of this in a way with his idea of the "contingent order" of creation that 
exists in dependence upon God. See his work Divine and Contingent Order (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1981). 
11 This suggestion has been made by ecofeminist theology, especially in the work of Sallie McFague, 
Models of God: Theology for an Ecological Age (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1987),69-87. 
12 Bielfeldt, "The Promise and Peril of Supervenience," 131. 
13 Peacocke, Theology for a Scientific Age, 158-161; See also Polkinghome for a brief critique, Science 
and Christian Belief(London: SPCK Press, 1994),64-66. 
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A combination of the notion of top-down causation from the 
integrated, unitive mindlbrain state to human bodily action with the 
recognition of the unity of the human mindlbrainlhody event together 
provide a fruitful clue or model for illuminating how we might think of 
God's interaction with the world. According to this suggestion the in-
principle cognizable aspects of the state of the world as a whole (all-
that-is) would be known only to God and would be the field of exercise 
of God's influence at God's own level of comprehension. Just as our 
human personal subjectivity (the sense of being an "I") is a unitive, 
unifying, centered influence on the conscious, willed activity of our 
bodies, and this is what characterizes personal agency, so God is here 
conceived as a unifying, unitive source and centered influence on the 
world's activity. We are exploring here the notion that the succession 
of the states of the system of the world-as-a-whole is also a succession 
in the thought of God, who is present to it all; and that this is a model 
for, as analogous to, the way, it has to be presumed, a succession of 
brain states constitutes the succession of our thoughts. In this model, 
God would be regarded as exerting continuously top-down causative 
influences on the world-as-a-whole in a way analogous to that whereby 
we in our thinking can exert effects on our bodies in a "top-down" 
manner. 14 
Through this concept of supervenience, the eternal God who is above, outside, and 
around time allows creation to operate in a freedom that is apart from God, yet God 
communicates his intentions within the complex levels of creation's operating 
systems. 
The tum toward eschatology and supervenience may be made keeping in mind 
the work of our three theologians, who each affirm that God is acting upon the world 
to bring about its fulfillment in his kingdom. I propose that supervenience provides 
the method of understanding how God acts upon the world to fulfill his promises 
without violating the laws of creation that the modem preference for science deems 
coherent and inviolable. Supervenience may be applied to address the primary area of 
eschatology that we have examined in this thesis: time and eternity. I am not 
proposing another attempt at scientific eschatology -- the way in which the world will 
14 Peacocke, Theology for a Scientific Age, 161. 
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end. 15 I agree with Brunner in his assertion that the physical processes by which the 
world may end, for example in a "big crunch," do not, ultimately, negate the 
establishing of God's new creation. Rather, I am attempting to show that the concept 
of supervenience is a helpful model to demonstrate how we may view the relation of 
God's eternity to time in such a way as to maintain the hopeful belief that creation has 
an eschatological origin and goal in the glory of God. 
Eternity Supervenes on Time 
We have seen that twentieth century eschatology reshaped the understanding 
of time and eternity in that eternity is now understood to be a description of God's 
being which incorporates time. Eternity is descriptive of the quality of God's life 
rather than God's timelessness. For human beings, temporal life is marked by 
transience, change, and death, while eternal life characterizes living in the fullness of 
God's presence. As a result of faith, eternal life has begun now for human beings in a 
provisional way. We have also seen how the resurrection of Jesus was an 
eschatological event that ushered in the new eschatological eon for creation. The 
process of creation's transition from temporality to eternity began at the resurrection 
and will be completed at the consummation. 
For this reason, I believe that a better description for creation's existence in the 
present is Moltmann's term "the interlacing of the times" rather than "between the 
times." "Between the times" captures the notion that the world still exists 
dynamically after one event and before another, i.e. after the resurrection and before 
the consummation. This is where Moltmann stands with his view of the future of 
15 There have been numerous attempts to describe the end of the world scientifically. For example, 
Paul Davies, The Last Three Minutes (London: Phoenix, 1994). 
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Christ's advent, hence his future-oriented eschatology. In a sense Moltmann is right: 
history and humanity still await their ultimate redemption in Christ's final revelation 
of God's kingdom. Yet what this view lacks is a proper emphasis on the way in which 
God's eternal kingdom exists now in relation to creation. I propose that time and 
eternity interlace in a way that supervenience can best describe. 
As a result of Christ's resurrection and the new, eschatological age ushered in 
by it, we may say that the eternity of God supervenes on temporal reality. We have 
seen how important the human experience of time is to our theologian's understanding 
of the relation between time and eternity. On the one hand, human beings experience 
time in the linear, unidirectional movement captured by the tenses of past, present, 
, 
and future. Peacocke comes to the same conclusion from a scientific point-of-view by 
stating that the "thermodynamic arrow of time" is necessary in the processes of life 
and that "the direction of time in which our lives move, from birth to death, is the 
same on the cosmic scale as that in which physical and biological forms develop.,,16 
In the creation of time, God instituted this single direction of the flow of time. Yet we 
have also seen that human beings experience time in a way that suspends this flow by 
allowing access to the past and future in the present. Natural processes are 
irreversible, but psychological processes allow for a transcendent simultaneity within 
human experience. This simultaneity is reflective of God's own experience of 
eternity, in which the Christian is invited to participate through faith. 
Brunner's accent on duree reele and Moltmann's eschatological moments of 
aeonic time express this concept of a person's participation in God's eternal 
simultaneity. All human experiences of eternity are relative to God's, however, and 
thus we see how eternity supervenes on time. The "time" of a person's life is actually 
16 Peacocke, Theology for a Scientific Age, 32. 
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that person's whole history of being -- all the individual moments that make up the 
totality of a person's life. Yet this totality of moments is a unified whole in one's 
eternal life given by God. All the moments of my life will in eternity be a 
simultaneous moment without the distinctions of past and future. Further, the 
eschatological moments of eternity in this life, as described especially by Moltmann, 
are actually the supervenience of God's eternity on my subvenient temporality. 
The interlacing of time and eternity comes to the foreground here when one 
considers both the one-dimensional and simultaneous experiences of time. The 
resurrection is the event by which God has introduced simultaneity into the Christian 
experience of time. Christians live within creation's temporality and God's eternity, 
but God's eternity takes precedence over human temporality. God's eternity 
supervenes on a human's temporality to give it structure, to provide it direction, and to 
bring it to a hopeful conclusion. 
A supervenient approach to history is possible considering the affirmations 
that all three theologians give to the necessity of historical events for the redemption 
of humanity. As we have observed, our theologians stress both the immanence of 
God within history as well as God's transcendence over history. Supervenience relies 
on a carefully crafted argument to express how God may work within creation 
without violating its natural laws. In the terminology of scientific theology, God acts 
on both micro-levels in sustaining creation and macro-levels in redeeming it.
I7 
In this 
way, we meet our theologians' insistence that humanity must be redeemed from 
within history by the specific, immanent acts of God. 
17 Murphy, "Divine Action in the Natural Order: Buridian's Ass and Schrodinger's Cat," in Chaos and 
Complexity: Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action, ed. Nancey Murphy, Robert 1. Russell, and 
Arthur Peacocke (The Vatican: The Vatican Observatory Foundation, 1997). 
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With supervenience in mind, we may say that God acts upon creation from in 
a "top-down" manner through the incarnation, and God acts from within creation 
through the life of the incarnated Son. The incarnation, life, and death of Jesus are the 
primary means by which God redeems humanity from sin and creation from evil. 
Moltmann stresses the ongoing history of Jesus as the means of human salvation and 
hope, and in this way the eschatological history of Jesus is therefore supervenient to 
the earthly history of Jesus. Jesus' ministry is yet to be completed because creation 
still waits for his final manifestation in glory. The Son's eschatological history cannot 
be reduced to his earthly ministry, yet it is the earthly ministry that constitutes his 
eschatological history without being limited to it. 
One of the fundamental aspects of supervenience regarding the humanity is 
that it negates the idea ofbody/soul dualism regarding the anthropological make-up of 
a personality. Scientifically-minded theologians draw upon supervenience to assert 
that mental processes are dependent upon physical stimuli and chemical reactions, yet 
mental states cannot be reduced to their physical causation. Using this supervenient 
approach we may speak of the resurrection of the body in such a way as to state how 
the resurrected body supervenes on the earthly body. In the interlacing of eternity and 
temporality, I am joined to Christ's resurrected body through faith and the Spirit, and 
the power of his resurrection is alive in my mortal body. In this way my personality, 
body and soul together, shares in Christ's resurrection, and resurrection life is present 
in me. My resurrected body supervenes on my mortal body in such a way that I can 
experience resurrected life here and now. All three of our theologians express the 
view that the resurrection of the dead signifies the transformation of the human person 
from one bodily existence to another. My mortal body constitutes my resurrected 
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body, yet my resurrected body exists on a plane higher than the physical body and 
cannot be reduced to it. 
Since a supervenient analysis of any system assumes that lower level systems 
are constituents of higher level entities, and these higher level entities act upon the 
lower to influence them in a certain direction, we may take this idea a step further to 
say that God supervenes on creation in order to move it providentially toward its 
consummation in the kingdom of GOd. I8 Faith in a teleologically-guided creation is 
found, to one degree or another, all three theologians' views on the eschatological goal 
of creation. The kingdom of God is the highest order toward which God is moving 
creation. To say that the kingdom of God supervenes on creation is to affirm that the 
kingdom is comprised of the current creation -- its life and relationships. This 
harmonizes with Moltmann's views on the relation between the current creation and 
the new eschatological creation that God is bringing about. 
The new creation was begun by the resurrection of Jesus, and his resurrection 
life signals what life will be like in the kingdom of God. The new creation is 
supervenient to the old creation through resurrection because, as Moltmann and 
Brunner affirm, the new creation will emerge out of the old. In God's kingdom 
creation will not be destroyed but will be transformed. Thus, the old creation is a 
lower-level system that both constitutes and is acted upon from without by the new 
creation, a higher level entity of God's causation. The new creation cannot be reduced 
to the old creation, yet the new creation is dependent upon the old creation for its 
content and relationships. 
This preliminary excursion into the concept of supervenience is meant to 
provide one possible direction for the future of eschatological dialogue. Describing 
18 Moltmann offers a brief "experiment," as he calls it, in this direction in "Reflections .on Chaos and 
God's Interaction with the World From a Trinitarian Perspective," in Chaos and Complexity, 208-210. 
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the relationship of God's kingdom, and all it entails, to the present creation requires 
various methods, such as that of the supervenientlsubvenient relationship. There is 
more work to be done in this area to ascertain the benefits of interpreting concepts 
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